Saturday, June 16, 2007

Ahmed Rashid: America's Bad Deal With Musharraf

Washington Post

America's Bad Deal With Musharraf, Going Down in Flames By Ahmed Rashid
Sunday, June 17, 2007

LAHORE, Pakistan Pakistan is on the brink of disaster, and the Bush administration is continuing to back the man who dragged it there. As President Pervez Musharraf fights off the most serious challenge to his eight-year dictatorship, the United States is supporting him to the hilt. The message to the Pakistani public is clear: To the Bush White House, the war on terrorism tops everything, and that includes democracy.

The crisis began on March 9, when Musharraf suspended Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, the chief justice of the supreme court, who bravely threatened Musharraf's plans to consolidate his power. That triggered street protests demanding Musharraf's resignation, which were met by a government-led crackdown on lawyers, the opposition and the media. Thousands of lawyers nationwide, looking like penguins in their courtroom black suits and white shirts, braved police batons and the heat to lead marches. They were joined by women's groups, journalists and the opposition. For the first time in two decades, Pakistan's civil society has taken to the streets.

The roots of the crisis go back to the blind bargain Washington made after 9/11 with the regime that had heretofore been the Taliban's main patron: ignoring Musharraf's despotism in return for his promises to crack down on al-Qaeda and cut the Taliban loose. Today, despite $10 billion in U.S. aid to Pakistan since 2001, that bargain is in tatters; the Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda's senior leadership has set up another haven inside Pakistan's chaotic border regions.

The problem is exacerbated by a dramatic drop-off in U.S. expertise on Pakistan. Retired American officials say that, for the first time in U.S. history, nobody with serious Pakistan experience is working in the South Asia bureau of the State Department, on State's policy planning staff, on the National Security Council staff or even in Vice President Cheney's office. Anne W. Patterson, the new U.S. ambassador to Islamabad, is an expert on Latin American "drugs and thugs"; Richard A. Boucher, the assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, is a former department spokesman who served three tours in Hong Kong and China but never was posted in South Asia. "They know nothing of Pakistan," a former senior U.S. diplomat said.

Current and past U.S. officials tell me that Pakistan policy is essentially being run from Cheney's office. The vice president, they say, is close to Musharraf and refuses to brook any U.S. criticism of him. This all fits; in recent months, I'm told, Pakistani opposition politicians visiting Washington have been ushered in to meet Cheney's aides, rather than taken to the State Department.

No one in Foggy Bottom seems willing to question Cheney's decisions. Boucher, for one, has largely limited his remarks on the crisis to expressions of support for Musharraf. Current and retired U.S. diplomats tell me that throughout the previous year, Boucher refused to let the State Department even consider alternative policies if Musharraf were threatened with being ousted, even though 2007 is an election year in Pakistan. Last winter, Boucher reportedly limited the scope of a U.S. government seminar on Pakistan for fear that it might send a signal that U.S. support for Musharraf was declining. Likewise, I'm told, he has refused to meet with leading opposition figures such as former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf has exiled. (Boucher says he has met with "people across the full political spectrum of Pakistan" during his nine visits there, from government parties to Islamic radicals to Chaudhry's lawyer.) Meanwhile, Boucher's boss, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, demands democracy and media freedom in Venezuela but apparently deems such niceties irrelevant to Pakistan.

With Cheney in charge and Rice in eclipse, rumblings of alarm can be heard at the Defense Department and the CIA. While neither agency is usually directly concerned with decision-making on Pakistan, both boast officers with far greater expertise than the White House and State Department crew. These officers, many of whom have served in Islamabad or Kabul, understand the double game that Musharraf has played -- helping the United States go after al-Qaeda while letting his intelligence services help the Taliban claw their way back in Afghanistan. The Pentagon and the CIA have been privately expressing concern about the lack of an alternative to blind support for Musharraf. Ironically, both departments have historically supported military rulers in Pakistan. They seem to have learned their lesson. It's a pity that those calling the shots have not.

What is at stake? Quite simply, the danger of a civil war or the country unraveling even more dramatically than it did when it lost Bangladesh in 1971.

The establishment that has sustained four military regimes is deeply divided. The judiciary and the legal system are out in the streets, demanding an end to military rule. They are backed by the country's gleeful federal bureaucracy, which resented being shunted aside by Musharraf, and joined by civil society organizations and opposition parties. The protesters' ranks have also been swelled by poor people protesting increases in the price of food and other necessities and shortages of electricity during an already blistering summer.

These dissenters have been joined by an increasingly influential media. Under military regimes, the media always grow in stature as they act as the conscience of the people and give voice to political opposition. For the first time, the public can watch demonstrations live on private satellite-TV channels -- something that has bewildered the army's Orwellian thought-control department.

On the opposing side stand Musharraf's remaining allies. The most important is the powerful, brooding army. On June 1, its top brass issued a strong statement of support for Musharraf that dismissed the protests as a "malicious campaign against institutions of the state, launched by vested interests and opportunists." But on live TV talk shows, pundits are lambasting the army for the first time, shocking many viewers. Such withering criticism has forced younger officers to question whether the entire military establishment should risk the public's wrath to keep one man in power.

Musharraf is also supported by the business community, which has experienced economic stability and rising investment from the Arab world during his regime. He also retains -- for now -- the backing of a motley group of politicians who came to power after the military rigged elections in 2002, although many of them are considering jumping ship or ditching Musharraf.

Running parallel to this domestic political crisis is the growing problem of radical Islam; the Taliban and al-Qaeda are now deeply entrenched in the tribal border belt adjacent to Afghanistan. These groups gained political legitimacy last year when Musharraf signed a series of dubious peace deals with the Pakistani Taliban. They are now coming down from the mountains to spread their radical ideology in towns and cities by burning down DVD and TV shops, insisting that young men grow beards, forcibly recruiting schoolboys for the jihad and terrifying girls so that they won't attend school. The military has refused to put a brake on their extremism.

