See if you have read these words before? Many times. Right?Musharraf Government says it has found 118 missing persons and the Supreme Court seeks separate reports on each case.
How many time do the judges have to repeat this tiring, stale rhetoric to realize that we know what is going on?
I ask the to stop playing this game of giving hope to the families of the disappeared Pakistanis and throw your hands like sons of men and admit that the odds are to high for you to pull it off.
Look at this news piece: "The government on Wednesday told the Supreme Court that five more missing people had been traced and four of them sent home. It said 118 out of a total of 285 missing persons had been traced so far".
Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Tariq Khokhar told the court that Zafar Yasin, Naeem Noor Khan, Luqman and Abid Raza had been recently found and sent home, adding that Alim Nasir was in custody of a political agent [?] in DI Khan.
Luqman’s brother-in-law contradicted the DAG’s claim, saying Luqman had not reached his home yet. The SC bench, consisting of Justices Javed Iqbal and Falak Sher, directed the DAG to recheck the record.
Can you imagine: check the record!
The wife of Khalid Khawaja, a former ISI official claimed police arrested her husband without any warrant, adding that he was not linked with Lal Masjid.
Deputy Commissioner (DC) Muhammad Ali said Khawaja was booked in a police case. The court directed the DC to submit details of the case with it in a week.
How many weeks are in a judicial week?
The bench also took notice of the arrest of Hafiz Abdul Basit on allegation of his involvement in the ‘Muaharraf attack case’ and directed the authorities to release him because he was not named in the list of convicted people and no FIR was registered against him.
Would they? No way.
Father of recently traced Qari Obaidullah told the bench that he had met his son in CMH Rawalpindi, adding that the man’s weight had reduced from 72-kilogrammes to 42-kilogrammes. The bench summoned a complete record of medical treatment of Obaidullah from the CMH. The DAG, meanwhile, said missing Attiqur Rehman was not held by any intelligence agencies.
SP Faislabad told the court that an FIR for the disappearance of Atif Javed was lodged on August 4, 2005. The court called for a complete record of Javed’s case.
Human rights activist Asma Jahangir appeared before the court to plead the constitutional petition of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP). She said only 78 out of 173 missing people listed by the HRCP had been traced thus far. The bench expressed anger [ha!]over the slow process of recovery of the missing people.
Advocate Habibur Rehman pleaded a constitutional petition for 28 missing Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal men. Justice Falak Sher said four governments had expired since the case began, asking the lawyer why it was not brought into court earlier. “You did not bother to lodge FIR of these missing people. Today, if a person tries to move Supreme Court regarding the killings in riots during 1947, then how we would help him,” asked Justice Falak Sher.
The counsel submitted that the persons mentioned in his petition disappeared between 1992 and 1996. Justice Javed Iqbal asked him to provide complete details of the missing people within a month.
Amna Masud Janjua, coordinator of the families of missing people, submitted that the court must pass an order to expedite the process of recovery. The bench directed the authorities to give a separate progress report on each missing person within 10 days otherwise action would be taken against them. The hearing was adjourned till August 6.
August 6 is not far. Let us see what the judges come up on that date.
Now look at the following news piece: "Deputy Attorney General Tariq Mahmood Khokar on Wednesday told a two-member bench of the Supreme Court that five of . the remaining 248 missing persons had been traced and released. Is it 118 or 248?
Thursday, July 19, 2007
Sunday, July 15, 2007
End or Beginning?
By first encouraging, for months, his old buddies and veterans of Afghanistan Jihad in Lal Masjid, and then invading them only when China came down hard on him for the kidnapping of its citizens by the militants, Musharraf might have been able to convince the White House that he was the man US still needed to control extremism in Pakistan. He might also have gotten some more time in power. But I don't believe he himself is convinced that, without pushing his army in the midst of a low-intensity civil war, he can eliminate the scourge his army had created, supported, and trained at the behest of USA, for two decades starting at the end of seventies.
The militants have grown too strong for him, or for the USA for that matter. Look what is going on:
Militants in pamphlets distributed in Miranshah, the main town of North Waziristan region, say they have ended their ten months long truce with the government and blamed the government for breaking the agreement. Pakistan deployed thousands of troops in Swat area, fearing "holy war" after the storming of the militant Red Mosque last week.
More than 60 Pakistanis, including soldiers and police recruits, have been killed in three attacks in the past two days. At least 11 Pakistani soldiers were killed in Swat when two suicide bombers rammed explosive laden cars into a convoy. At the same time a roadside bomb also went off. Another 40 were injured in the attack near the town of Matta.
In the city of Dera Ismail Khan at least 26 people died and more than 30 were wounded when a suicide bomber blew himself up among young men waiting to take a police recruitment test at a police recruitment centre.
On Saturday, a suicide attack on an army convoy near the village of Daznary, near Miranshah, killed 24 and wounded at least 30.
Previously 102 people died in the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) siege including 11 soldiers.
If Musharraf thinks that by killing a hundred or so people in the mess called Lal Masjid Incident he is moving in the right direction then he is in for a shock. I hope I am wrong but I don't believe it is the end. I am afraid it is the beginning. The militants of Lal Masjid have clearly struck a chord with the conservative segments of the society because they tapped into a strong and seething sense of injustice and inequality. They have shown by their example that when the state fails to take action then people themselves can take action but they have to be very strong to do so. People can see the government system does not work. It is corrupt and people are sick and tired of it.
The worst example was set by Musharraf himself when he seized power by force. He has marginalized moderate political parties and has created a political vacuum that needs to filled. And that is being filled by religious extremists. He does not seem to understand or his masters who push him in that direction are too powerful for him to let him understand that there cannot be no a military solution to Pakistan's problems.
More and more Pakistanis will be drawn to the mindset of power as long as long as a general, whose only training is in using force, is sitting in the president's chair.
The militants have grown too strong for him, or for the USA for that matter. Look what is going on:
Militants in pamphlets distributed in Miranshah, the main town of North Waziristan region, say they have ended their ten months long truce with the government and blamed the government for breaking the agreement. Pakistan deployed thousands of troops in Swat area, fearing "holy war" after the storming of the militant Red Mosque last week.
More than 60 Pakistanis, including soldiers and police recruits, have been killed in three attacks in the past two days. At least 11 Pakistani soldiers were killed in Swat when two suicide bombers rammed explosive laden cars into a convoy. At the same time a roadside bomb also went off. Another 40 were injured in the attack near the town of Matta.
