Saturday, July 26, 2008

Bunglers And Botchers



The new government of Zardari et al, if it is still new and if he still has anyone left with him, once again has succeeded in breaking its own previously set records of bunglings and botches. It hastily issued and promptly retracted, in record time, what may amount to be its worse gaffe yet. Two statements - one by Zardari himself, and the other by Press Information Department - accompanied the issuance and the retraction of orders, respectively.

The Prime Minister and Rehman Malik, the new beneficiary of the orders, had their heads in the air, literally, when the orders were issued. They both were flying over the Atlantic on their way to Washington. Zardari was in Dubai from where he issued a statement making it amply clear who was behind this goof up.

This is how the whole fiasco transpired.

First, the Cabinet Division issued a formal notification - a Memorandum - on Saturday saying that the all-powerful Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) - had been administratively, financially and operationally removed from the hands of Defence Ministry and given in the clutched of Rehman Malik's Interior Ministry, as per Rule 3 if the Constitution 1973. Intelligence Bureau (IB)was thrown in the deal for good measure.

This notification was followed by a Zardari statement, from his desert den, claiming "that the decision to place the ISI under the Interior Ministry is a step towards the civilian rule and also to save the Army from controversies and a bad name", he told the News. He further said that after this "historic decision" nobody would be able to "say that this agency is not under the control of an elected government as the Interior Ministry will be responsible for responding to the allegations against the ISI."

Then came the statement from the Press Information Department (PID) in an effort to retrieve the government's foot from its mouth. It said that "the notification regarding Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) has been misunderstood." By who? The statement did not clarify. The PID statement further said "the ISI would remain under prime minister"....And "more details in this regard will be given in a detailed notification."

Which means another notification is on its way. A detailed one!

How America Turned Afghanistan into a Narco-State?

In the Magazine section of the New York Times, on July 27, 2008, Thomas Schweich, a senior counternarcotics official for two years - deputy at the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs under Anne Patterson, then assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law-enforcement affairs - writes that he discovered that "the Afghan government was deeply involved in protecting the opium trade" and that many of Karzai's supporters including Sher Muhammad Akhundzada, a former member of Afghanistan’s Parliament and ex-governor of the heroin capital of the world — Helmand Province — "finance themselves from the drug trade" and "senior Afghan officials were deeply involved in the narcotics trade." NATO allies and America's own Defense Department have also "resisted the anti-opium offensive." In the fall of 2005 "Afghan farmers had planted almost 60 percent more poppy than the year before, for a total of 165,000 hectares (637 square miles). The 2006 harvest would be the biggest narco-crop in history".

In January 2007, Karzai appointed a convicted heroin dealer, Izzatulla Wasifi, to head his anticorruption commission. Karzai also appointed several corrupt local police chiefs. There were numerous diplomatic reports that his brother Ahmed Wali, who was running half of Kandahar, was involved in the drug trade.
Thomas Schweich went to the White House in the first quarter of 2006 to brief Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Condy Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and others on the expanding opium problem and proposed a policy consisting of "public education about the evils of heroin and the illegality of cultivating poppies; alternative crops; eradication of poppy fields; interdiction of drug shipments and arrest of traffickers; and improvements to the judicial system." But Karzai "opposed "quick, fair and efficient " aerial eradication" in favor of "inefficient, costly, dangerous and more subject to corrupt dealings among local officials" ground-based eradication in which tractors and weed-whackers were used to destroy the poppy fields.

"Even before she got to the bureau of international narcotics, Anne Patterson knew that the Pentagon was hostile to the antidrug mission" writes Thomas Schweich, "A couple of weeks into the job", she was told by Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, who commanded all U.S. forces in Afghanistan that "drugs were not a priority of the U.S. military in Afghanistan" because of Pentagon's strategy of “sequencing” — defeat the Taliban, then have someone else clean up the drug business."

The Pentagon had promised the Drug Enforcement Administration Mi-17 helicopters and other equipment necessary for the training of the counternarcotics police of Afghanistan but its agents in Afghanistan "had seemingly unending difficulties" receiving them. "The Pentagon had reneged on a deal to allow the D.E.A. the use of precious ramp space at the Kabul airport" too. "Consequently, the effort to interdict drug shipments and arrest traffickers had stalled. Less than 1 percent of the opium produced in Afghanistan was being seized there. The effort became even more complicated later in 2006, when Benjamin Freakley, the two-star U.S. general who ran the eastern front, shut down all operations by the D.E.A. and Afghan counternarcotics police in Nangarhar — a key heroin-trafficking province. The general said that antidrug operations were an unnecessary obstacle to his military operations".

"The Afghan anti-narcotics court" system set up by the Department of Justice was so corrupt that "dozens of reports" were received that "in the rare cases in which drug traffickers were convicted, they often walked in the front door of a prison, paid a bribe and walked out the back door." The Pentagon-trained Afghan Army was so poorly trained that it used German-and-American-trained Afghan Police "to fill holes in the army mission" and "thrust" it "into a military role" and left them to lose "their lives trying to hold territory in dangerous areas."

As big as these challenges were, there were even bigger ones. "A lot of intelligence", write Schweich, "indicated that senior Afghan officials were deeply involved in the narcotics trade. Narco-traffickers were buying off hundreds of police chiefs, judges and other officials. Narco-corruption went to the top of the Afghan government. The attorney general, Abdul Jabbar Sabit, a fiery Pashtun who had begun a self-described “jihad against corruption,” told me and other American officials that he had a list of more than 20 senior Afghan officials who were deeply corrupt — some tied to the narcotics trade. He added that President Karzai — also a Pashtun — had directed him, for political reasons, not to prosecute any of these people. (On July 16 of this year, Karzai dismissed Sabit after Sabit announced his candidacy for president. Karzai’s office said Sabit’s candidacy violated laws against political activity by officials...”)

Americans and Afghans were not the only ones who opposed antinarcotic efforts. "The British military were even more hostile to the antidrug mission than the U.S. military" says Schweich. "British forces — centered in Helmand — actually issued leaflets and bought radio advertisements telling the local criminals that the British military was not part of the anti-poppy effort."

The result: By late 2006 poppy cultivation was increasingly concentrated and was becoming limited to the south of the country, where the Taliban insurgency was and remains the strongest and the Taliban are financing the insurgency there with drug money. In 2007, "the United States released photos of industrial-size poppy farms — many owned by pro-government opportunists, others owned by Taliban sympathizers. Most of these narco-farms were near major southern cities. Farmers were digging wells, surveying new land for poppy cultivation, diverting U.S.-built irrigation canals to poppy fields and starting expensive reclamation projects." Schweich says claims that "at a lunch in Brussels in September 2006 attended by Habibullah Qaderi, who was then Afghanistan’s minister for counternarcotics. He gave a speech in which he said that poor Afghan farmers have no choice but to grow poppies, and asked for more money. A top European diplomat challenged him, holding up a U.N. map showing the recent trend: poppy growth decreasing in the poorest areas and growing in the wealthier areas. The minister, taken aback, simply reiterated his earlier point that Afghanistan needed more money for its destitute farmers. After the lunch, however, Qaderi approached me and whispered: “I know what you say is right. Poverty is not the main reason people are growing poppy. But this is what the president of Afghanistan tells me to tell others.”

When in July 2007, Schweich says, he breifed President Karzai on the drive for a new strategy and proposed a balance between "incentives with new disincentives" and discussed the need for "arrests of high-level traffickers and eradication of poppy fields in the wealthier areas of the Pashtun south, where Karzai had his roots and power base" Karzai "became sullen and unresponsive." Many of European countries, who had only one- or two-year legislative mandates to be in Afghanistan, "wanted to avoid any uptick in violence that would most likely result from an aggressive strategy, even if the strategy would result in long-term success. The myth gave military officers a reason to stay out of the drug war."

Schweich quotes from the Kabul Weekly editorial and the first vice president of Afghanistan, Ahmad Zia Massoud, who wrote an op-ed article in The Sunday Telegraph in London that how Afghan government is involved in drug business. The editorial said: “It is obvious that the Afghan government is more than kind to poppy growers." And Massoud wrote: “Millions of pounds have been committed in provinces including Helmand Province for irrigation projects and road building to help farmers get their produce to market. But for now this has simply made it easier for them to grow and transport opium. . . . Deep-rooted corruption . . . exists in our state institutions.”