Musharraf promised the international community that he would purge pro-Taliban elements from his security services and convinced the Bush administration that his philosophy of "enlightened moderation" was the only way to fend off Islamic extremism. But Pakistan today is the center of global Islamic terrorism, with Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mohammad Omar probably living here.

Instead of confronting this threat, the army has focused on keeping Musharraf in power -- negotiating with extremists, letting radical Islamic students set up a base in Islamabad and so forth. Meanwhile, to spook the West into continuing to support him, Musharraf continues to grossly exaggerate the strength of the Islamic parties that he warns might take over his nuclear-armed country. In fact, the United States would be far safer if it pushed for a truly representative Pakistani government that could marginalize the jihadists, rather than placing all its eggs in Musharraf's basket.

How will the current crisis end? It's unlikely to peter out; the movement has lasted three months now, despite Musharraf's intelligence services' prediction that it would end within days. And Chaudhry is a formidable foe -- not a mere politician (who, in Pakistan, are inevitably corrupt) but a judge perched above the political fray.

The logical strategy for Musharraf would be to apologize to the nation for hounding the chief justice, bring all parties to a reconciliation conference and agree to early elections under a neutral interim government. If he still insisted on running for president, he would have to agree to take off his uniform first so that no matter who won, Pakistan would return to civilian rule.

But how can a commando general carry out such a U-turn without losing face, especially when he is being publicly backed by the White House? A secretary of state with vision -- a James Baker or a Madeleine Albright -- could have recognized that Musharraf's time is up. Instead, we have Rice and Boucher and Cheney, who -- just as in Iraq -- can only reinforce a failed policy. Washington is doing itself no favors by serving as Musharraf's enabler. Indeed, the Bush administration's policy of sticking by Musharraf is fast becoming eerily reminiscent of the Carter administration's policy of sticking by the shah of Iran.

Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist, is the author of "Taliban."

Friday, June 15, 2007

AI Condemns Musharraf Crackdown On Political Activists

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL Public Statement 15 June 2007

Amnesty International condemns the arbitrary arrests and detention of political activists

Amnesty International is concerned at reports of arbitrary arrests and detention of several hundred political activists belonging to different opposition parties in Pakistan in the past two weeks.

According to media reports and human rights groups, most of the party workers and political activists have been detained in prisons across Punjab province, while others have been detained in other parts of the country. Activists are reportedly being held under three forms of detention: some are believed to be held under preventive detention orders, ranging from 30 to 90 days, others appear to be arbitrarily held without reference to any law, while other political activists are being detained for allegedly breaching restrictions on public gatherings imposed by the government under section 144 of the Code of Criminal of Procedure.

The arrests have reportedly taken place in an attempt to prevent people from participating in welcoming rallies for the suspended Chief Justice to Faisalabad, in Punjab, on June 16. Similar waves of arbitrary detention were reported in recent weeks when the Chief Justice travelled to other parts of the country to address lawyers' gatherings and opposition rallies.

Amnesty International is also concerned at reports that elderly workers were dragged from their homes in the middle of the night and that some activists have been detained in prisons far from their homes making it difficult for their families to contact them.

Across Punjab, police have reportedly arrested activists belonging to the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the Mutthhida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and other political parties. Amnesty International is concerned for the safety of a number of woman political activists who have reportedly been arrested.

The Pakistan government has claimed that preventative detention has been used to preserve law and order under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance. Amnesty International is concerned that the Pakistan government, besides resorting to preventive detention, is also increasingly using Section 144 of the Criminal Code of Procedure in violation of the rights to freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of peaceful assembly and association, enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Pakistan's Constitution also guarantees the right to Freedom of Assembly and Association under articles 16 and 17 respectively.

Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits a gathering of more than four people in public without police authorization, while a magistrate can prohibit meetings of five or more persons.

Amnesty International calls on the Government of Pakistan to respect Pakistan's own constitutional safeguards and international human rights standards and to guarantee the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association of its people. Amnesty International urges the Government of Pakistan to immediately release all of the political activists arbitrarily detained to prevent them exercising their rights to peaceful assembly in this latest crackdown.

Those seeking to exercise their rights of peaceful assembly and expression must be secure from violence by security personnel in the name of maintaining public order.

American Visitors: Freinds or Masters?


Americans are in town. A lot of them. First came the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian affairs, Richard Boucher. Then came the US Deputy Secretary of State and former intelligence chief, John Negroponte, and joined Boucher who had already spent three days meeting government officials, election authorities and opposition politicians. Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander of U.S. Central Command, is also in town. As U.S. intelligence chief John Negroponte had predicted that due to elections both Musharraf and the United States would have a challenging time this year.

They did their home work before they came to face this challenge. Two top Pakistani generals, Ehsan Saleem Hayat, the army's vice chief of staff, and Ehsan ul-Haq, the chairman of the joint chiefs, were summoned to Washington in recent days as Bush administration wanted to assess the post-Musharraf scenario before it sends its viceroys to Islamabad to dictate its new terms.

Americans have now dictated the terms. Assigned the seats. Choreographed the moves. Everyone is listening and obeying.

Americans want free, fair and transparent elections. Musharraf 'may' get his chance to ssek re-election as President if he is willing to get elected not by the outgoing legislature before it is dissolved but by the next parliament. Musharraf had planned to get re-elcted by the sitting parliament twice in order to perpetuate his rule in case his minions lost in the next election as they were sure to do.