In the city of Dera Ismail Khan at least 26 people died and more than 30 were wounded when a suicide bomber blew himself up among young men waiting to take a police recruitment test at a police recruitment centre.
On Saturday, a suicide attack on an army convoy near the village of Daznary, near Miranshah, killed 24 and wounded at least 30.
Previously 102 people died in the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) siege including 11 soldiers.
If Musharraf thinks that by killing a hundred or so people in the mess called Lal Masjid Incident he is moving in the right direction then he is in for a shock. I hope I am wrong but I don't believe it is the end. I am afraid it is the beginning. The militants of Lal Masjid have clearly struck a chord with the conservative segments of the society because they tapped into a strong and seething sense of injustice and inequality. They have shown by their example that when the state fails to take action then people themselves can take action but they have to be very strong to do so. People can see the government system does not work. It is corrupt and people are sick and tired of it.
The worst example was set by Musharraf himself when he seized power by force. He has marginalized moderate political parties and has created a political vacuum that needs to filled. And that is being filled by religious extremists. He does not seem to understand or his masters who push him in that direction are too powerful for him to let him understand that there cannot be no a military solution to Pakistan's problems.
More and more Pakistanis will be drawn to the mindset of power as long as long as a general, whose only training is in using force, is sitting in the president's chair.
Bush's Lawless Detainee Policies
US Senate is finally going to consider a bill that would restore to the prisoners of Guantánamo Bay the right to challenge their detention in court. But Bush administration is looking for a legislation that would permit the long-term detention of foreigners on American soil without charges or appeal, basically just changing the address of Guantanamo Bay. But "the biggest challenge", as Defense Secretary Gates said, "is finding a statutory basis for holding prisoners who should never be released and who may or may not be able to be put on trial.”
Read the New York Times editorial on this issue published: July 15, 2007
Terrorism and the Law: In Washington, a Need to Right Wrongs
Congress and President Bush are engaged in a profound debate over what the founding fathers intended when they divided the powers to declare and conduct war between two co-equal branches of government. But on one thing, the Constitution is clear: Congress makes the rules on prisoners.
At least that is what it says in Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 11 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to “make rules concerning captures on land and water.” And it is good that Congress seems finally ready to get back on the job. This week, the Senate will consider a bill that would restore to the prisoners of Guantánamo Bay the right to challenge their detention in court.
The Senate and then the House must pass the bill with veto-proof majorities. But that is only a start. The White House and its Republican allies have managed to delay consideration of bills that would finally shut the prison at Guantánamo Bay and begin undoing the damage wrought by the Military Commissions Act of 2006. That national disgrace gave legal cover to secret prisons, kangaroo courts and the indefinite detention of prisoners without charges in a camp outside the United States.
Shutting Guantánamo Bay will not be easy — and it will not be enough. Of about 375 inmates, the administration says only about 80 can be charged under the Military Commissions Act. Along with Guantánamo the entire law needs to be scrapped. Prisoners against whom there is actual evidence of crimes should be tried either in military or federal courts. Mounting an effective prosecution may be hard, since these prisoners were held for years without charges and some were tortured. But it is up to the administration’s lawyers — who helped Mr. Bush create the problem by allowing indefinite detention and torture to begin with — to deal with it.
Human rights groups say there are about 30 inmates who should be released but have legitimate fear of persecution or torture if sent home. The administration reportedly has already sent back some vulnerable prisoners, after obtaining what it must know are worthless assurances of their safety. Congress should require notice of such transfers, real guarantees of protection for released prisoners, and a review of the deal by outside judicial authority.
That leaves around 265 prisoners who have been held for years in violation of American and international law because Mr. Bush decided they were illegal enemy combatants — even though most were captured while fighting the invasion of Afghanistan. Under pressure from the courts, the administration created Combatant Status Review Tribunals to rubber-stamp that designation. These tribunals must be disbanded and their rulings reviewed by courts. Inmates who are not security risks should be released, and the others held under normal articles of war.
President Bush, of course, wants Congress to simply endorse his arrogation of power. The Times reported recently that the White House is seeking support for legislation that would permit the long-term detention of foreigners on American soil without charges or appeal, just on Mr. Bush’s say-so. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said “the biggest challenge is finding a statutory basis for holding prisoners who should never be released and who may or may not be able to be put on trial.”
Challenge? The very idea is anathema to American democracy. Congress did harm enough by tolerating Mr. Bush’s lawless detainee policies, and then by passing the Military Commissions Act. Giving the president a dictator’s power to select people for detention without charges on American soil would be an utter betrayal of their oath to support and defend the Constitution, and of the founders’ vision of America.
Read the New York Times editorial on this issue published: July 15, 2007
Terrorism and the Law: In Washington, a Need to Right Wrongs
Congress and President Bush are engaged in a profound debate over what the founding fathers intended when they divided the powers to declare and conduct war between two co-equal branches of government. But on one thing, the Constitution is clear: Congress makes the rules on prisoners.
At least that is what it says in Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 11 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to “make rules concerning captures on land and water.” And it is good that Congress seems finally ready to get back on the job. This week, the Senate will consider a bill that would restore to the prisoners of Guantánamo Bay the right to challenge their detention in court.
The Senate and then the House must pass the bill with veto-proof majorities. But that is only a start. The White House and its Republican allies have managed to delay consideration of bills that would finally shut the prison at Guantánamo Bay and begin undoing the damage wrought by the Military Commissions Act of 2006. That national disgrace gave legal cover to secret prisons, kangaroo courts and the indefinite detention of prisoners without charges in a camp outside the United States.
Shutting Guantánamo Bay will not be easy — and it will not be enough. Of about 375 inmates, the administration says only about 80 can be charged under the Military Commissions Act. Along with Guantánamo the entire law needs to be scrapped. Prisoners against whom there is actual evidence of crimes should be tried either in military or federal courts. Mounting an effective prosecution may be hard, since these prisoners were held for years without charges and some were tortured. But it is up to the administration’s lawyers — who helped Mr. Bush create the problem by allowing indefinite detention and torture to begin with — to deal with it.
Human rights groups say there are about 30 inmates who should be released but have legitimate fear of persecution or torture if sent home. The administration reportedly has already sent back some vulnerable prisoners, after obtaining what it must know are worthless assurances of their safety. Congress should require notice of such transfers, real guarantees of protection for released prisoners, and a review of the deal by outside judicial authority.