In frustration Schweich concludes that Karzai has played Americans "like a fiddle" and "the U.S. would spend billions of dollars on infrastructure improvement; the U.S. and its allies would fight the Taliban; Karzai’s friends could get rich off the drug trade; he could blame the West for his problems; and in 2009 he would be elected to a new term."

This is how Americans turned Afghanistan into a narco-state.

Wednesday, July 16, 2008

Next Target: It Is Pakistan, Stupid!

I have been dormant for months. No time or mind for blogging. But the situation in Pakistan has deteriorated so fast in my dormant months that I feel compelled to say something about it.

How a bunch of idiots and imbeciles - those who took over as the new administration as well as those left-overs who still lurk in power centers - have behaved is so pathetic and obvious that it deosn't need any rehashing.

These so called leaders of this benighted country called Pakistan are so deep in the pathetic stupor of their own blissful ignorance and petty interests that they are quite oblivious and unmindful to the gathering storm that could very well threaten Pakistan's very existence as a country as we know it.

If one could only pay attention to the amount and nature of the ruminations churning up in the American media and think tanks it would not be difficult to to fathom what could be simmering behind the closed doors of the White House and the Pentagon as the policy makers in these two latter places take their cues from two former sources.

To have a glimpse of what the Dark Vaders of American Empire could be brewing for Pakistan and in which way things are heading for Pakistanis, just read the follong op-ed piece that appeared way back, November 18, 2007, in the New York Times: The writers of the piece are Frederick W. Kagan, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.



Pakistan’s Collapse, Our Problem

AS the government of Pakistan totters, we must face a fact: the United States simply could not stand by as a nuclear-armed Pakistan descended into the abyss. Nor would it be strategically prudent to withdraw our forces from an improving situation in Iraq to cope with a deteriorating one in Pakistan. We need to think — now — about our feasible military options in Pakistan, should it really come to that.

We do not intend to be fear mongers. Pakistan’s officer corps and ruling elites remain largely moderate and more interested in building a strong, modern state than in exporting terrorism or nuclear weapons to the highest bidder. But then again, Americans felt similarly about the shah’s regime in Iran until it was too late.

Moreover, Pakistan’s intelligence services contain enough sympathizers and supporters of the Afghan Taliban, and enough nationalists bent on seizing the disputed province of Kashmir from India, that there are grounds for real worries.

The most likely possible dangers are these: a complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum; a total loss of federal control over outlying provinces, which splinter along ethnic and tribal lines; or a struggle within the Pakistani military in which the minority sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda try to establish Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism.

All possible military initiatives to avoid those possibilities are daunting. With 160 million people, Pakistan is more than five times the size of Iraq. It would take a long time to move large numbers of American forces halfway across the world. And unless we had precise information about the location of all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials, we could not rely on bombing or using Special Forces to destroy them.

The task of stabilizing a collapsed Pakistan is beyond the means of the United States and its allies. Rule-of-thumb estimates suggest that a force of more than a million troops would be required for a country of this size. Thus, if we have any hope of success, we would have to act before a complete government collapse, and we would need the cooperation of moderate Pakistani forces.

One possible plan would be a Special Forces operation with the limited goal of preventing Pakistan’s nuclear materials and warheads from getting into the wrong hands. Given the degree to which Pakistani nationalists cherish these assets, it is unlikely the United States would get permission to destroy them. Somehow, American forces would have to team with Pakistanis to secure critical sites and possibly to move the material to a safer place.

For the United States, the safest bet would be shipping the material to someplace like New Mexico; but even pro-American Pakistanis would be unlikely to cooperate. More likely, we would have to settle for establishing a remote redoubt within Pakistan, with the nuclear technology guarded by elite Pakistani forces backed up (and watched over) by crack international troops. It is realistic to think that such a mission might be undertaken within days of a decision to act. The price for rapid action and secrecy, however, would probably be a very small international coalition.

A second, broader option would involve supporting the core of the Pakistani armed forces as they sought to hold the country together in the face of an ineffective government, seceding border regions and Al Qaeda and Taliban assassination attempts against the leadership. This would require a sizable combat force — not only from the United States, but ideally also other Western powers and moderate Muslim nations.

Even if we were not so committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western powers would need months to get the troops there. Fortunately, given the longstanding effectiveness of Pakistan’s security forces, any process of state decline probably would be gradual, giving us the time to act.

So, if we got a large number of troops into the country, what would they do? The most likely directive would be to help Pakistan’s military and security forces hold the country’s center — primarily the region around the capital, Islamabad, and the populous areas like Punjab Province to its south.

We would also have to be wary of internecine warfare within the Pakistani security forces. Pro-American moderates could well win a fight against extremist sympathizers on their own. But they might need help if splinter forces or radical Islamists took control of parts of the country containing crucial nuclear materials. The task of retaking any such regions and reclaiming custody of any nuclear weapons would be a priority for our troops.

If a holding operation in the nation’s center was successful, we would probably then seek to establish order in the parts of Pakistan where extremists operate. Beyond propping up the state, this would benefit American efforts in Afghanistan by depriving terrorists of the sanctuaries they have long enjoyed in Pakistan’s tribal and frontier regions.

The great paradox of the post-cold war world is that we are both safer, day to day, and in greater peril than before. There was a time when volatility in places like Pakistan was mostly a humanitarian worry; today it is as much a threat to our basic security as Soviet tanks once were. We must be militarily and diplomatically prepared to keep ourselves safe in such a world. Pakistan may be the next big test.

Wednesday, May 14, 2008

Barack Obama: President Apostate?

The New York Times in its May 12, 2008 issue has an Op-Ed column by Edward N. Luttwak from Chevy Chase, Md. who is a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and is the author of “Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace.”

At the end of his ravings I am pasting in this post online letters to the editor: Frank Talk About Obama and Islam.

BARACK OBAMA has emerged as a classic example of charismatic leadership — a figure upon whom others project their own hopes and desires. The resulting emotional intensity adds greatly to the more conventional strengths of the well-organized Obama campaign, and it has certainly sufficed to overcome the formidable initial advantages of Senator Hillary Clinton.

One danger of such charisma, however, is that it can evoke unrealistic hopes of what a candidate could actually accomplish in office regardless of his own personal abilities. Case in point is the oft-made claim that an Obama presidency would be welcomed by the Muslim world.

This idea often goes hand in hand with the altogether more plausible argument that Mr. Obama’s election would raise America’s esteem in Africa — indeed, he already arouses much enthusiasm in his father’s native Kenya and to a degree elsewhere on the continent.

But it is a mistake to conflate his African identity with his Muslim heritage. Senator Obama is half African by birth and Africans can understandably identify with him. In Islam, however, there is no such thing as a half-Muslim. Like all monotheistic religions, Islam is an exclusive faith.

As the son of the Muslim father, Senator Obama was born a Muslim under Muslim law as it is universally understood. It makes no difference that, as Senator Obama has written, his father said he renounced his religion. Likewise, under Muslim law based on the Koran his mother’s Christian background is irrelevant.

Of course, as most Americans understand it, Senator Obama is not a Muslim. He chose to become a Christian, and indeed has written convincingly to explain how he arrived at his choice and how important his Christian faith is to him.

His conversion, however, was a crime in Muslim eyes; it is “irtidad” or “ridda,” usually translated from the Arabic as “apostasy,” but with connotations of rebellion and treason. Indeed, it is the worst of all crimes that a Muslim can commit, worse than murder (which the victim’s family may choose to forgive).

With few exceptions, the jurists of all Sunni and Shiite schools prescribe execution for all adults who leave the faith not under duress; the recommended punishment is beheading at the hands of a cleric, although in recent years there have been both stonings and hangings. (Some may point to cases in which lesser punishments were ordered — as with some Egyptian intellectuals who have been punished for writings that were construed as apostasy — but those were really instances of supposed heresy, not explicitly declared apostasy as in Senator Obama’s case.)

It is true that the criminal codes in most Muslim countries do not mandate execution for apostasy (although a law doing exactly that is pending before Iran’s Parliament and in two Malaysian states). But as a practical matter, in very few Islamic countries do the governments have sufficient authority to resist demands for the punishment of apostates at the hands of religious authorities.