On Wednesday, Boucher told opposition leaders that the US was "pressuring" Musharraf to "fulfil the promises" he made regarding his re-election. The elaboration of promises came from Sean McCormack's briefing on Tuesday when he gave the timeline from Washington : elections will be held in the fall and "the parliament will then choose who will be Pakistan's next president".

Musharraf also has to shed his 'seconf skin' - his uniform. Sean McCormack said that Musharraf had already pledged that if he "continues in political life", he will "put aside the uniform". He insisted that US takes "him at his word at that", and "would expect him to follow through on his commitments". It is obvious Americans have already made adjustments to their policy towards Musharraf after the ground realities changed.

Musharraf is silent. He does not feel slighted, by the dictation, but relieved. He knows his jig is up. "For years," as the San Francisco Chronicle ialized, "he has sold Washington on the threat that without him Pakistan would descend into an Iran-style Islamic theocracy, exporting trouble and waving nuclear weaponry... But it may be time to call his bluff". Americans are to call his bluff. Now he is "looking for an exit strategy" as former CIA deputy chief Rob Richer, has said. Americans are offering him a choice between a lamp post for hanging or a luxrious retirement home in suburban Chicago or Boston or share power with "our interlocutors in Pakistan". It is his choice. He knows his predecessor army dictators were either kicking out in humiliation or were blown out in a puff of smoke and some fallen debris.

Opposition is not saying anything either. It has been ensured by U.S. National Security Council spokeswoman Kate Starr from Washington that democracy is getting a second chance because "the people of Pakistan have a long-standing respect for democracy and, as a friend of Pakistan, we want to see the further development of strong democratic institutions in that country".

The United States does not much care who runs Pakistan as long as army retains its primacy as the senior and domineering partner in the future political setup as it did in the sixty years of Pakistan's history; and there is stability in Islamabad; and the Americans have direct line with army; and have the power to dictate terms. Washington does not want any unpredictable consequences and unmanagable people in power so it is trying to create a political scenario od choice before it gets too little, too late. US needs army's help in its war against Al-Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistant as a senior partner to get all the help it can in its war on terror in Afghanistan.

The American visitors are in town not as friends but masters.

These masters don't want true and undiluted democracy in Pakistan. They don't want Pakistanis to have full-fldged human rights, civil liberties and the rule of law. They just want a smooth transition from an uncomfortable and potentially dangerous situation to one of ad-hoc stability and utility.

I am afraid American visitors are in Pakistan to thwart Pakistani movement for democracy. If Pakistanis, especially the lawyer community, will not go all the way to get rid of army rule and replace it with rule of law, they may not get a second chance for a long, very long time.

Pakistanis have to decide whether it is America and army and some of their cronies who should be our masters or Pakistanis themselves. Pakistanis have a long and hard fight cut out for them. They have to rise to the ocassion. There is no other way. Rule of law in Pakistan does not suit army or America. It only suits Pakistanis.

Wednesday, June 13, 2007

Musharraf on his way out? Some in US Intelligence Think So

Some in U.S. Intelligence See Musharraf on His Way Out
By Spencer Ackerman - June 11, 2007

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S.'s Pakistan policy can be summed up in two words: Pervez Musharraf. But within the U.S. intelligence community, and in Pakistan, there's a growing belief that the U.S.-friendly military dictator's days are drawing to a close -- and possibly within the next few months. It may be time for the U.S. to face what it's long feared in the nuclear state: the prospect of chaos, rising Islamism or anti-Americanism that follows Musharraf.

But the hope -- among Pakistani military officers and politicians, to say nothing of U.S. diplomats -- is that the increasingly inept and unpopular Musharraf can be eased out of power while the U.S. slowly distances itself from him, allowing for as smooth a transition as is possible in the turbulent South Asian country. Some see the Pakistani Army remaining powerful enough to prevent a chaotic transition or an Islamist takeover. "This is going to be a Pinochet-like transition, instead of a Marcos-like one," one former Pakistani official tells TPMmuckraker. In other words, according to the ex-official, the U.S. may not stand foursquare behind its ally Musharraf until he's ultimately forced from power, as President Ronald Reagan chose with doomed Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos.

Over the past few weeks, U.S. intelligence have started to conclude that Musharraf is on his way out. "It is the sense people have, and it's been out there," says Rob Richer, a former deputy head of CIA operations who has met with Musharraf personally and long worked with the Pakistanis on intelligence issues. "This is the view of both senior (U.S. intelligence) officials and people who follow the issue closely." What's more, Richer tells TPMmuckraker, Musharraf himself knows his time is up, and is "looking for an exit strategy":

"He believes his successor has got to be someone who supports the military but it won't necessarily be someone in uniform. There's no obvious candidate … At this point, he's looking for the right person, a right-winger, someone who understands the Army."
Musharraf's vision is to make Pakistan like Turkey, where Islamic currents ebb and flow with popular sentiment, "but who enforces what they call democracy? The military." Adds Frederic Grare, a former French diplomat in Pakistan, the military could "withdraw behind the scenes but keep the levers of power," while a civilian takes charge after elections that Musharraf has called for in the fall.

Musharraf, whose alliance with the U.S. on counterterrorism has been the subject of fierce controversy within Pakistan, has made error after error since March, when he ousted a leading critic, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, a move of dubious legality. Chaudhry's Supreme Court was set to hear a case on the constitutionality of Musharraf retaining the post of Army Chief of Staff while holding the presidency, and Musharraf cited unspecified allegations of corruption in removing him. Since then, Pakistan has been rocked by popular protest, uniting many of Musharraf's enemies. On May 12, over 40 people were killed when members of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, which supports Musharraf, attacked a pro-Chaudhry demonstration in Karachi, an incident that has become a national scandal.