That leaves around 265 prisoners who have been held for years in violation of American and international law because Mr. Bush decided they were illegal enemy combatants — even though most were captured while fighting the invasion of Afghanistan. Under pressure from the courts, the administration created Combatant Status Review Tribunals to rubber-stamp that designation. These tribunals must be disbanded and their rulings reviewed by courts. Inmates who are not security risks should be released, and the others held under normal articles of war.
President Bush, of course, wants Congress to simply endorse his arrogation of power. The Times reported recently that the White House is seeking support for legislation that would permit the long-term detention of foreigners on American soil without charges or appeal, just on Mr. Bush’s say-so. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said “the biggest challenge is finding a statutory basis for holding prisoners who should never be released and who may or may not be able to be put on trial.”
Challenge? The very idea is anathema to American democracy. Congress did harm enough by tolerating Mr. Bush’s lawless detainee policies, and then by passing the Military Commissions Act. Giving the president a dictator’s power to select people for detention without charges on American soil would be an utter betrayal of their oath to support and defend the Constitution, and of the founders’ vision of America.
Sunday, July 08, 2007
Red (Mosque) Herring
Musharraf always seems eager to present his credentials as an "enlightened moderate" and as the only choice the west has in Pakistan to stem the growing tide of extremism. The west has bought this line of argument in its totality, without any questions asked.
At the same time he does whatever he can to keep his cronies in various places stoking the fires of extremism according to his needs, a la carte. To pay back he keeps them on payroll and in the news.
He has been doing it successfully in Islamabad for the last six months with the help of two brothers of the Red Mosque. If you ask him why he is not eliminating this threat to the writ of the state he says there are little girls and boys there and he is not cruel, notwithstanding he has incinerated scores of little boys in other madrassas in the North Western Frontier Province and in the tribal areas.
The other excuse he gives is that there are also present in the Red Mosque militants linked with Al-Qaida. It should make the elimination more urgent and not less.
The real reason he keeps these pseudo mujahideen in the news is that these stage-managed provocations help him scare the west into keeping him in power and billions of dollars coming.
If he is so enlighted a moderate as he claims to be then why was he not bothered by the kidnappings of women and the harassing of businesses at the hands of Red Mosque students for months until they bit more than they could chew by kidnapping seven Chinese?
Chinese came down hard on him and he in turn came down hard on his red herring. The timing also suited him fine as the Chief Justice movement as well as All Parties Conference in London got buried in his botched and prolonged operation in Islamabad.
The way the operation is being conducted shows poor planning and execution. 24 people have been killed so far in 5 days. The inhabitants of two neigborhood of Islamabad have virtually become hostages in their houses without water, electricity, gas and other provisions. They cannot come out of their houses because curfew is imposed. They cannot go onto their roofs and cannot open their windows because they could get killed with stray bullets. They have to stay in their rooms in this hot weather. They don't know when their ordeal is going to end.
The operation is also an embarrassment for a professional army. I hope our enemies are not watching otherwise the professionalism, discipline and efficiency of our armed forces will be amply exposed and will threaten our national security.
The question is who is Musharraf helping by blocking the way of the mainstream political parties' way into free, fair and transparent election by stacking his cards while giving free hand to his extremist cronies, including MQM?
Not Pakistan!
At the same time he does whatever he can to keep his cronies in various places stoking the fires of extremism according to his needs, a la carte. To pay back he keeps them on payroll and in the news.
He has been doing it successfully in Islamabad for the last six months with the help of two brothers of the Red Mosque. If you ask him why he is not eliminating this threat to the writ of the state he says there are little girls and boys there and he is not cruel, notwithstanding he has incinerated scores of little boys in other madrassas in the North Western Frontier Province and in the tribal areas.
The other excuse he gives is that there are also present in the Red Mosque militants linked with Al-Qaida. It should make the elimination more urgent and not less.
The real reason he keeps these pseudo mujahideen in the news is that these stage-managed provocations help him scare the west into keeping him in power and billions of dollars coming.
If he is so enlighted a moderate as he claims to be then why was he not bothered by the kidnappings of women and the harassing of businesses at the hands of Red Mosque students for months until they bit more than they could chew by kidnapping seven Chinese?
Chinese came down hard on him and he in turn came down hard on his red herring. The timing also suited him fine as the Chief Justice movement as well as All Parties Conference in London got buried in his botched and prolonged operation in Islamabad.
The way the operation is being conducted shows poor planning and execution. 24 people have been killed so far in 5 days. The inhabitants of two neigborhood of Islamabad have virtually become hostages in their houses without water, electricity, gas and other provisions. They cannot come out of their houses because curfew is imposed. They cannot go onto their roofs and cannot open their windows because they could get killed with stray bullets. They have to stay in their rooms in this hot weather. They don't know when their ordeal is going to end.
The operation is also an embarrassment for a professional army. I hope our enemies are not watching otherwise the professionalism, discipline and efficiency of our armed forces will be amply exposed and will threaten our national security.
The question is who is Musharraf helping by blocking the way of the mainstream political parties' way into free, fair and transparent election by stacking his cards while giving free hand to his extremist cronies, including MQM?
Not Pakistan!
Wednesday, July 04, 2007
Justice Delayed
The Supreme Court justices who are hering missing persons' case are going through all the required motions to make us, all Pakistanis, believe that they are trying very hard to despense justice. But if look at the pace at which the wheels of justice are grinding there is no doubt left in any mind that they are helpless in the face of a dictatorship that is paying their salaries and other perks. There is only so much they can, or want to, do.
They try to give solace to disgruntled families of the kidnapped persons. They try to give warnings to the secretaries of defence and interior departments without putting any teeth in their warnings. They threaten them with dire consequences without daring to do so.
After a session of huffing and puffing they adjourn teir proceeding for another month or half while families cry their eyes and pull their hairs out for their loved ones who have gone missing for months and years on end. Nobody tells them where the missing people are. They are dead or alive. They are being tortured or have been sold into captivity in other countries where they sit in dark dungeons.
Once again the The Supreme Court on Monday has "directed" defence and interior secretaries to file concise statements explaining as to why they had not complied with the court directives in the case of another detainee, Imran Munir.