For example, in Iran in 1994 the intervention of Pope John Paul II and others won a Christian convert a last-minute reprieve, but the man was abducted and killed shortly after his release. Likewise, in 2006 in Afghanistan, a Christian convert had to be declared insane to prevent his execution, and he was still forced to flee to Italy.

Because no government is likely to allow the prosecution of a President Obama — not even those of Iran and Saudi Arabia, the only two countries where Islamic religious courts dominate over secular law — another provision of Muslim law is perhaps more relevant: it prohibits punishment for any Muslim who kills any apostate, and effectively prohibits interference with such a killing.

At the very least, that would complicate the security planning of state visits by President Obama to Muslim countries, because the very act of protecting him would be sinful for Islamic security guards. More broadly, most citizens of the Islamic world would be horrified by the fact of Senator Obama’s conversion to Christianity once it became widely known — as it would, no doubt, should he win the White House. This would compromise the ability of governments in Muslim nations to cooperate with the United States in the fight against terrorism, as well as American efforts to export democracy and human rights abroad.

That an Obama presidency would cause such complications in our dealings with the Islamic world is not likely to be a major factor with American voters, and the implication is not that it should be. But of all the well-meaning desires projected on Senator Obama, the hope that he would decisively improve relations with the world’s Muslims is the least realistic.

Frank Talk About Obama and Islam

May 14, 2008
Letters
Frank Talk About Obama and Islam
To the Editor:

Re “President Apostate?,” by Edward N. Luttwak (Op-Ed, May 12):

Middle Easterners are fascinated by American politics. The prospect that Barack Obama could be elected president inspires awe, not charges of apostasy, as Mr. Luttwak claims.

I have spent about half of the last two years in the Middle East (Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon) conducting book research. I have been struck by the profound disappointment that United States policy typically evokes among old and young, including ultra-pious and lax Muslims. These people do not see Mr. Obama as a lapsed Muslim but as a potentially empathetic American leader who grew to maturity as a Christian.

Moreover, most Muslim scholars apply the epithet “apostate” to adult conversion from Islam to another faith.

Augustus Richard Norton
Boston, May 12, 2008

The writer is a professor of anthropology and international relations at Boston University.



To the Editor:

Like the Jewish legal tradition, Islamic law is a conversation represented in dynamic and diverse schools of thought. Edward N. Luttwak speaks of an essentialized Islamic law that does not exist.

Nevertheless, there is no dispute among Muslims that Islam is not an ethnic affiliation, nor is it passed through the gene pool. A Muslim parent is morally responsible for raising his or her child within Islam; children, for their part, have no legal culpability. There is no legal obligation by a child to affiliate with the Muslim community.

Islam does not consider Barack Obama ever to have been part of the Muslim community. Apostasy has no relevance here.

Ingrid Mattson
Hartford, May 12, 2008

The writer is president of the Islamic Society of North America, the largest umbrella Muslim group in the country.



To the Editor:

As an American Muslim, I found Edward N. Luttwak’s assertion that Senator Barack Obama would be viewed as an “apostate” by the Muslim world because he doesn’t follow the religion of Islam of his nonpracticing Kenyan father as simply absurd.

Yes, some Muslims out of millions may view Mr. Obama as an apostate just as some Christians view him erroneously as a Muslim, but the fact remains that no candidate has a more colorful background, more dynamic life story and more mixed-race blood flowing in his veins than Mr. Obama.

And with an inclination to talk to his foes, Mr. Obama’s excitement in the Muslim world lies less on his vaguely having a Muslim grandfather than on the simple fact that he’s lived in the Muslim world and is not another warmongering Bush Republican.

Zainab Bello
Woodbridge, N.J., May 12, 2008



To the Editor:

People in Muslim countries are aware that Senator Barack Obama is not a Muslim, and yet he enjoys wide support in those countries. That support has nothing to do with Mr. Obama’s being a full, half or non-Muslim; it is rooted in the fact that he promises to change the kind of policies that have led to such a negative view of America by people in other countries, both Muslims and members of other faith communities.

Zaid Shakir
Berkeley, Calif., May 12, 2008

The writer is a professor of Arabic and Islamic studies at the Zaytuna Institute.



To the Editor:

Edward N. Luttwak misses the point when he says that the people’s “well-meaning” hope placed on Barack Obama that he can improve our relations with the Muslim world is a false one.

It’s not that Muslims will embrace him as one of their own and then be disappointed and even irate to find that he long ago became a Christian. It’s that to the moderate Muslim world, Senator Obama’s worldview that United States power abroad should be based on honesty, humility and force only when necessary is much more appealing than the reverse strategy, practiced in this country over the last eight years.

It’s even appealing to some of us non-Muslims right here in the States.

Daniel Frederick Levin
Brooklyn, May 12, 2008



To the Editor:

Yes, the election of Senator Barack Obama would be “welcomed by the Muslim world” — indeed in nearly all of the world — as signaling America’s rejection of President Bush’s misguided and incompetent foreign policy.

Moreover, Muslims and non-Muslims around the world are captivated by the story of a man of color running, so far successfully, for the presidency. In their eyes, an Obama victory in November would demonstrate that America is truly a land of opportunity for all.

A surge of good will would likely result, though I doubt that this possibility will sway many voters.

Kenneth M. Cuno
Urbana, Ill., May 12, 2008

The writer teaches Middle Eastern history at the University of Illinois.



To the Editor:

With reference to Barack Obama, it would be wiser to allow the global Muslim community to arrive at its own consensus as to his status, rather than follow the dire prediction of an outsider interpreting Islamic law. Mr. Obama might even serve as an inspiration for modernizers and liberals fighting their own internal battle of legal interpretations.

Stanley E. Brush
Lumberton, N.J., May 12, 2008

Sunday, May 11, 2008

Humayun's Business on Neptune Ave.



In The New York Times of May 11, 2008 has appeared an article about Brighton Beach, Brooklyn, titled "The City Visible - After Hard Pasts, a Sanctuary by the Sea" By BECKY HOLLADAY in which an acquaintance of mine, Humayun, and his wife who have a fabric business on Neptune Ave. have been mentioned with his wife and daughter's photo.

The following is the excerpt about them:

A few blocks away from the ocean, on Neptune Avenue, is a pocket of Pakistani shops, restaurants and houses, thriving once more after an exodus of Pakistanis from the city following the attack of Sept. 11.

Humayun and Kulsoom Butt, the husband-and-wife owners of Anchal Fabrics, a sari store, moved to the neighborhood in 1987. On any given night, women crowd into the tiny shop to gossip, buy presents and discuss the latest fashions from Pakistan. Single women over 30 will first be lectured on the necessity of marriage. “Your hair is turning white already, and you are still single?” Mr. Butt will say. Then they may be shown photos of Ms. Butt’s brother in Pakistan, who is looking for a wife.

One block south of Anchal Fabrics is the house owned by Maritza and Rafael Rodriguez, a five-room bungalow on Brighton Seventh Court, one of the many two-foot-wide lanes that crisscross the neighborhood’s main streets...

Thursday, March 27, 2008

US Invasion Of Pakistan?

If we can even begin to believe anything Musharraf ever says then America has already invaded Pakistan. That is what he in effect told Singapore's newspaper The Strait Times on January 11 this year. The paper reported him saying that "Musharraf, Pakistan's embattled president, warned that any unilateral intervention in his country by coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan would be treated as an invasion".

The Washington Post reported today that the United States controlled Predator aircrafts have already struck at least three times in Pakistan over the past two months (on March 16, killing about 20 in Shahnawaz Kot; on Feb. 28, killing 12 in the village of Kaloosha; and on Jan. 29, killing 13 people in North Waziristan) but the United States "has escalated its unilateral strikes" ... "in Pakistan's tribal areas, partly because of anxieties that Pakistan's new leaders will insist on scaling back military operations in that country."

A Pentagon spokeman Bryan Whitman said: "Pakistan recognizes that we fight a common enemy when it comes to terrorists."

But how is Musharraf reacting to this invasion of his country? With a "tacit understanding" and by "providing better information to guide the strikes." And he is doing it at a time when he is on his way out; his cronies have lost elections big time; and a new prime minister who has sworn in and has told US President Bush that a broader approach to the "war on terror" is necessary, including political solutions. His army chief General Ashfaq Kayani is also in cahoots with him in closing his eyes to the American invasion.

A senior American official described the strikes as a "shake the tree" strategy.