Making matters worse, just days later, Musharraf was confronted with another crisis: the pro-Taliban Red Mosque, located in the heart of the capitol city of Islamabad, denounced Pakistan's female tourism minister and then captured the policemen who came to arrest the mosque's leaders. On May 22, Musharraf defused the crisis without invading the mosque -- defying the wishes of many in his security apparatus -- but the militants were allowed to keep their weapons. The incident was a reminder that Pakistani jihadists have gained strength since September 2006, when Musharraf agreed to a truce with Islamist militants in the lawless Waziristan province, where Osama bin Laden and his coterie are believed to be hiding.

Within three months, Musharraf has grown steadily weaker in the eyes of the security services, the Islamists, and the general public, compounding the doubts that some in the U.S. have over his commitment to taking on al-Qaeda. The mistakes expose a regime "imploding" under the weight of its contradictions, according to Grere, and unable to mollify the multifaceted discontent that has taken root since Musharraf seized power in a 1999 coup.

Neither Richer nor Grare believes that there's an obvious candidate to succeed Musharraf, the ex-Pakistani official cited two prominent generals who could emerge as successors if the Army opts to retain formal rule, or alternatively, serve as crucial behind-the-scenes power brokers. The two are Ehsan Saleem Hayat, the army's vice chief of staff, and Ehsan ul-Haq, the chairman of the joint chiefs and a former head of Pakistan's powerful intelligence apparatus, known as the ISI. According to the ex-Pakistani official, both men were recently in Washington, sounding out senior officials: "They didn't come to Washington for a Burger King meal." A State Department official confirms that ul-Haq met in May with Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, but could not say the same for Hayat.

The former Pakistani official says that the message that the possible successors are trying to send to the U.S. is that "continuity in policy can be ensured without the continuity of an individual, while at the same time, a democratic process can proceed." In other words, the U.S. can wean itself off of Musharraf without fear that the U.S.-Pakistani alliance is at risk, and will likely have some kind of election to point to that blesses the result. Not many see the Islamists as able to take control. "One common factor in places where Islamists rise to power is the economy tanking," observes Richer. "But in Pakistan investment is taking off. It doesn't have many of the factors that drive religious elements taking power."

This week, Richard Boucher, the assistant secretary of state for South Asia, will visit Pakistan as part of region-wide trip. A State Department official denies that Boucher would send any particular message to Musharraf, and says he's there to "follow up on (previous) discussions," especially about counterterrorism cooperation.

Tuesday, June 12, 2007

Stratfor on Musharraf's Problematic Survival Plan

Summary

In an effort designed to help dissipate the growing political storm in the country and secure his own re-election, Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf plans, among other things, to reinstate suspended Pakistani Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry. The plan is crippled by too many moving parts, however, meaning Musharraf at best could only hold on to power as a president sharing power with a prime minister at the head of a coalition government.

Analysis

Richard Boucher, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, arrived June 12 in Islamabad on a two-day official visit. Topping the agenda of discussion between Boucher and Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf is Pakistan's increasing crisis of governance. Boucher will relay Washington's interest in having Musharraf remain at the helm, but also will communicate that Musharraf needs to reach an accommodation with his opponents.

The two main reasons informing Musharraf's decision to tough it out in the face of the South Asian nation's rapidly expanding crisis are U.S. backing and the support of the senior generals within Pakistan's military hierarchy. Musharraf also knows that he must demonstrate to both Washington and his own generals that he very much controls the situation to ensure their continued support. To do so he has devised a plan to defuse the political crisis involving reinstating suspended Pakistani Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, something that also will help create conditions conducive for his own re-election.

Though Chaudhry's reinstatement might provide the embattled general with a brief respite, his bid for re-election is going to be extremely hard to pull off in part due to the increasingly assertive nature of Pakistan's judiciary and the media. Ultimately, there is just too much that can go wrong in the process of securing a second term.

The first step in defusing tensions was the government's June 9 move to withdraw restrictions on the media; this had two effects. First, it satisfied concerns within the Bush administration, which was finding it difficult to support Musharraf while his government was openly limiting free speech. Second, it prevented the anti-Musharraf movement from receiving a sudden and major boost.

In the meantime, the government produced a budget significantly increasing government employee salaries and announced that an election schedule would be released soon after parliament approved the budget. Musharraf himself said June 8 that the nation would hear the good news about the end of the ongoing political crisis. "The ongoing drama will end itself very soon and there is nothing to worry about it," he told members of parliament from the ruling coalition and Cabinet members.

The next step will be allowing Pakistan's Supreme Court to reinstate the chief justice, which will be Musharraf's way of neutralizing the legal community's protests. Once back on the job, Chaudhry will not be able to participate in rallies given his position as a nonpartisan national figure -- thus taking the chief justice and his supporters out of the limelight. The government also will try to block Chaudhry from presiding over cases involving the president on grounds that as a party to a dispute with the president, the top jurist cannot appear unbiased against Musharraf. The chief justice and his allies indeed would like to see Chaudhry's restoration and Musharraf's ouster. The government, however, hopes the restoration will forestall the latter.

The chief justice's reinstatement could provide some brief respite to Musharraf. But the president general must go through the process of re-election, which according to the government must take place between Sept. 15 and Oct. 15. The presidential election is highly controversial because Musharraf is seeking re-election from the same electoral college, composed of the current national and provincial legislatures, that elected him in the first place. His opponents have demanded fresh parliamentary elections before the presidential vote. But the main opposition group, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto might be willing to negotiate a deal whereby Musharraf can be re-elected on the condition he steps down as military chief.