Justice Javed Iqbal, who was prompt in taking oath of Chief Justice when Musharraf had sached Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry on March 9, is moving with a snail's pace to dispense justice. In its June 6 proceeding he had directed the government to arrange a meeting of legal counsel of Mr Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada with Imran Munir, a civilian, who was sentenced to eight-year imprisonment over charges of espionage by army's field general court martial (FGCM).
Obviously the government did not want to comply with Sureme Court's orders so no such meeting was arranged. On June 20, the court summoned Interior Secretary Kamal Shah and Defence Secretary Kamran Rasool in the court. The justices were told about the non-implementation of its order. The justices served notices on the two federal secretaries.
During the hearing on Monday, another missing person, Imran Ali Naqvi's distraught mother submitted that she had not been given a single chance so far to meet her son Imran Ali Naqvi, who is in state custody for the last one year. On her complaint, Justice Javed Iqbal took another "serious notice" and asked the Deputy Attorney General to explain under which law meetings with the detene by their relatives were being denied, saying that it was the "legal right" of the relatives and defense attorney "to meet detenues".
The bench adjourned the case till July 19 when the state attorney has been asked to submit medical report of Imran Munir.
After the hearing, father of Imran Munir, Dr Munir Ahmed, a dentist in Canada, told reporters that if he did not get justice in Pakistani courts then he would take his son's case to international forum.
Justice Javed Iqbal, who had previously threatened the secretaries with contempt of court in case of non-compliance of his orders, said that the court has no intention to initiate contempt proceedings against them even though they had failed to comply with court's direct orders. Justices could only ask the DAG as to “why the order of the court has been flouted by both the secretaries".
Justice has been delayed at least until July 19. The justices must be familiar with the adage: Justice delayed is justice denied.
They try to give solace to disgruntled families of the kidnapped persons. They try to give warnings to the secretaries of defence and interior departments without putting any teeth in their warnings. They threaten them with dire consequences without daring to do so.
After a session of huffing and puffing they adjourn teir proceeding for another month or half while families cry their eyes and pull their hairs out for their loved ones who have gone missing for months and years on end. Nobody tells them where the missing people are. They are dead or alive. They are being tortured or have been sold into captivity in other countries where they sit in dark dungeons.
Once again the The Supreme Court on Monday has "directed" defence and interior secretaries to file concise statements explaining as to why they had not complied with the court directives in the case of another detainee, Imran Munir.
Justice Javed Iqbal, who was prompt in taking oath of Chief Justice when Musharraf had sached Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry on March 9, is moving with a snail's pace to dispense justice. In its June 6 proceeding he had directed the government to arrange a meeting of legal counsel of Mr Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada with Imran Munir, a civilian, who was sentenced to eight-year imprisonment over charges of espionage by army's field general court martial (FGCM).
Obviously the government did not want to comply with Sureme Court's orders so no such meeting was arranged. On June 20, the court summoned Interior Secretary Kamal Shah and Defence Secretary Kamran Rasool in the court. The justices were told about the non-implementation of its order. The justices served notices on the two federal secretaries.
During the hearing on Monday, another missing person, Imran Ali Naqvi's distraught mother submitted that she had not been given a single chance so far to meet her son Imran Ali Naqvi, who is in state custody for the last one year. On her complaint, Justice Javed Iqbal took another "serious notice" and asked the Deputy Attorney General to explain under which law meetings with the detene by their relatives were being denied, saying that it was the "legal right" of the relatives and defense attorney "to meet detenues".
The bench adjourned the case till July 19 when the state attorney has been asked to submit medical report of Imran Munir.
After the hearing, father of Imran Munir, Dr Munir Ahmed, a dentist in Canada, told reporters that if he did not get justice in Pakistani courts then he would take his son's case to international forum.
Justice Javed Iqbal, who had previously threatened the secretaries with contempt of court in case of non-compliance of his orders, said that the court has no intention to initiate contempt proceedings against them even though they had failed to comply with court's direct orders. Justices could only ask the DAG as to “why the order of the court has been flouted by both the secretaries".
Justice has been delayed at least until July 19. The justices must be familiar with the adage: Justice delayed is justice denied.
Saturday, June 16, 2007
Ahmed Rashid: America's Bad Deal With Musharraf
Washington Post
America's Bad Deal With Musharraf, Going Down in Flames By Ahmed Rashid
Sunday, June 17, 2007
LAHORE, Pakistan Pakistan is on the brink of disaster, and the Bush administration is continuing to back the man who dragged it there. As President Pervez Musharraf fights off the most serious challenge to his eight-year dictatorship, the United States is supporting him to the hilt. The message to the Pakistani public is clear: To the Bush White House, the war on terrorism tops everything, and that includes democracy.
The crisis began on March 9, when Musharraf suspended Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, the chief justice of the supreme court, who bravely threatened Musharraf's plans to consolidate his power. That triggered street protests demanding Musharraf's resignation, which were met by a government-led crackdown on lawyers, the opposition and the media. Thousands of lawyers nationwide, looking like penguins in their courtroom black suits and white shirts, braved police batons and the heat to lead marches. They were joined by women's groups, journalists and the opposition. For the first time in two decades, Pakistan's civil society has taken to the streets.
The roots of the crisis go back to the blind bargain Washington made after 9/11 with the regime that had heretofore been the Taliban's main patron: ignoring Musharraf's despotism in return for his promises to crack down on al-Qaeda and cut the Taliban loose. Today, despite $10 billion in U.S. aid to Pakistan since 2001, that bargain is in tatters; the Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda's senior leadership has set up another haven inside Pakistan's chaotic border regions.
The problem is exacerbated by a dramatic drop-off in U.S. expertise on Pakistan. Retired American officials say that, for the first time in U.S. history, nobody with serious Pakistan experience is working in the South Asia bureau of the State Department, on State's policy planning staff, on the National Security Council staff or even in Vice President Cheney's office. Anne W. Patterson, the new U.S. ambassador to Islamabad, is an expert on Latin American "drugs and thugs"; Richard A. Boucher, the assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, is a former department spokesman who served three tours in Hong Kong and China but never was posted in South Asia. "They know nothing of Pakistan," a former senior U.S. diplomat said.
Current and past U.S. officials tell me that Pakistan policy is essentially being run from Cheney's office. The vice president, they say, is close to Musharraf and refuses to brook any U.S. criticism of him. This all fits; in recent months, I'm told, Pakistani opposition politicians visiting Washington have been ushered in to meet Cheney's aides, rather than taken to the State Department.