Are two senior US diplomats, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte and Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian affairs Richard Boucher, in Pakistan just to make sure that the "tree" does not "shake" too much?

President Bush called Gillani on Tuesday, and basically threatened him that "fighting extremists is in everyone's interest," according to a White House spokesman. A former State Department policy planning staffer Daniel Markey, who is now a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said the new leaders are being "pulled in opposite directions by their electorate and the Bush administration."

But Americans are not content with the Drone strikes. They "need exploitation, troops on the ground."

Musharraf is not concerned that these "strikes only encourage militants to undertake retaliatory actions in urban areas" as it has happened in Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Islamabad.

Pakistan has become "a killing field" as Nawaz Sharif has put it. Pakistan has lost hundreds of army and civilian personnels, including some generals, and innocent people. A former prime minister has been assassinated. This Mush-Bush policy has brought war of terror to Pakistan's streets.

The newspaper has quoted a tribal (Pashtu) saying: 'Kill one person, make 10 enemies". And that is what this ludicrous strategy is doing. The paper has also quoted Thomas H. Johnson, a research professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. saying: "You might take out a bad guy in one of these strikes, but you might also be creating more foot soldiers. This is a war in which the more people you kill, the faster you lose."

Is America moving to 1954 Iran situation in Pakistan? Many people are thinking on this line. Dana Priest, the Washington Post intelligence reporter, who was online todya for live discussion on national security, was asked a similar question by some one from Ogden, Utah:

The story in today's paper about us hurrying up and doing a lot of bombing in Pakistan makes me flash back to Iran in 1954, when we were worried that the democratically elected government there might not be our most vigorous ally against Communism, so we engineered an overthrow. Here we are again, worried that democratically elected people might not be as helpful as the dictator who supported us as long as we kept him well paid. That overthrow, for short-term gains, caused long term misery, not the least of which is the development of the extremists who took over, and now run, Iran. Please convince me I should not be worried. History has a way of repeating itself.

Dana Priest: There's no way the US would attempt to overthrown the newly elected Pakistan government as we did in the Iranian case. First of all, and most importantly, with what support internally? The Army? no. The intel services? no. Plus, you have the pesky press, which you didn't have as much back then. The whole thing would be chronicled for all to see and the backlash would be huge everywhere.

Saturday, March 22, 2008

Zardari's First Coup de maitre

Asif Zardari, with his measured and calculated moves, has shown himself, so far, to be a political tactician of grand proportions. Since he took over the party with a little noticed coup no one expected him to be this mature politically. At least I did not.

Yesterday his move to contact MQM head honcho Altaf Hussain was a stroke of genius. He had Altaf take his candidate Farooq Sattar out of the game without his consulting with his erstwhile partners in the PML-Q. With that one move he chopped Musharraf as well as Amin's political legs and decimated Chaudhries of Gujrat. At the same time he diluted Nawaz Sharif's power in central government by taking MQM on board and decreased its nuisance value in Sindh, at least for the crucial early days of PPP's government there. He is set go either way on judges issue.

He has finally nominated a Makhdoom (Yousaf Raza Gilani) from southern Punjab to combat the anticipated Resistance from Makhdoom of Hala. As soon as the the announcement was made Makhdoom Amin Fahim folded without a whimper in his interview on Aaj TV channel. He said he was standing with the party in this decision and he will especially come from Karachi to cast his vote for his 'friend' and has already congratulated him. He said though that he was not consulted by the party.

Gilani has been officially nominated as the candidate for prime minister. He is a vice chairman of Pakistan People's Party and a former National Assembly speaker (from 1993 to 1997 - during Benazir Bhutto's second term as prime minister). He later spent four years in prison on charges of making illegal government appointments.

He will certainly be elected prime minister with an overwhelming majority - a lot more than two third - I believe.

After the MQM coup Zardari did not need the chairman of the party Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, who has asked to return to Pakistan for a short break from Britain to announce the decision himself. Farhat Ullah Babar announced the 'unanimous' decision.

The question is why he did not let Makhdoom Amin Fahim get nominated? Does he has his own eyes on the seat and Gilani would be only a stop-gap prime minister and Zardari would take over the post after entering parliament via a by-election? Is Gilani too pliable and Amin was not?

If he proves his critics wrong, once again, as he has done so far in the last three months after the assassination of his wife, by letting Gilani stay in power for the next five years without interruption then he is bigger than what he is thought of. If he does decide to use his extra ordinary power for the benefit of Pakistan as he has done so far then it is good omen for the future of Pakistan.

Sunday, March 16, 2008

A New Pakistan

The Washington Post in its editorial on Sunday, March 16, writes that the two largest political parties in Pakistan, the Pakistan People's Party and the Muslim League, are ready to take "a major step" toward democracy by agreeing to implement the Charter for Democracy that Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif hammered out in 2006. They have decided to form a coalition government. They "plan to reform the constitution to eliminate autocratic powers accumulated by Mr. Musharraf following his 1999 coup against a democratic government" and more importantly, they plan to "restore the 63 senior judges" - including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court - "illegally fired by Mr. Musharraf in November in a second coup intended to ensure himself another term as president".

But there is one huge and last hurdle in thier way: President Pervez Musharraf, and President Bush.

Musharraf wants to keep clinging on and Bush wants to keep supporting him. Bush is hte only support he is left with. His source of all power, the position of the army chief is gone. His hand-picked party has been routed in the elections after he received their votes for his own re-election just before they went to contest the elections and lose big time.

The editorial exhorts President Bush "who claims to believe that the replacement of autocrats with secular democratic governments is a key U.S. interest, should act on his own principle. He should tell Mr. Musharraf either to accept the decisions of the new government and courts, or step down".

There is hope that when the judges are "restored to the bench and controls imposed by Mr. Musharraf on the media are removed, Pakistan could have the most liberal and open political system in its history. That is the long-term solution to the assault on the country by the Taliban, al-Qaeda and other Islamist fanatics, who so far this year have carried out 16 suicide bombings and killed more than 500 people -- making Pakistan almost as violent as Iraq."

Would President Bush and Busharraf will listen?

Saturday, March 15, 2008

Bush Must Stay Away From His Crumbling "Buddy"

The New York Times in its editorial of March 15, 2008 has dubbed the electoral defeat of General Musharraf's hand-made Q party as "a stern rout of President Musharraf" himself and has given a timely advice to President Bush who "stubbornly supported Mr. Musharraf as he ran roughshod over the Constitution and Pakistan’s people" and "still seems to be betting that Mr. Musharraf will survive" to stay away from the crumbling dictator and support the newly emerged leaders - Mr Zaedari and Mr. Sharif - who have joined forces to form a coalition government and "who say they will want real constitutional democracy and the rule of law".

By not interfering in "Pakistan’s democratic processes" President Bush can "prove his commitment to democracy — and real stability", the editorial says.

The editorial has also endorsed Senator Joseph Biden's proposal of "tripling nonmilitary aid to $1.5 billion"..."for projects that would strengthen Pakistan’s battered institutions and improve the daily lives of Pakistanis".

The editorial has asked the "army that helped put Mr. Musharraf in powe" to "fully divorce itself from politics" and has "the intelligence services" to "end their double-game".

Here is the complete editorial:

Leaving Musharraf Behind

Parliamentary elections in Pakistan last month delivered a verdict that was just clean enough to be credible — a stern rout of President Pervez Musharraf’s party. Now, rivals Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif, the leading opposition politicians, have further defied expectations by joining forces in a deal that could force Mr. Musharraf from office.

Assuming the agreement holds, the new Parliament, set to convene on Monday, would reinstate the Supreme Court judges whom Mr. Musharraf fired last year in a desperate bid to hold on to power. Once reinstated, the Supreme Court is likely to do exactly what Mr. Musharraf feared: invalidate his re-election. Mr. Zardari and Mr. Sharif also agreed to pass legislation stripping the former army chief of the power to dissolve Parliament and appoint military leaders.

As a monthlong surge in suicide bombings attests, this is a dangerous time for Pakistan, which has both nuclear arms and a far too cozy relationship with the Taliban and Al Qaeda. If Mr. Musharraf is ousted as a result of Pakistan’s democratic processes, that is Pakistan’s decision. The United States should not interfere.

The Bush administration stubbornly supported Mr. Musharraf as he ran roughshod over the Constitution and Pakistan’s people. The administration has promised to work with whatever government emerges, but it has refused to take a position on reinstating the judges and still seems to be betting that Mr. Musharraf will survive.