Accepting a president in uniform is a redline the PPP cannot cross and sustain its position as the country's largest political party and its reputation of being anti-establishment. Musharraf's uniform constitutes the basis of his power, and assuming the role of a civilian president is a prospect fraught with perils. Even so, mounting pressure to defuse the crisis could force his hand and make him decide to retire from the military, though that would entail another set of complexities.

Ideally, Musharraf wants to remain army chief of staff until after the parliamentary elections to be held sometime in November, though even he knows that under the present conditions that is asking too much. At a bare minimum, however, he wants to remain military chief until the first week of October so he can oversee the next round of routine promotions and retirements of senior generals. That would allow him to stack the military deck with people he can theoretically work with even after becoming a civilian president.

Another hurdle to his re-election is that even if he were to have a deal with the PPP, members of parliament from the Islamist coalition, the Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) -- which controls one and a half provinces and is one of the largest opposition blocs in parliament -- could see its members tender their resignations, thereby rendering the electoral college dysfunctional. And street protests would come back with a bang should Musharraf try to force his way to re-election. So any deal would have to include not just the PPP, but the MMA and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf ousted from power in 1999.

Balancing the civilian side of his government with the military side is rapidly becoming untenable for Musharraf. As a result, the resolution to the current crisis requires a very complex arrangement that under the present conditions is unlikely to hold. Thus Musharraf at best can hope to share power as a civilian with a much broader array of far more assertive civilians.

Monday, June 11, 2007

Pakistan: Pressure Cooker of Repression

The New York Times Editorial: Pakistan’s Dictator Published: June 11, 2007

If Gen. Pervez Musharraf were the democratic leader he indignantly insists he is, he would not be so busy threatening independent news outlets, arresting hundreds of opposition politicians and berating parliamentary leaders and ministers from his own party for insufficient loyalty to his arbitrary and widely unpopular policies.

But nobody takes General Musharraf’s democratic claims seriously anymore, except for the Bush administration, which has put itself in the embarrassing position of propping up the Muslim world’s most powerful military dictator as an essential ally in its half-baked campaign to promote democracy throughout the Muslim world. Washington needs to disentangle America, quickly, from the general’s damaging embrace.

Ever since his high-handed dismissal of the country’s independent-minded chief justice in March, the general has been busily digging himself into an ever deeper political hole.

Last week, he issued a decree giving himself increased powers to shut down independent television channels, but under mounting pressure he withdrew it over the weekend. More than 300 local political leaders in Punjab were arrested in an effort to head off protests against the decree. Still, thousands of lawyers, journalists and political activists gathered to protest the firing, the censorship and the general’s continued rule. Pakistan seems to be rapidly approaching a critical turning point, with a choice between intensified repression and instability or an orderly transition back to democratic rule.

Were Washington now to begin distancing itself from the general, it would greatly encourage civic-minded Pakistanis to step up the pressure for free national elections. That’s a process the chief justice was trying to make possible when he was fired. And that is what Pakistan’s last two democratically elected leaders — Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif — are both campaigning for from abroad. The United States should be supporting these efforts, not continuing to make excuses for General Musharraf.

Pakistan has its share of violent Islamic extremists, military and civilian. But they are clearly in the minority. The best hope for diluting their political, and geopolitical, influence lies not in heating the pressure cooker of repression, but in promoting the earliest possible democratic elections.

Saturday, June 09, 2007

Stratfor on The Future Pakistani Military Leadership

Pakistan: The Future Military Leadership
June 08, 2007

Summary

For the first time since Pakistan's current political crisis began March 9, Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf acknowledged June 7 that he is in trouble. His admission that his hold on power is slipping raises significant doubts about his ability to secure a second term in the presidential election slated for the second half of September. It is too early to predict which actor will succeed him politically, but Musharraf's ability (or lack thereof) to win re-election will be a key element in shaping the Pakistani military's future.

Analysis

In a speech to lawmakers from Pakistan's ruling coalition, embattled Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf said he is worried and warned that a change in the current political order would be disastrous for the country, Pakistani media reported June 7. Musharraf accused his parliamentary allies of abandoning him in the ongoing political crisis and said he constantly receives reports about what they are saying privately. The president went on to criticize his allies for not supporting him publicly and questioned their usefulness if they are not willing to step up and defend him in the media and other public forums against criticism from the opposition.

These comments -- Musharraf's first admission of concern since the political crisis began March 9 -- show that the Musharraf regime is buckling under the weight of the crisis, which has created serious fissures within the civilian side of the hybrid Musharrafian political system. Infighting among his allies -- upon whom he depends to secure a second presidential term -- and the rapidly intensifying unrest in the country raise serious doubts about Musharraf's ability to win the next presidential election, scheduled for the second half of September. If the president cannot win re-election, he could try to impose an emergency rule of sorts, but that would only exacerbate matters.

When Musharraf cannot seek re-election, his generals likely will force him to throw in the towel, and a caretaker government, whose main task will be holding fresh parliamentary polls, will be created. It is too early to predict which political force will form the next government, since a number of elements are in play. Whatever happens to Musharraf politically, the composition of Pakistan's military -- with or without Musharraf -- is relatively easier to discern.

If Musharraf Wins Re-election

Musharraf not only wants to get re-elected as president, but he also wants to do so while holding onto the position of military chief. This is because he wants to oversee the forthcoming round of promotions and retirements in order to build the right team to ensure his hold on power -- a step that would be an absolute necessity if Musharraf later caves to domestic pressure and steps down as military chief.