No one in Foggy Bottom seems willing to question Cheney's decisions. Boucher, for one, has largely limited his remarks on the crisis to expressions of support for Musharraf. Current and retired U.S. diplomats tell me that throughout the previous year, Boucher refused to let the State Department even consider alternative policies if Musharraf were threatened with being ousted, even though 2007 is an election year in Pakistan. Last winter, Boucher reportedly limited the scope of a U.S. government seminar on Pakistan for fear that it might send a signal that U.S. support for Musharraf was declining. Likewise, I'm told, he has refused to meet with leading opposition figures such as former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf has exiled. (Boucher says he has met with "people across the full political spectrum of Pakistan" during his nine visits there, from government parties to Islamic radicals to Chaudhry's lawyer.) Meanwhile, Boucher's boss, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, demands democracy and media freedom in Venezuela but apparently deems such niceties irrelevant to Pakistan.
With Cheney in charge and Rice in eclipse, rumblings of alarm can be heard at the Defense Department and the CIA. While neither agency is usually directly concerned with decision-making on Pakistan, both boast officers with far greater expertise than the White House and State Department crew. These officers, many of whom have served in Islamabad or Kabul, understand the double game that Musharraf has played -- helping the United States go after al-Qaeda while letting his intelligence services help the Taliban claw their way back in Afghanistan. The Pentagon and the CIA have been privately expressing concern about the lack of an alternative to blind support for Musharraf. Ironically, both departments have historically supported military rulers in Pakistan. They seem to have learned their lesson. It's a pity that those calling the shots have not.
What is at stake? Quite simply, the danger of a civil war or the country unraveling even more dramatically than it did when it lost Bangladesh in 1971.
The establishment that has sustained four military regimes is deeply divided. The judiciary and the legal system are out in the streets, demanding an end to military rule. They are backed by the country's gleeful federal bureaucracy, which resented being shunted aside by Musharraf, and joined by civil society organizations and opposition parties. The protesters' ranks have also been swelled by poor people protesting increases in the price of food and other necessities and shortages of electricity during an already blistering summer.
These dissenters have been joined by an increasingly influential media. Under military regimes, the media always grow in stature as they act as the conscience of the people and give voice to political opposition. For the first time, the public can watch demonstrations live on private satellite-TV channels -- something that has bewildered the army's Orwellian thought-control department.
On the opposing side stand Musharraf's remaining allies. The most important is the powerful, brooding army. On June 1, its top brass issued a strong statement of support for Musharraf that dismissed the protests as a "malicious campaign against institutions of the state, launched by vested interests and opportunists." But on live TV talk shows, pundits are lambasting the army for the first time, shocking many viewers. Such withering criticism has forced younger officers to question whether the entire military establishment should risk the public's wrath to keep one man in power.
Musharraf is also supported by the business community, which has experienced economic stability and rising investment from the Arab world during his regime. He also retains -- for now -- the backing of a motley group of politicians who came to power after the military rigged elections in 2002, although many of them are considering jumping ship or ditching Musharraf.
Running parallel to this domestic political crisis is the growing problem of radical Islam; the Taliban and al-Qaeda are now deeply entrenched in the tribal border belt adjacent to Afghanistan. These groups gained political legitimacy last year when Musharraf signed a series of dubious peace deals with the Pakistani Taliban. They are now coming down from the mountains to spread their radical ideology in towns and cities by burning down DVD and TV shops, insisting that young men grow beards, forcibly recruiting schoolboys for the jihad and terrifying girls so that they won't attend school. The military has refused to put a brake on their extremism.
Musharraf promised the international community that he would purge pro-Taliban elements from his security services and convinced the Bush administration that his philosophy of "enlightened moderation" was the only way to fend off Islamic extremism. But Pakistan today is the center of global Islamic terrorism, with Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mohammad Omar probably living here.
Instead of confronting this threat, the army has focused on keeping Musharraf in power -- negotiating with extremists, letting radical Islamic students set up a base in Islamabad and so forth. Meanwhile, to spook the West into continuing to support him, Musharraf continues to grossly exaggerate the strength of the Islamic parties that he warns might take over his nuclear-armed country. In fact, the United States would be far safer if it pushed for a truly representative Pakistani government that could marginalize the jihadists, rather than placing all its eggs in Musharraf's basket.
How will the current crisis end? It's unlikely to peter out; the movement has lasted three months now, despite Musharraf's intelligence services' prediction that it would end within days. And Chaudhry is a formidable foe -- not a mere politician (who, in Pakistan, are inevitably corrupt) but a judge perched above the political fray.
The logical strategy for Musharraf would be to apologize to the nation for hounding the chief justice, bring all parties to a reconciliation conference and agree to early elections under a neutral interim government. If he still insisted on running for president, he would have to agree to take off his uniform first so that no matter who won, Pakistan would return to civilian rule.
But how can a commando general carry out such a U-turn without losing face, especially when he is being publicly backed by the White House? A secretary of state with vision -- a James Baker or a Madeleine Albright -- could have recognized that Musharraf's time is up. Instead, we have Rice and Boucher and Cheney, who -- just as in Iraq -- can only reinforce a failed policy. Washington is doing itself no favors by serving as Musharraf's enabler. Indeed, the Bush administration's policy of sticking by Musharraf is fast becoming eerily reminiscent of the Carter administration's policy of sticking by the shah of Iran.
Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist, is the author of "Taliban."
America's Bad Deal With Musharraf, Going Down in Flames By Ahmed Rashid
Sunday, June 17, 2007
LAHORE, Pakistan Pakistan is on the brink of disaster, and the Bush administration is continuing to back the man who dragged it there. As President Pervez Musharraf fights off the most serious challenge to his eight-year dictatorship, the United States is supporting him to the hilt. The message to the Pakistani public is clear: To the Bush White House, the war on terrorism tops everything, and that includes democracy.
The crisis began on March 9, when Musharraf suspended Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, the chief justice of the supreme court, who bravely threatened Musharraf's plans to consolidate his power. That triggered street protests demanding Musharraf's resignation, which were met by a government-led crackdown on lawyers, the opposition and the media. Thousands of lawyers nationwide, looking like penguins in their courtroom black suits and white shirts, braved police batons and the heat to lead marches. They were joined by women's groups, journalists and the opposition. For the first time in two decades, Pakistan's civil society has taken to the streets.