That may happen, but it must not stop Washington from supporting Mr. Zardari, Mr. Sharif and other secular moderate leaders who say they will want real constitutional democracy and the rule of law. President Bush can prove his commitment to democracy — and real stability — in Pakistan by vastly increasing nonmilitary aid for projects that would strengthen Pakistan’s battered institutions and improve the daily lives of Pakistanis.

Senator Joseph Biden, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has proposed tripling nonmilitary aid to $1.5 billion annually for schools, roads and clinics and providing an annual $1 billion “democracy” dividend — as reward and encouragement for Pakistan’s new government to stay on a democratic path. That is a good starting point.

Extremists will capitalize on any sign of weakness, and Mr. Musharraf and his rivals must make the political transition as free of conflict as possible. The army that helped put Mr. Musharraf in power — and stayed out of last month’s elections — must fully divorce itself from politics. Instead, it should focus on retooling its skills to confront Al Qaeda, the Taliban and homegrown insurgencies — all are increasingly powerful. The intelligence services must end their double-game with the militants.

What happens in Pakistan directly affects Afghanistan. The two share a lawless border; neither can withstand much more upheaval.

Pakistan’s new civilian leaders are undeniably flawed — both Mr. Zardari and Mr. Sharif are seriously tainted by corruption. But they deserve Washington’s support as they try to set their country on a new course. They do not have a lot of time to get it right. Every suicide bombing is a reminder of the extremists’ strength and how determined they are to see democracy fail.

Sunday, March 09, 2008

9 March 2007 - Black Day

Last year on March 9 Musharraf with all his arrogance and in full military regalia gave a cut to the body of justice and Pakistan when he "summoned" the chief justice of Pakistan to his Army Chief's residence in Rawalpindi and while sitting among a bunch of barefaced cronies including the Prime Minister, the intelligence chiefs, and other accomplices and tried flagrantly to coerce the judge to resign or he would be suspended on corruption, misconduct, abuse of authority and nepotism charges.

In that cut the chief justice put a seed of defiance when he uttered a little, two-lettered word - 'no'. From that tiny seed sprouted a delicate seedling of courage and hope and overnight it grew into a towering and gigantic tree which gave cooling shade and motherly shelter to the deprived people of Pakistan who had been burning in the scorching sun of smothering martial law and tyrannical military rule.

The whole population of Pakistan erupted into a spontaneous explosion of euphoria and resentment simultaneously. Euphoria, for the simple fact that someone had found enough courage, at last, to stand up to the bullies and pit bulls of establishment. Resentment, for being kept in a position of oppression and suppression for so long by so few.

Pakistanis stumbled upon an accidental hero and and unlikely leader. Iftikhar Muhammad Chaoudhry was not in any conceivable way an exceptional man or judge or anything. In fact, he took an oath under a Provisional Constitutional Order himself after Musharraf unconstitutionally and illegally toppled a democratically elected government with two-third majority and suspended the Constitution. He treaded gingerly and negotiated carefully his way through the judicial landmines to avoid stepping on any sensitive, super-size toes. He knew his limitations under the circumstances and knew perfectly well where not to wander. He was not uncompliant in any way, shape or form. He was simply doing what he could not shrink from without casting any doubts on his integrity or inviting any suspicious looks.

His judicial decisions were a mixed bag. He stopped the selling of the Steel Mills to one of the friends of the prime minister rendering the whole process was being done "in indecent haste" and then referring it to the Council of Common Interests. When Musharraf wanted to stop a provincial-assembly-passed bill from becoming a law he brought the case before Chaudhry and he obliged him by casting it "unconstitutional" and then ordered the Governor of the NWFP to not sign it. In the "Disappeared Pakistanis" case he was most careful not to do more than just asking for comprehensive reports from federal agencies about the whereabouts of the missing people. His main focus remained on cases which were not otherwise difficult but were very popular: he started taking suo moto notices of cases ranging from prices of vegetables, words of lyrics, traffic congestion, one-dish meals on weddings, ban on kite flying, gang rapes, respect for consumers paying utility bills at commercial banks.

But even then he was thought by Musharraf to be tantalizing close to what the regime thought was too independent and too dangerous a stance and which could have caused him trouble down the road. His court was likely to rule, in the next several months, on Musharraf’s re-election in uniform from the assemblies that were close to the tail end of their term and were going out for new elections of their own - in which most of the members were crushingly defeated on February 18, 2008.

Musharraf threatened him to tender his resignation. But once the Chief Justice said 'no' the people of Pakistan rallied to his support starting with lawyers. Throngs of people came to swell his rallies and lined to see him on his way to addresses the bar councils of various cities. They were so many that his motorcade was forced to slow down to such a speed that it took him 25 hours to travel the same distance it normally takes 4 hours. The ebullient rallies, demonstrations and well-attended meeting and boycotts were not a sign of love for him but were a tribute to his one-time defiance. They were not as much pro-Chaudhry as they were anti-Musharraf.

The rest, as they say, is history and detail.

That cut that was inflicted upon the body of justice and Pakistan by Musharraf was supposed to bleed them to anemia or death. But the seed of defiance planted in it by Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhrt has given us a towering and gigantic tree of well organized Lawyers' Movement, a rejuvinated and energized civil society, a dynamic and vigorous media, and an alive and kicking parliament. It has also given us Eitizaz Ahsan, Ali Ahmad Kurd, Munir A. Malik, Justice Tariq Mahmood, and a scores of other unsung heroes including sixty or so judges who refused to take oath under the new P.C.O.

From that one cut has emerged the towering tree of energetic society bent upon changing Pakistan's political and judicial face for once and all. That one cut has also given Musharraf a political death by a thousand cuts. He is on his way to the trash heap of history and oblivion.

We have, no doubt, achieved a lot in past one year. But there is still a lot more ahead that we have to strive for: an independent judiciary, rule of law, strengthening of all the institutions, and the respect for human rights.

Unfortunately Chief justice and his peers are still incarcerated behind barbed wires. That is one reason Eitizaz Ahsan, the great new-found leader has asked us to commemorate this day of 9 March as a Black Flag Day and rest of the week as Black Flag Week.

That is how nations make history and remember their heroes and the milestones in their history.

11 More American Demands On Musharraf - Is He Reay To Capitulate?


Pakistan's daily newspaper 'The News" broke a story by Dr. Shireen Mazari on 8 March and confirmed it on 9 March that Bush administration made a set of eleven demands on Musharraf, probably through US Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, America’s highest-ranking military officer, who visited Pakistan twice in a month - on February 8 and March 3. The director of national intelligence, Mike McConnell, and the Central Intelligence Agency director, Gen. Michael V. Hayden, also made a secret visit last month that was later made public.

Admiral Mullen did not discuss any specifics of the various proposals being drawn up by the American military to assist Pakistan. But he did say as he arrived in Pakistan on Monday, that the United States had developed “a fairly comprehensive plan” of assistance. Was it this plan he was talking about?

Americans know their man in Islamabad. He has a history of putting his knees on the ground. They know he is at his weakest point in his life. He capitulated in 2001 when he was not this weak. They know he needs them more than ever before. Which means he is vulnerable to their blackmailing and may bend his knees again.

This is the same person who had kowtowed before - on 13 September 2001 - when he was presented with those seven infamous demands by US Secretary of State Colin Powell via a "positive" telephone call. American were apprehensive that Musharraf would only accept one or two of their demands but were astonished when Musharraf decided to give "unstinted cooperation" because, as he claimed then, it was necessary to safeguard Pakistan's nuclear assets and its Kashmir policy. Later he claimed in his book that his friend Richard Armitage, then the Deputy Secretary of State, had threatened ISI chief General Mahmood in Washington to bomb Pakistan back into the stone age. Remember?

General Mahmood, on the other hand, in his visit to the State Department on September 13 and in his second meeting with Armitage had already acquiesced when he was handed over a single sheet of paper with seven demands. The general, who was known for his hard-line pro-Taliban position and wasb one of the chief architects of October 12 coup against Nawaz Sharif's elected government, glanced through the paper for only a few seconds and replied: "They are all acceptable to us." The prompt response took Armitage by surprise and he, not believing his ears, said: "These are very powerful words, General. Do you not want to discuss with your President?". "I know the president's mind," replied General Mahmood.