The military deck is scheduled to undergo a routine reshuffle in the first week of October. The most prominent change to come is the retirement of Musharraf's two senior-most subordinates: Vice Chief of the Army Staff (VCOAS) Gen. Ahsan Saleem Hayat and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq. Currently, these two are the only four-star generals besides Musharraf himself. If he wins re-election in September, Musharraf's priority will be to fill the vacant positions. This process will bring to the fore younger generals, among whom there are a number of possible candidates based on merit and seniority, as well as on personal ties to Musharraf:
• Lt. Gen. Tariq Majeed: commander of the 10th Corps, who is considered to be the most capable among all the corps commanders, and who is the front-runner for the No. 2 position of VCOAS
• Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani: director-general of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and another senior general who could be appointed to the No. 3 post, the CJCSC
• Lt. Gen. Salahuddin Satti: current chief of the General Staff who, though a bit junior to other generals, could be moved to a key position
• Lt. Gen. Muhammad Yousaf: current vice chief of the General Staff, who also could be appointed to a critical position


While effecting promotions and appointments, he would want to make sure that his own position is not threatened, especially given the growing movement to oust him from power. Moreover, should he need to step down as military chief and become a civilian president, he would want the next military chief to be beholden to him. This involves not just loyalty but also the creation of dependency. Therefore, he could go beyond the top tier of generals and elevate others, such as 4th Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Shafaatullah Shah, Quarter Master General Lt. Gen. Afzal Muzaffar or 30th Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Waseem Ahmed Ashraf. Director-General of Military Intelligence Maj-Gen. Nadeem Ejaz could also become a three-star general and be made director-general of the ISI.

There is a downside to filling the top slots with second-tier commanders. These generals are inexperienced in political matters, especially in situations like the current crisis. Therefore, they are more likely to press Musharraf to step down if the existing situation escalates, especially with political forces mobilizing for the parliamentary polls slated for November.

Considering the pace and magnitude of the anti-Musharraf movement's growth, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that Musharraf can win re-election. Once Musharraf realizes that an election victory is beyond his reach, he could attempt to impose emergency rule as a means of prolonging his hold on power. This will only accelerate the unrest and lead to the point at which his generals will likely have to force him to quit.

If Musharraf is Forced to Step Down

Though he is the army chief, Musharraf has not had time to oversee the day-to-day running of the military because of his duties as a president -- especially as a president who has had to deal with an extraordinary number of domestic and foreign policy issues. As a result, Hayat has been running the military on Musharraf's behalf and could easily step into the role of military chief.

But the task of removing the increasingly unpopular Musharraf -- especially since Hayat is due to retire -- would make the process very complicated, to say the least. Furthermore, Hayat is known to be mild-mannered, which makes him unlikely to initiate Musharraf's removal. Instead, a consensus among corps commanders and certain key agency heads would be required.

This is where the other four-star general, Ehsan-ul-Haq, who has served as head of the military's two intelligence directorates, could play an important role. However, Ehsan-ul-Haq's position is ceremonial, so he does not have the authority to get the ball rolling or even secure a position in a post-Musharraf military leadership. This makes the role of the corps commanders -- who already are key because they are in command of the troops -- all the more important.

From the seniority standpoint, Majeed and Kiyani would be the key deciding players, while Satti and commander of the Mangla-based 1st Corps Lt. Gen. Sajjad Akram would be the prominent players from a logistical standpoint. At the end of the day, a consensus would be needed among the three-star generals, who likely would back Hayat to succeed Musharraf as army chief and get a three-year extension, thereby avoiding his scheduled retirement.

Hayat's first order of business as military chief would be to work with the political forces and the civilian establishment to install an acting president and caretaker government headed by an interim prime minister, which would hold parliamentary elections within 90 days. Though Hayat would not inherit Musharraf's political powers, he would be the one to oversee the reshuffle of the military deck, at which point every position aside from his own would be up for grabs. That said, those who would have played leading roles in the removal of Musharraf will be the ones most likely to assume key posts in the post-Musharraf military hierarchy.

After Musharraf's departure from the helm, regardless of how and when that happens, the military is unlikely to continue to directly run the country. Moreover, because of the assertiveness of the judiciary and the media, and an increasingly vibrant civil society, the military will have to give the civilian setup more freedom than it did in 1988, when military rule came to an end after military-chief-cum-president Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq died in a mysterious plane crash. But, for the foreseeable future, the military will continue to maintain a strong hold over the state -- partly because it is the most disciplined and professional institution in the country.

Friday, June 08, 2007

Hollow Promises of Justice

The Faisalabad police Deputy Inspector General (DIG) admits in the court thatHafiz Abdul Basit was arrested by his force in January 2004, and after taking his statement he was handed over to Captain Amir of Military Intelligence.

Then Hafiz Abdul Basit's uncle, Hafiz Abdul Nasir submits an affidavit in the Supreme Court stating that he himself was abducted by army and put in detention with his nephew to put pressure on the ‘detainee’ (Hafiz Abdul Basit) whom he found in critical condition.

But when on Wednesday the Supreme Court bench, comprising of Justice Javed Iqbal, Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar and Justice Falak Sher taking up petitions, for the recovery of ‘missing’ persons, of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and former senator Farhatullah Babar and complaints of Amina Masood Janjua and others, orders that Hafiz Abdul Basit be produced in the court the National Crisis Management Cell (NCMC) Director Colonel Javed Iqbal Lodhi insists that the he and his NCMC have no information about Mr Basit.

Justice Javed Iqbal then orders that either Mr Basit be produced in the court or the authorities concerned rebut the claim on oath.

Deputy Attorney-General Tariq Mehmood Khokhar informs the court, however, that four more missing persons had been "traced".

DAG said Sher Ahmed Khan and Mohammad Jan had been found in the custody of Dera Ismail Khan police for their alleged involvement in a bomb blast case.

Afzal Dilbar and Shabbir Tararau had reached their homes. (From where he does not say; and the judges do not ask.)

According to DAG's latest statement out of 254 missing persons on the list 102 had been located. 152 were still "missing".