The roots of the crisis go back to the blind bargain Washington made after 9/11 with the regime that had heretofore been the Taliban's main patron: ignoring Musharraf's despotism in return for his promises to crack down on al-Qaeda and cut the Taliban loose. Today, despite $10 billion in U.S. aid to Pakistan since 2001, that bargain is in tatters; the Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda's senior leadership has set up another haven inside Pakistan's chaotic border regions.
The problem is exacerbated by a dramatic drop-off in U.S. expertise on Pakistan. Retired American officials say that, for the first time in U.S. history, nobody with serious Pakistan experience is working in the South Asia bureau of the State Department, on State's policy planning staff, on the National Security Council staff or even in Vice President Cheney's office. Anne W. Patterson, the new U.S. ambassador to Islamabad, is an expert on Latin American "drugs and thugs"; Richard A. Boucher, the assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, is a former department spokesman who served three tours in Hong Kong and China but never was posted in South Asia. "They know nothing of Pakistan," a former senior U.S. diplomat said.
Current and past U.S. officials tell me that Pakistan policy is essentially being run from Cheney's office. The vice president, they say, is close to Musharraf and refuses to brook any U.S. criticism of him. This all fits; in recent months, I'm told, Pakistani opposition politicians visiting Washington have been ushered in to meet Cheney's aides, rather than taken to the State Department.
No one in Foggy Bottom seems willing to question Cheney's decisions. Boucher, for one, has largely limited his remarks on the crisis to expressions of support for Musharraf. Current and retired U.S. diplomats tell me that throughout the previous year, Boucher refused to let the State Department even consider alternative policies if Musharraf were threatened with being ousted, even though 2007 is an election year in Pakistan. Last winter, Boucher reportedly limited the scope of a U.S. government seminar on Pakistan for fear that it might send a signal that U.S. support for Musharraf was declining. Likewise, I'm told, he has refused to meet with leading opposition figures such as former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf has exiled. (Boucher says he has met with "people across the full political spectrum of Pakistan" during his nine visits there, from government parties to Islamic radicals to Chaudhry's lawyer.) Meanwhile, Boucher's boss, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, demands democracy and media freedom in Venezuela but apparently deems such niceties irrelevant to Pakistan.
With Cheney in charge and Rice in eclipse, rumblings of alarm can be heard at the Defense Department and the CIA. While neither agency is usually directly concerned with decision-making on Pakistan, both boast officers with far greater expertise than the White House and State Department crew. These officers, many of whom have served in Islamabad or Kabul, understand the double game that Musharraf has played -- helping the United States go after al-Qaeda while letting his intelligence services help the Taliban claw their way back in Afghanistan. The Pentagon and the CIA have been privately expressing concern about the lack of an alternative to blind support for Musharraf. Ironically, both departments have historically supported military rulers in Pakistan. They seem to have learned their lesson. It's a pity that those calling the shots have not.
What is at stake? Quite simply, the danger of a civil war or the country unraveling even more dramatically than it did when it lost Bangladesh in 1971.
The establishment that has sustained four military regimes is deeply divided. The judiciary and the legal system are out in the streets, demanding an end to military rule. They are backed by the country's gleeful federal bureaucracy, which resented being shunted aside by Musharraf, and joined by civil society organizations and opposition parties. The protesters' ranks have also been swelled by poor people protesting increases in the price of food and other necessities and shortages of electricity during an already blistering summer.
These dissenters have been joined by an increasingly influential media. Under military regimes, the media always grow in stature as they act as the conscience of the people and give voice to political opposition. For the first time, the public can watch demonstrations live on private satellite-TV channels -- something that has bewildered the army's Orwellian thought-control department.
On the opposing side stand Musharraf's remaining allies. The most important is the powerful, brooding army. On June 1, its top brass issued a strong statement of support for Musharraf that dismissed the protests as a "malicious campaign against institutions of the state, launched by vested interests and opportunists." But on live TV talk shows, pundits are lambasting the army for the first time, shocking many viewers. Such withering criticism has forced younger officers to question whether the entire military establishment should risk the public's wrath to keep one man in power.
Musharraf is also supported by the business community, which has experienced economic stability and rising investment from the Arab world during his regime. He also retains -- for now -- the backing of a motley group of politicians who came to power after the military rigged elections in 2002, although many of them are considering jumping ship or ditching Musharraf.
Running parallel to this domestic political crisis is the growing problem of radical Islam; the Taliban and al-Qaeda are now deeply entrenched in the tribal border belt adjacent to Afghanistan. These groups gained political legitimacy last year when Musharraf signed a series of dubious peace deals with the Pakistani Taliban. They are now coming down from the mountains to spread their radical ideology in towns and cities by burning down DVD and TV shops, insisting that young men grow beards, forcibly recruiting schoolboys for the jihad and terrifying girls so that they won't attend school. The military has refused to put a brake on their extremism.
Musharraf promised the international community that he would purge pro-Taliban elements from his security services and convinced the Bush administration that his philosophy of "enlightened moderation" was the only way to fend off Islamic extremism. But Pakistan today is the center of global Islamic terrorism, with Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mohammad Omar probably living here.
Instead of confronting this threat, the army has focused on keeping Musharraf in power -- negotiating with extremists, letting radical Islamic students set up a base in Islamabad and so forth. Meanwhile, to spook the West into continuing to support him, Musharraf continues to grossly exaggerate the strength of the Islamic parties that he warns might take over his nuclear-armed country. In fact, the United States would be far safer if it pushed for a truly representative Pakistani government that could marginalize the jihadists, rather than placing all its eggs in Musharraf's basket.
How will the current crisis end? It's unlikely to peter out; the movement has lasted three months now, despite Musharraf's intelligence services' prediction that it would end within days. And Chaudhry is a formidable foe -- not a mere politician (who, in Pakistan, are inevitably corrupt) but a judge perched above the political fray.
The logical strategy for Musharraf would be to apologize to the nation for hounding the chief justice, bring all parties to a reconciliation conference and agree to early elections under a neutral interim government. If he still insisted on running for president, he would have to agree to take off his uniform first so that no matter who won, Pakistan would return to civilian rule.
But how can a commando general carry out such a U-turn without losing face, especially when he is being publicly backed by the White House? A secretary of state with vision -- a James Baker or a Madeleine Albright -- could have recognized that Musharraf's time is up. Instead, we have Rice and Boucher and Cheney, who -- just as in Iraq -- can only reinforce a failed policy. Washington is doing itself no favors by serving as Musharraf's enabler. Indeed, the Bush administration's policy of sticking by Musharraf is fast becoming eerily reminiscent of the Carter administration's policy of sticking by the shah of Iran.
Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist, is the author of "Taliban."
Friday, June 15, 2007
AI Condemns Musharraf Crackdown On Political Activists
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL Public Statement 15 June 2007
Amnesty International condemns the arbitrary arrests and detention of political activists
Amnesty International is concerned at reports of arbitrary arrests and detention of several hundred political activists belonging to different opposition parties in Pakistan in the past two weeks.
According to media reports and human rights groups, most of the party workers and political activists have been detained in prisons across Punjab province, while others have been detained in other parts of the country. Activists are reportedly being held under three forms of detention: some are believed to be held under preventive detention orders, ranging from 30 to 90 days, others appear to be arbitrarily held without reference to any law, while other political activists are being detained for allegedly breaching restrictions on public gatherings imposed by the government under section 144 of the Code of Criminal of Procedure.
The arrests have reportedly taken place in an attempt to prevent people from participating in welcoming rallies for the suspended Chief Justice to Faisalabad, in Punjab, on June 16. Similar waves of arbitrary detention were reported in recent weeks when the Chief Justice travelled to other parts of the country to address lawyers' gatherings and opposition rallies.
Amnesty International is also concerned at reports that elderly workers were dragged from their homes in the middle of the night and that some activists have been detained in prisons far from their homes making it difficult for their families to contact them.
Across Punjab, police have reportedly arrested activists belonging to the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the Mutthhida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and other political parties. Amnesty International is concerned for the safety of a number of woman political activists who have reportedly been arrested.
The Pakistan government has claimed that preventative detention has been used to preserve law and order under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance. Amnesty International is concerned that the Pakistan government, besides resorting to preventive detention, is also increasingly using Section 144 of the Criminal Code of Procedure in violation of the rights to freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of peaceful assembly and association, enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Pakistan's Constitution also guarantees the right to Freedom of Assembly and Association under articles 16 and 17 respectively.
Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits a gathering of more than four people in public without police authorization, while a magistrate can prohibit meetings of five or more persons.
Amnesty International calls on the Government of Pakistan to respect Pakistan's own constitutional safeguards and international human rights standards and to guarantee the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association of its people. Amnesty International urges the Government of Pakistan to immediately release all of the political activists arbitrarily detained to prevent them exercising their rights to peaceful assembly in this latest crackdown.
Those seeking to exercise their rights of peaceful assembly and expression must be secure from violence by security personnel in the name of maintaining public order.
Amnesty International condemns the arbitrary arrests and detention of political activists
Amnesty International is concerned at reports of arbitrary arrests and detention of several hundred political activists belonging to different opposition parties in Pakistan in the past two weeks.
According to media reports and human rights groups, most of the party workers and political activists have been detained in prisons across Punjab province, while others have been detained in other parts of the country. Activists are reportedly being held under three forms of detention: some are believed to be held under preventive detention orders, ranging from 30 to 90 days, others appear to be arbitrarily held without reference to any law, while other political activists are being detained for allegedly breaching restrictions on public gatherings imposed by the government under section 144 of the Code of Criminal of Procedure.
The arrests have reportedly taken place in an attempt to prevent people from participating in welcoming rallies for the suspended Chief Justice to Faisalabad, in Punjab, on June 16. Similar waves of arbitrary detention were reported in recent weeks when the Chief Justice travelled to other parts of the country to address lawyers' gatherings and opposition rallies.
Amnesty International is also concerned at reports that elderly workers were dragged from their homes in the middle of the night and that some activists have been detained in prisons far from their homes making it difficult for their families to contact them.
Across Punjab, police have reportedly arrested activists belonging to the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the Mutthhida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and other political parties. Amnesty International is concerned for the safety of a number of woman political activists who have reportedly been arrested.
The Pakistan government has claimed that preventative detention has been used to preserve law and order under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance. Amnesty International is concerned that the Pakistan government, besides resorting to preventive detention, is also increasingly using Section 144 of the Criminal Code of Procedure in violation of the rights to freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of peaceful assembly and association, enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Pakistan's Constitution also guarantees the right to Freedom of Assembly and Association under articles 16 and 17 respectively.
Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits a gathering of more than four people in public without police authorization, while a magistrate can prohibit meetings of five or more persons.
Amnesty International calls on the Government of Pakistan to respect Pakistan's own constitutional safeguards and international human rights standards and to guarantee the rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association of its people. Amnesty International urges the Government of Pakistan to immediately release all of the political activists arbitrarily detained to prevent them exercising their rights to peaceful assembly in this latest crackdown.
Those seeking to exercise their rights of peaceful assembly and expression must be secure from violence by security personnel in the name of maintaining public order.
American Visitors: Freinds or Masters?
Americans are in town. A lot of them. First came the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian affairs, Richard Boucher. Then came the US Deputy Secretary of State and former intelligence chief, John Negroponte, and joined Boucher who had already spent three days meeting government officials, election authorities and opposition politicians. Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander of U.S. Central Command, is also in town. As U.S. intelligence chief John Negroponte had predicted that due to elections both Musharraf and the United States would have a challenging time this year.
They did their home work before they came to face this challenge. Two top Pakistani generals, Ehsan Saleem Hayat, the army's vice chief of staff, and Ehsan ul-Haq, the chairman of the joint chiefs, were summoned to Washington in recent days as Bush administration wanted to assess the post-Musharraf scenario before it sends its viceroys to Islamabad to dictate its new terms.
Americans have now dictated the terms. Assigned the seats. Choreographed the moves. Everyone is listening and obeying.
Americans want free, fair and transparent elections. Musharraf 'may' get his chance to ssek re-election as President if he is willing to get elected not by the outgoing legislature before it is dissolved but by the next parliament. Musharraf had planned to get re-elcted by the sitting parliament twice in order to perpetuate his rule in case his minions lost in the next election as they were sure to do.
On Wednesday, Boucher told opposition leaders that the US was "pressuring" Musharraf to "fulfil the promises" he made regarding his re-election. The elaboration of promises came from Sean McCormack's briefing on Tuesday when he gave the timeline from Washington : elections will be held in the fall and "the parliament will then choose who will be Pakistan's next president".