But this time around Americans are not asking for assisstance against Afghani neighbors. It is Pakistan's turn. They are asking for a Tora Bora in Pakistan.

The Seven Demands were nothing compared with the Eleven Demands they have given Musharraf this time. Have a look at the earlier demands:

1) Stop Al-Qaeda operations on the Pakistani border, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and all logistical support for bin Laden;

2) Blanket over-flights and landing rights for US planes;

3) Access to Pakistan's naval bases, airbases and borders;

4) Immediate intelligence and immigration information;

5) Curb all domestic expression of support for terrorism against the United States, its friends and allies;

6) Cut off fuel supply to the Taliban and stop Pakistani volunteers going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban; and

7) Break diplomatic relations with the Taliban and assist USA to destroy bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network.

Now look at the Eleven new ones:

1) Grant special status to the US personnel who is already in or will be coming to Pakistan - the same that is granted to the technical and administrative staff of the US embassy.

Which means complete diplomatic immunity.

2) The US personnel be allowed to enter and exit Pakistan on mere National Identification (such as driving licence) and without any passports or visas.

Which means that they can come and go without any record at their port of entries or exits.

3) Accept the legality of all US licences, which would include arms licences.

Which means they don't have to have their guns registered in Pakistan.

4) All these personnel be allowed to carry arms and wear uniforms throughout Pakistan.

Which means they will be free to roam about on Pakistani streets as they are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan.

5) US criminal jurisdiction be applicable in Pakistan to US nationals.

In other words, these personnel would not be subject to any Pakistani law.

6) Exemption from all taxes, including indirect taxes like excise duty, etc.

They can bring anything to sell and take anything they want.

7) Inspection-free import and export of all goods and materials.

No record can be kept of what they would be bringing in or taking out of our country – including archaeological finds, artifacts of historical nature and national inheritance as well as any sensitive materials, even nuclear weapons.

8) Free movement of vehicles, vessels including aircraft, without landing or parking fees.

9)Selected US contractors should also be exempted from tax payments.

They can make all the money building what they will destroy first and then leave without paying any taxes.

10) Free of cost usage of US telecommunication systems and all necessary radio frequencies.

All the Pakistanis still have to get licences and pay fees to use the same, though.

11) Waiver of all claims to damage, loss, or destruction of Pakistani property, or death of Pakistani personnel or armed forces or civilians.

They will have, effectively, a licence to kill whoever they want in Pakistan.

It is obvious that if these demands, or any one of them, is accepted by this weakened regime of general Musharraf, Pakistan's honor and sovereignty will clearly and directly be undermined.

US presence in Japan, Iraq and Afghanistan has undermined the sovereignty of these countries and it has become a source of major resentment and embarrasment because there are frequent cases of US soldiers and marines raping young school girls and women and getting away with it because they are not subject to the local laws. In Japan they occupy limited space. In Pakistan, however, the demands to make the US personnel above the Pakistani law would not be limited to confined spaces and territories but throughout the country!

The sneaky way the whole affair of American demands on Musharraf has been kept shrouded in mysterious secrecy by Musharraf regime until the lid was blown off by Dr. Shireen Mazari shows Musharraf has still not stopped doing secret deals with his overlords in Washington.

Musharraf has already shown tendency to stoop to any level for a few more days in power or a few more dollars in his pocket. There are chances that he could cave in once again and accept these unacceptable and humiliating and dangerous demands.

He must be stopped by asking him to leave. As long he is holding the seat of president Pakistan will remain in danger.

Saturday, March 08, 2008

One Way To Perform Constitutional Roles

Is it the indelibly etched, lingering, and haunting memory of the ubiquitous military boots in the corridors of civilian power for thirty years (out of the total sixty of Pakistan's life) that makes the Pakistani nation pay more attention to what the army chief is saying than it should deserve otherwise under normal circumstances?

Or is it the aggrandized power the occupiers of this post over the long, dark years have gained at the expense of the civilian rule that makes them jittery and jumpy?

Whatever the case may be, the way every Pakistani is dwelling on every single word of Ashfaq Kayani's latest statement to figure out the exact meaning of his statement and the intention behind it shows the abnormal level of fear and uncertainty a few words from that quarter can generate in their minds and hearts.

I am talking about the speech the army chief made on Thursday at a Corps Commanders’ conference.

He rejected suggestions of any rift between the military and his ex-boss, retired general and embattled President Pervez Musharraf. He pointed out that any kind of schism, at any level, under the circumstances would not be in the "larger interest" of the nation.

In other words he is standing behind his man.

At the same time he insisted that the armed forces would stay out of politics and they should not be "dragged into any unnecessary controversy".

Is he preempting any such effort or he is publicly warning someone who is already doing so? Is there any unnecessary controversy going on somewhere we don't know of?

Is he talking about the controversy of Musharraf egging on his Q-MQM cronies to stay put and wait for their soon-coming-turn? And it is being done, of all places, in the occupied Army House that actually belongs to Kayani and not to Musharraf.

Is he talking about the support Musharraf is giving to his trounced Q-MQM friends by giving them hope that it won't be long before there will be rift between Zardari and Nawaz Sharif?

Kayani also "reaffirmed that the army stands fully behind the democratic process and is committed to playing its constitutional role in support of the elected government". He also called for a "harmonised relationship between various pillars of the state, as provided in the constitution, in order to maximize national effort."

How he can "stand fully the democratic process" and play his "constitutional role in support of the elected government" by standing behind Musharraf? He did not elaborate. But isn't it oxymoron to stand behind two opposing poles?

Is he inclining towards assuming the wrongly established "constitutional role" of a referee and a power broker as chief of staff?

Is he telling the victor parties to stay away from his man? Is that the only way, in his mind, to bring harmony between various pillars of state?

If that is the case then it is very very dangerous path to take and does not bode well for Pakistan and its people. I don't blame them if they feel jittery and jumpy.

One way he can stay out of politics and let the politicians do their job without him breathing over their necks is to stop releasing the statements about what he is being said and done in top commanders meetings.

Wednesday, March 05, 2008

Musharraf: The Real Problem



He is skinless, vulnerable and hunkered in a place - the Army House, the government residence of the chief of army staff - where he does not belong any more. Some of the vanquished and humiliated cronies, finding nowhere to go, have gathered around him and are trying desperately to bask in the fading glow of his vanishing power. Week-kneed among them have already shifted their loyalties or are busy licking their wounds in their kennels.

He, at least for now, has failed the see the writing on the wall which is clearly saying to him: get the hell out of here!

He is busy brooding and conspiring and scheming because he is not comfortable with the situation that has emerged.

He should give the parties that have won elections a chance to get to the meat of the things and focus to ameliorate the mess he has helped create in the eight years of his terrible rule. Rising food prices, the threat of terrorism, inter-ethnic tensions are the real and present danger. But he somehow seems bent upon adding to the woes by remaining in office and becoming a problem himself.

He seems oblivious to the fact that the lawyers' movement he managed to unleash by stepping out of the constitutional bounds has become a reinvigorated and revitalized political force. Media is vibrant and back with vengeance. Muslim League Nawaz is showing virulent aversion to serve under him. 63 judges dismissed by Musharraf as army chief with an executive order are waiting in the wings to be reinstated as victors have pledged. Six senators from Q League have already said that they would break ranks with the party and vote according to their their newly awoken conscience on coming motions. Even slippery Mushahid Hussain, the general secretary of the Q-League, has said he will vote to curtail the president’s powers to dissolve Parliament.

He thinks he still retains one powerful weapon handed to him under controversial constitutional amendments: to dissolve Parliament and dismiss the government; and the right to appoint and remove the top officials of the armed forces.

He should do a favor to Pakistan and its people and leave and let the elected representatives concentrate on the problems he piled up during the dark days of his rule before it is too late.

Would he?

Sunday, March 02, 2008

From Musharraf To Pakistan

Joe Biden, the Democratic senator from Delaware has written an op-ed in the New York Times.Afghanistan. Pakistan. Forgotten. He says:

THE next president will have to rally America and the world to “fight them over there unless we want to fight them over here.” The “over there” is not, as President Bush has claimed, Iraq, but rather the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

That is where those who attacked us on 9/11 came from, where the attacks in Europe since originated and where Al Qaeda is regrouping. It is the real central front in the war on terrorism.