But Justice Javed Iqbal assures the families that the case would be taken to its logical conclusion and legal action would be taken against those responsible, regardless of their official status.

“No one is above the law. Legal action will be taken irrespective of who is who. And what I am saying, I mean it. If someone feels that he is above the law, he is committing a mistake. Let your superior know that we are very serious about this case,” Justice Javed Iqbal observed while giving directions to the NCMC representative.

The judge asked the NCMC director under which law had the people been picked up, detained and then released.

Then the judge give a nice piece of advice to the abductors: “There are a number of statutory laws to proceed against any person. Why don’t you adopt those provisions”.

Then he gives just a glimpse of the tragic and grave situation of the abuse of human rights in Pakistan at the hands of military government: “I receive 10 to 15 letters of complaints daily, mostly from Balochistan, regarding enforced disappearances”.

The court took suo moto notice of fresh ‘disappearances’ of Shah Zain Bugti, grandson of the late Baloch leader Akbar Bugti; Ghulam Qadir and Khan Mohammad. The latter two were picked up from Gaddap in Karachi on April 16, while Ali Asghar Menagalzai was taken away from Quetta.

The case of a 12-year-old girl, Sherry, whose father Abdul Wahid is reported to have been picked up by intelligence agencies from Makran on March 14, will also be taken up during the next hearing on June 20.

Advocate Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui told the court that most cases of disappearances belonged to Balochistan. Even the district nazim of Dera Bugti had been picked up, he said.

Former senator Babar urged the court to obtain affidavits from the heads of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the MI about the missing persons.

Advocate Dr Babar Awan said the federal information minister, interior minister and the ISPR director-general had confirmed the arrest of a wanted man, Naeem Noor Khan, but he was still in the category of ‘missing’ persons and his whereabouts were not known.

Justice Javed Iqbal assured the families of the missing persons that action would be taken at the inspector-general and secretary level, and constables or SHOs would not be made scapegoat.

Amina Janjua filed an affidavit, stating that five released men told her that they had seen her husband Masood Janjua in different detention cells of the ISI, including the army-run 501 Workshop in Rawalpindi cantonment. The court directed the DAG to verify the contents of the affidavit and submit a report, with the observation that “the 501 Workshop is not out of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.”

NYT Enforced Disappearances


Rights Groups Call for End to Secret Detentions
June 7, 2007
By SCOTT SHANE
WASHINGTON, June 6 — Six human rights groups on Wednesday released a list of 39 people they believe have been secretly imprisoned by the United States and whose whereabouts are unknown, calling on the Bush administration to abandon such detentions.

The list, compiled from news media reports, interviews and government documents, includes terrorism suspects and those thought to have ties to militant groups. In some suspects’ cases, officials acknowledge that they were at one time in United States custody. In others, the rights groups say, there is other evidence, sometimes sketchy, that they had at least once been in American hands.

The list includes, for instance, Hassan Ghul, a Pakistani who is accused of being a member of Al Qaeda and whose capture in northern Iraq in January 2004 was announced by President Bush. At the other extreme, two unnamed Somali nationals are on the list because they were overheard in 2005 by another prisoner who was later released, Marwan Jabour, in the cell next to his at a secret American detention center, possibly in Afghanistan.

Meg Satterthwaite, of the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at New York University, one of the six groups, said the recent American practice mimiced “disappearances” of political opponents under Latin American dictators. “Enforced disappearances are illegal, regardless of who carries them out,” she said.

The other groups that compiled the list were Amnesty International, the Center for Constitutional Rights, Human Rights Watch and two British groups, Reprieve and Cageprisoners. Three of the groups are suing under the Freedom of Information Act to learn what became of the prisoners.

The Bush administration has defended secretly detaining some suspects as a necessity of the fight against terrorism because officials do not want to tip off terrorist groups that their operatives are in custody. They say the comparison with past Latin American regimes is unfair, because those seized by the Americans are not killed and their whereabouts will eventually be revealed.

A Central Intelligence Agency spokesman, Paul Gimigliano, would not comment on the names on the list. But he said “there is no shortage of myth about what the C.I.A. has done to fight terror.”

“The plain truth is that we act in strict accord with American law,” he said, adding that the agency’s actions “have been very effective in disrupting plots and saving lives.”

In a reminder that the handling of captured terrorism suspects remains a pressing issue, Pentagon officials said Wednesday that a courier linking terrorist cells in the Horn of Africa and Al Qaeda officials in Pakistan was captured recently in East Africa and transported this week to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.

Bryan Whitman, a Pentagon spokesman, said the detainee, Abdullahi Sudi Arale, was suspected of providing terrorist cells in East Africa with explosives and weapons. He traveled from Pakistan to Somalia in September 2006 and held a leadership role in the Islamic Courts Council, which held power in part of Somalia until earlier this year, according to a Pentagon statement.

“We believe him to be an extremely dangerous member of the Al Qaeda network,” Mr. Whitman said. But he said Mr. Arale, whose age and nationality were not released, would not be part of the “high value” group in the Guantánamo prisoner population of about 385.

Even before the secret detentions were officially confirmed, the practice drew widespread objections, including from within the Bush administration. William H. Taft IV, legal adviser at the State Department from 2001 to 2005, opposed it while in office and on Wednesday said he had not changed his view.

“I believe the United States should always account for people in its custody,” said Mr. Taft, who had not reviewed the human rights groups’ report. “When our own people are missing, we want to be able to insist on an accounting from their captors,” Mr. Taft said. He added that keeping prisoners secret could tempt their jailers to abuse them and to cover up their deaths in custody.