Afghanistan is slipping toward failure. The Taliban is back, violence is up, drug production is booming and the Afghans are losing faith in their government. All the legs of our strategy — security, counternarcotics efforts, reconstruction and governance — have gone wobbly.

If we should have had a surge anywhere, it is Afghanistan. And instead of eradicating poppy crops, which forces many farmers to turn to the Taliban, we should go after drug kingpins.

We also need to make good on President Bush’s pledge for a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan. In six years, we have spent on Afghanistan’s reconstruction only what we spend every three weeks on military operations in Iraq.

Afghanistan’s fate is directly tied to Pakistan’s future and America’s security. When President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan concluded that we were not serious about finishing the job in Afghanistan, he began to cut deals with extremists in his own country.

As a result, the border area remains a freeway of fundamentalism: the Taliban and Al Qaeda find sanctuary in Pakistan, while Pakistani suicide bombers wreak havoc in Afghanistan.

The recent Pakistani elections gave the moderate majority its voice back and gives the United States an opportunity to move from a Musharraf policy to a Pakistan policy. To demonstrate to its people that we care about their needs, not just our own, we must triple assistance for schools, roads and clinics, sustain it for a decade, and demand accountability for the military aid we provide.

If Afghanistan fails or Pakistan falls to fundamentalism, America will suffer a terrible setback. The candidates should tell Americans how they will handle what may be the next president’s most difficult challenge.

Kiss of Death

NYT

U.S. Plan Widens Role in Training Pakistani Forces in Qaeda Battle

The United States military is developing a plan to send about 100 American trainers to work with a Pakistani paramilitary force that is the vanguard in the fight against Al Qaeda and other extremist groups in Pakistan’s restive tribal areas, American military officials said.

Pakistan has ruled out allowing American combat troops to fight Qaeda and Taliban militants in the tribal areas. But Pakistani leaders have privately indicated that they would welcome additional American trainers to help teach new skills to Pakistani soldiers whose army was tailored not for counterinsurgency but to fight a conventional land war against India.

Even though the training program would unfold over several months, it is being disclosed at a time of heightened operations in the unruly tribal areas along the Afghan border. At least eight people suspected of being Islamic militants were killed Thursday in a triple missile attack on a house used for training in the tribal areas.

For several years, small teams of American Special Operations forces have trained their Pakistani counterparts in counterinsurgency tactics. But the 40-page classified plan now under review at the United States Central Command to help train the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force of about 85,000 members recruited from ethnic groups on the border, would significantly increase the size and scope of the American training role in the country.

United States trainers initially would be restricted to training compounds, but with Pakistani consent could eventually accompany Pakistani troops on missions “to the point of contact” with militants, as American trainers now do with Iraqi troops in Iraq, a senior American military official said. Britain is also considering a similar training mission in Pakistan, officials said. A spokesman at the British Embassy here declined to comment.

“The U.S. is bringing in a small number of trainers to assist Pakistan in their efforts to improve training of the Frontier Corps,” Elizabeth O. Colton, a spokeswoman for the United States Embassy in Islamabad, said in an e-mail message. “The U.S. trainers will be primarily focused on assisting the Pakistan cadre who will do the actual training of the Frontier Corps troops.”

Ms. Colton declined to specify how many American trainers would participate or where their bases would be. But Defense Department officials said that the number of American trainers could grow to about 100. Along with intensified missile strikes in Pakistan against suspected militants, the increased training program is another sign of the Bush administration’s growing concern and frustration with Pakistan’s failure to do more about Al Qaeda’s movements in the tribal areas.

The proposed expanded training program is modest compared with the training efforts under way in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is said to offer scant likelihood of blossoming into a much larger American combat presence. American officials are also acutely aware of Pakistani sensitivities to any United States military presence in the country, even trainers, and spoke largely on the basis of anonymity because of the diplomatic concerns and because the plan had not been formally approved.

Until now, American officials have worked closely with President Pervez Musharraf on counterterrorism policies, including training programs. The landslide victory by Pakistan’s opposition parties in last month’s parliamentary elections adds a degree of complication and confusion to any long-term military planning of this sort because it is unclear to what extent new leaders, like Asif Ali Zardari, the head of the victorious Pakistan Peoples Party and the widower of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, will embrace those policies.

American officials are also taking a number of other steps to help increase Pakistan’s long-term ability to battle a newly resurgent Al Qaeda and other extremist groups in the tribal areas.

At the request of Pakistan’s new army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the Central Command two weeks ago sent a four-member intelligence team, led by a lieutenant colonel, to work closely with Pakistani intelligence officers in Islamabad. The Americans are helping with techniques on sharing satellite imagery and addressing Pakistani requests to buy equipment used to intercept the militants’ communications, a senior American officer said.

The United States is also helping to establish border coordination centers in Afghanistan just across the Pakistan border, where Afghan, Pakistani and American officials can share intelligence about Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist groups in and around the tribal areas.

The Pentagon has spent about $25 million so far to equip the Frontier Corps with new body armor, vehicles, radios and surveillance equipment, and plans to spend $75 million more in the next year. Over all, a senior Bush administration official said, the United States could spend more than $400 million in the next several years to enhance the Frontier Corps, including building a training base near Peshawar.

The training proposal now under review at Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Fla., which oversees military operations in the Middle East and much of South Asia, is subject to the approval of the commander, Adm. William J. Fallon, and top Pentagon officials, including Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.

Admiral Fallon said in an interview at his headquarters last week that additional trainers would be part of “a comprehensive approach” to address Pakistan’s security needs. “They want to do as much of this as they can themselves,” Admiral Fallon said.

Pakistani officials said they were aware of the Pentagon’s general offer for more trainers, but were not familiar with the details of the Central Command plan.

That document, titled “Plan for Training the Frontier Corps,” envisions a combination of Special Forces and regular Army troops working with the Frontier Corps in basic marksmanship, infantry skills and counterinsurgency techniques, Defense Department officials said.

Until recently, the Frontier Corps had not received American military financing because the corps technically falls under the Pakistani Interior Ministry, a nonmilitary agency that the Pentagon ordinarily does not deal with. But American and Pakistani officials say the Frontier Corps is drawn from Pashtun tribesmen, who know the language and culture of the tribal areas, and in the long term is the most suitable force to combat an insurgency there.

American and Pakistani officials acknowledge that it will take several years to build the Frontier Corps into an effective counterinsurgency. American officials say they have seen some Frontier Corps members wearing sandals on patrol and wielding barely functional Kalashnikov rifles with little ammunition.

The need for the training is evident. In January, hundreds of Islamic militants attacked a paramilitary fort in the restive South Waziristan tribal region in northwest Pakistan, killing 22 soldiers and taking several others hostage. A Pentagon official said the fort was overrun in part because the commander had failed to range his artillery properly before the attack.

“Pakistani military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas have had limited effect on Al Qaeda,” Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week. “Pakistan recognizes the threat and realizes the need to develop more effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities to complement their conventional forces.”

Robert L. Grenier, a former director of the C.I.A.’s Counterterrorism Center, told a panel of the Council on Foreign Relations last week that any high-profile American military presence in the tribal areas or the neighboring North-West Frontier Province would be “the kiss of death.”

But Pakistan, he said, would welcome small numbers of trainers who kept a low profile, and were not involved in combat operations. “To an increasing degree as they see that it doesn’t cause the sky to fall, they will be willing to accept low-level support from the Americans, particularly in the form of training,” said Mr. Grenier, a former C.I.A. station chief in Islamabad.

Mr. Grenier added that the role American trainers played would rest largely with General Kayani, the new army chief. “He’s a very conservative, very cautious fellow,” Mr. Grenier said. “He will want to make his own decisions as to what is sustainable and what is not in the way of U.S. support.”

Friday, February 29, 2008

Friends No More

The Washington Post in an article headed "The Missing Man" says that Americans don't seem to be friends with Musharraf any more. Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte while testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday about U.S. policy toward Pakistan made no mention of President Pervez Musharraf - the longtime Bush administration ally and recipient of more than $10 billion in U.S. aid since 2001.

In an effort to distance the United States from the routed and embattled Musharraf, Negroponte stayed away from uttering his name in his prepared testimony as if the erstwhile "buddy" had become a pariah all of a sudden.

Only four months ago, four days after Musharraf had declared emergency rule, Negroponte had testified about Pakistan before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 7, and named Musharraf 11 times singing his praises.