In September, President Bush for the first time officially acknowledged the C.I.A.’s secret overseas detentions, saying that the 14 prisoners then in the agency’s hands had been moved to Guantánamo. A 15th so-called high-level prisoner, an Iraqi Kurd named Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, alleged to be a top aide to Osama bin Laden, was moved to Guantánamo in April after being held secretly by the C.I.A. for several months.

Mohammad Khan, 31, a Pakistani banker who was held in secret in Pakistan and questioned by Americans for 56 days in 2003, described the experience in an interview from Karachi on Wednesday. Mr. Khan’s brother, Majid Khan, who was arrested along with him but held in secret C.I.A. custody for the next three years, is among the high-level prisoners at Guantánamo. He is accused of plotting to blow up gas stations in the United States and planning other terrorist acts, charges his brother said he denies.

After their imprisonment, “Our family members had no idea where we were,” Mr. Khan said. He said his brother was questioned by Americans for up to eight hours while confined to a small chair and eventually signed false confessions.

Later, Mr. Khan said, he and other family members, including some who live in the Baltimore area, believed for a time that Majid Khan was dead and learned of his whereabouts only from President Bush’s September speech.

“How can there be any justification for this?” Mr. Khan said. “You can’t kidnap people and hold them somewhere in the world and torture them.”

Sunday, June 03, 2007

Constitutional Duties of the Armed Forces of Pakistan

In the Constitution of Pakistan the Armed Forces have been dealt with in PART XII, appropriately headed: Miscellaneous. It happens to be the last part of our Constitution, just before annex, schedules and amendments.

It is Chapter 2 of this Part that specifically deals with the Armed Forces.

Under Article 243 the Constitution clearly states that the Command of Armed Forces shall be in the civilian hands.

243. Command of Armed Forces.

"(1) The Federal Government shall have control and command of the Armed Forces."

...

Under Article 244 the Constitution makes very clear that every member of the Armed Forces shall take an oath prescribed in the Third Schedule. This oath, too, happens to be the last oath in this schedule.

244. Oath of Armed Forces.

"Every member of the Armed Forces shall make oath in the form set out in the Third Schedule."

THIRD SCHEDULE

Oaths of Office

Members Of The Armed Forces [Article 244]

Here is the oath every member of the Armed Forces take in which every single member says that he will NOT engage himself in any political activities WHATSOEVER.

"(In the name of Allah, the most Beneficent, the most Merciful.)
I, ____________, do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to Pakistan and uphold the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which embodies the will of the people, that I will not engage myself in any political activities whatsoever and that I will honestly and faithfully serve Pakistan in the Pakistan Army (or Navy or Air Force) as required by and under the law.

May Allah Almighty help and guide me (A'meen)."

...

Now let me ask General Musharraf and his Corps Commanders that if they solemnly took this oath? Have they not gone against their oath by engaging in the political activities?

It is them, and no one else, who are a "small minority" of "obstructionist forces" and anti-State "opportunists" that have waged a "malicious campaign" of "serving their vested interests and agenda by flouting the rule of law".

Go back to your constitutional duties of defending the countries and keeping your oath and let civilians run the country and obey them.

Who are obstructionist forces of a small minority?

Looks like General Musharraf has finally seen the writing on the wall. But he has taken the wrong message from it.

In the face of growing storm of judicial crisis, instaed of calling for a retreat by taking the reference back, he has drawn his last weapon, the army, and has pushed it into the last fight of his life - that could turn out to be his Waterloo in the best of scenarios. But it could also plunge Pakistan into the hell pit of a civil war.

On Friday, he called the meeting of the corps commanders and principal staff officers ahead of schedule. And in a highly unusual fasion asked the Inter Services Public Relations office to release a press statement after the meeting. The statement says that the participants "reviewed internal situation in the country" and "the Commanders noted the positive developments in the field of socio-economic progress, and the efforts being made to promote tolerance and moderation in the society" and "strongly reaffirmed Pakistan Army’s support for continuity of Government’s policies, both internal and external. The participants reiterated support for the pivotal role of the President and the COAS in the ongoing reform process". They "took serious note of the malicious campaign against Institutions of State, launched by vested interests and opportunists who were acting as obstructionist forces to serve their personal interests and agenda even at the cost of flouting the rule of law".

They also "affirmed to stand committed for the security of their country under the leadership and guidance of the President and the COAS". They warned that they "any attempt by a small minority to obstruct the aspirations of vast majority would only derail the nation from its path of progress and prosperity. The Pakistan Army is committed to lend full support towards realization of the vision set by the President for a dynamic, progressive and moderate Islamic State".

At the end the statement says that "the President appreciated unstinted support of the participants and assured them that nobody will be allowed to bring instability in the country".

The question is who are these "obstructionist forces", "a small minority" of "vested interests" and of "opportunists" who have waged a "malicious campaign against Institutions of State" ... "to serve their personal interests and agenda even at the cost of flouting the rule of law"?

Army itself is that small minority which has, for the last 60 years, proven to be an obstructionist force that has been hell bent to serve its personal interests and agenda while flouting the rule of law by committing the high treason of abrogating the Constitution of Pakistan over and over again and forgetting its assigned duties. It is the army and its top commanders who always waged a milicious campaign against all other institutions of state.

Since when number 9 (# of corps commanders) has grown bigger than 100's (number of members of the parliament)? What system of counting the cammoanders have used to show 500,000 (# of military personnel) is greater than 169,500,000 (# of Pakistanis)?

General Musharraf has thrown his last weapon into the fray. It is a dangerous and reckless move. It won't be long before this policy of involving the army as a party into Pakistani people's struggle for rule of law, and respect for human rights will fling Pakistan into a civil war.

But I don't believe there is any other recourse for the people to get their fundamental and natural rights back from the clutches of the military rule but through a civil war in which they are being pushed by the greed and lust of Generals.