What a difference a little election defeat can make!

On Fighting Terrorism

Nov. 7, 2007: "President Musharraf has been indispensable in the global war on terror."

Feb. 28, 2008: "Pakistan has been indispensable to our worldwide struggle against violent extremists."

On Pakistan's Future

Nov. 7, 2007: "Under President Musharraf, Pakistan has become a more moderate, more prosperous partner than it has been at some points in its past, with a government that shares many of our most basic strategic imperatives."

Feb. 28, 2008: "The United States continues to believe that only democracy can build a long-term consensus among Pakistanis on a moderate, prosperous future for their country."

On the Economy

Nov. 7, 2007: "Pakistan has enjoyed an average of 7 percent economic growth since 2001, due in part to President Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz's sound economic policies."

Feb. 28, 2008: "We should now renew our efforts by continuing to support Pakistan's democratic progress, to improve its education system, to improve governance across the country, and to offer more economic opportunities to its citizens in impoverished areas."

On Signs of Success

Nov. 7, 2007: "These successes were in no small measure due to the growth of civil society and media groups under President Musharraf."

Feb. 28, 2008: "Pakistan took a big step toward civilian democracy on February 18, holding successful elections under challenging circumstances."

On U.S. Aid

Nov. 7, 2007: "Pakistan has undoubtedly made progress toward becoming a more moderate, stable, and prosperous country since President Musharraf came to power."

Feb. 28, 2008: "Our assistance and engagement in Pakistan are designed to help the country develop into a modern, moderate, democratic and prosperous country."

U.S. Interference In Pakistani Elections

NYT

The Bush administration’s continued backing of President Pervez Musharraf, despite the overwhelming rejection of his party by voters this month, is fueling a new level of frustration in Pakistan with the United States.

That support has rankled the public, politicians and journalists here, inciting deep anger at what is perceived as American meddling and the refusal of Washington to embrace the new, democratically elected government. John D. Negroponte, the deputy secretary of state, said Thursday during a Senate panel hearing that the United States would maintain its close ties to Mr. Musharraf.

Pakistanis say the Bush administration is grossly misjudging the political mood in Pakistan and squandering an opportunity to win support from the Pakistani public for its fight against terrorism. The opposition parties that won the Feb. 18 parliamentary elections say they are moderate and pro-American. By working with them, analysts say, Washington could gain a vital, new ally.

The American insistence that Mr. Musharraf play a significant role, they say, will only draw out a power struggle with the president and distract the new government from pushing ahead with alternatives to Mr. Musharraf’s policies on the economy and terrorism, which are widely viewed here as having failed.

“I’ve never seen such an irrational, impractical move on the part of the United States,” said Rasul Baksh Rais, a political scientist at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. “The whole country has voted against Musharraf. This was a referendum against Musharraf.”

Over the last week, more than a dozen editorials and commentaries have appeared in Pakistan’s leading newspapers accusing the United States of “meddling” in the country’s affairs. Many have taken particular umbrage at statements by President Bush and other senior officials praising Mr. Musharraf, despite his lack of support among voters.

A series of postelection meetings between American Embassy officials and Asif Ali Zardari, the head of the victorious Pakistan Peoples Party, have also been criticized.

American officials have met three times with Mr. Zardari since the election. They have met twice with Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister whose own opposition party won the second most seats in Parliament.

In the meetings, American officials urged both leaders to work with moderate forces and Mr. Musharraf, according to officials from the two parties and the United States. It is the insistence to include Mr. Musharraf that rankles Pakistanis.

American officials said the meetings were routine. “This is standard diplomacy,” said an American official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

But Pakistani observers called the request that the parties work with Mr. Musharraf inappropriate, given his sweeping defeat. Typical of the outrage was an editorial published Sunday by The News, an English-language newspaper, with the headline “Hands Off, Please!”

“No further efforts must be made to intervene in the democratic process in Pakistan,” the editorial read. “The man who the U.S. continues to back has in many ways become a central part of Pakistan’s problems.”

A senior American official in Washington acknowledged that there was worry within the Bush administration about being seen as meddling. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly on the issue, conceded that American attempts last year to construct a power-sharing deal between Mr. Musharraf and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto “didn’t really work out quite as we’d hoped.” Differences remained between the president and Ms. Bhutto, who was killed Dec. 27.

“The last thing we need is to be seen by the Pakistanis as interfering again,” he said.

But while American officials have sought to portray the United States as neutral, their statements underscore that Mr. Musharraf remains at the center of the United States policy here.

On Monday, Dana Perino, the White House spokeswoman, said President Bush continued to support Mr. Musharraf for “all of the work that he’s done to help us in counterterrorism.”

“Now it will be up to the people of Pakistan to see what their new government will look like,” she said. “But the president does certainly support him.”

During his Senate hearing on Thursday, Mr. Negroponte said, “I think we would, as a general proposition, urge that the moderate political forces work together, and of course President Musharraf is still the president of his country, and we look forward to continuing to work well with him as well.”

Mr. Negroponte refused to call for the reinstatement of the judges dismissed last year by Mr. Musharraf when he imposed emergency rule. “We have been silent on this subject,” he said. Then he added, “to the best of my knowledge.”

That silence by American officials has led Pakistanis to accuse the United States of ignoring the will of voters, analysts say. The issue fueled anger against Mr. Musharraf and the protest vote against him.

In Pakistan, each American statement has been dissected in the media and widely perceived as overt American pressure.

In an editorial on Monday, the Daily Business Recorder, a leading English-language newspaper, criticized a call Mr. Bush made to Mr. Musharraf after learning of what it called his allies’ “electoral debacle.” It also cited Richard A. Boucher, an assistant secretary of state, as saying after the election that Mr. Musharraf “remains important to Washington.”

Mr. Bush and other administration officials still regard Mr. Musharraf as a significant player and as a force for stability in Pakistan, and one who could regain his standing, said an official involved in the policy deliberations.

The official said that American officials were waiting to see if the opposition could form the two-thirds majority needed to render Mr. Musharraf a powerless, ceremonial president, or even impeach him. The Americans recognize that the opposition parties have long feuded and think they could fail to unite.

“Musharraf still thinks he has options, which he does,” said an administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity. “The administration thinks so as well, but only so long as he does not overplay his hand.”

Over the last year, American assessments have repeatedly proven wrong. Before the Feb. 18 elections, a senior American intelligence official predicted in a briefing to journalists that no party would win a clear majority and that Mr. Musharraf would remain the strongest political figure in the country.

Wamiq Zuberi, chief editor of the Daily Business Recorder, said Washington “obviously doesn’t have the correct appreciation of the environment here.” He and others said the American backing for Mr. Musharraf had generated consternation among analysts who believe that Mr. Musharraf is not only deeply unpopular but also that he has performed poorly of late in the campaign against terrorism, polarizing Pakistan and striking a series of truces with militants.

“I’ve followed this for years, and I’ve never seen it so clear, apparent and continuous,” Nasim Zehra, a Pakistani analyst and writer, said of what she considered the American interference. “It’s not surprising, given the mindset in Washington.”

Central to the Bush administration’s support is the feeling that Mr. Musharraf retains the loyalty of the Pakistani Army, even though he stepped down as army chief in December. Current and former administration officials say they fear that withdrawing American support from Mr. Musharraf would alienate Pakistan’s military, country’s most powerful institution.

“He is still valuable for his relationship with the army,” said Daniel Markey, who helped coordinate Pakistan policy in the State Department from 2003 to 2007. “He is someone who the United States should work with — and will work with — for fear of alienating that important partner.”

Western military officials say Pakistan’s armed forces — Mr. Musharraf’s last potential bastion of support — have shifted loyalty to his chosen successor, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.

And they say General Kayani will choose stability over saving Mr. Musharraf. “If Kayani and Musharraf were diametrically opposed,” said a Western military official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, “I think Kayani would prevail.”

Ms. Zehra, the analyst, said that General Kayani had distanced himself from Mr. Musharraf by issuing a surprise order in January barring all officers from holding government posts or engaging in politics.

The move effectively prevented Mr. Musharraf from using Pakistan’s military intelligence agencies to manipulate the election. The loyalty of Pakistan’s military is irrevocably shifting behind General Kayani, she said. “The army will be led by its chief always,” she said. “The former chief is always the former chief.”