Musharraf also has to shed his 'seconf skin' - his uniform. Sean McCormack said that Musharraf had already pledged that if he "continues in political life", he will "put aside the uniform". He insisted that US takes "him at his word at that", and "would expect him to follow through on his commitments". It is obvious Americans have already made adjustments to their policy towards Musharraf after the ground realities changed.
Musharraf is silent. He does not feel slighted, by the dictation, but relieved. He knows his jig is up. "For years," as the San Francisco Chronicle ialized, "he has sold Washington on the threat that without him Pakistan would descend into an Iran-style Islamic theocracy, exporting trouble and waving nuclear weaponry... But it may be time to call his bluff". Americans are to call his bluff. Now he is "looking for an exit strategy" as former CIA deputy chief Rob Richer, has said. Americans are offering him a choice between a lamp post for hanging or a luxrious retirement home in suburban Chicago or Boston or share power with "our interlocutors in Pakistan". It is his choice. He knows his predecessor army dictators were either kicking out in humiliation or were blown out in a puff of smoke and some fallen debris.
Opposition is not saying anything either. It has been ensured by U.S. National Security Council spokeswoman Kate Starr from Washington that democracy is getting a second chance because "the people of Pakistan have a long-standing respect for democracy and, as a friend of Pakistan, we want to see the further development of strong democratic institutions in that country".
The United States does not much care who runs Pakistan as long as army retains its primacy as the senior and domineering partner in the future political setup as it did in the sixty years of Pakistan's history; and there is stability in Islamabad; and the Americans have direct line with army; and have the power to dictate terms. Washington does not want any unpredictable consequences and unmanagable people in power so it is trying to create a political scenario od choice before it gets too little, too late. US needs army's help in its war against Al-Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistant as a senior partner to get all the help it can in its war on terror in Afghanistan.
The American visitors are in town not as friends but masters.
These masters don't want true and undiluted democracy in Pakistan. They don't want Pakistanis to have full-fldged human rights, civil liberties and the rule of law. They just want a smooth transition from an uncomfortable and potentially dangerous situation to one of ad-hoc stability and utility.
I am afraid American visitors are in Pakistan to thwart Pakistani movement for democracy. If Pakistanis, especially the lawyer community, will not go all the way to get rid of army rule and replace it with rule of law, they may not get a second chance for a long, very long time.
Pakistanis have to decide whether it is America and army and some of their cronies who should be our masters or Pakistanis themselves. Pakistanis have a long and hard fight cut out for them. They have to rise to the ocassion. There is no other way. Rule of law in Pakistan does not suit army or America. It only suits Pakistanis.
Wednesday, June 13, 2007
Musharraf on his way out? Some in US Intelligence Think So
Some in U.S. Intelligence See Musharraf on His Way Out
By Spencer Ackerman - June 11, 2007
Since September 11, 2001, the U.S.'s Pakistan policy can be summed up in two words: Pervez Musharraf. But within the U.S. intelligence community, and in Pakistan, there's a growing belief that the U.S.-friendly military dictator's days are drawing to a close -- and possibly within the next few months. It may be time for the U.S. to face what it's long feared in the nuclear state: the prospect of chaos, rising Islamism or anti-Americanism that follows Musharraf.
But the hope -- among Pakistani military officers and politicians, to say nothing of U.S. diplomats -- is that the increasingly inept and unpopular Musharraf can be eased out of power while the U.S. slowly distances itself from him, allowing for as smooth a transition as is possible in the turbulent South Asian country. Some see the Pakistani Army remaining powerful enough to prevent a chaotic transition or an Islamist takeover. "This is going to be a Pinochet-like transition, instead of a Marcos-like one," one former Pakistani official tells TPMmuckraker. In other words, according to the ex-official, the U.S. may not stand foursquare behind its ally Musharraf until he's ultimately forced from power, as President Ronald Reagan chose with doomed Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos.
Over the past few weeks, U.S. intelligence have started to conclude that Musharraf is on his way out. "It is the sense people have, and it's been out there," says Rob Richer, a former deputy head of CIA operations who has met with Musharraf personally and long worked with the Pakistanis on intelligence issues. "This is the view of both senior (U.S. intelligence) officials and people who follow the issue closely." What's more, Richer tells TPMmuckraker, Musharraf himself knows his time is up, and is "looking for an exit strategy":
"He believes his successor has got to be someone who supports the military but it won't necessarily be someone in uniform. There's no obvious candidate … At this point, he's looking for the right person, a right-winger, someone who understands the Army."
Musharraf's vision is to make Pakistan like Turkey, where Islamic currents ebb and flow with popular sentiment, "but who enforces what they call democracy? The military." Adds Frederic Grare, a former French diplomat in Pakistan, the military could "withdraw behind the scenes but keep the levers of power," while a civilian takes charge after elections that Musharraf has called for in the fall.
Musharraf, whose alliance with the U.S. on counterterrorism has been the subject of fierce controversy within Pakistan, has made error after error since March, when he ousted a leading critic, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, a move of dubious legality. Chaudhry's Supreme Court was set to hear a case on the constitutionality of Musharraf retaining the post of Army Chief of Staff while holding the presidency, and Musharraf cited unspecified allegations of corruption in removing him. Since then, Pakistan has been rocked by popular protest, uniting many of Musharraf's enemies. On May 12, over 40 people were killed when members of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, which supports Musharraf, attacked a pro-Chaudhry demonstration in Karachi, an incident that has become a national scandal.
Making matters worse, just days later, Musharraf was confronted with another crisis: the pro-Taliban Red Mosque, located in the heart of the capitol city of Islamabad, denounced Pakistan's female tourism minister and then captured the policemen who came to arrest the mosque's leaders. On May 22, Musharraf defused the crisis without invading the mosque -- defying the wishes of many in his security apparatus -- but the militants were allowed to keep their weapons. The incident was a reminder that Pakistani jihadists have gained strength since September 2006, when Musharraf agreed to a truce with Islamist militants in the lawless Waziristan province, where Osama bin Laden and his coterie are believed to be hiding.
Within three months, Musharraf has grown steadily weaker in the eyes of the security services, the Islamists, and the general public, compounding the doubts that some in the U.S. have over his commitment to taking on al-Qaeda. The mistakes expose a regime "imploding" under the weight of its contradictions, according to Grere, and unable to mollify the multifaceted discontent that has taken root since Musharraf seized power in a 1999 coup.
Neither Richer nor Grare believes that there's an obvious candidate to succeed Musharraf, the ex-Pakistani official cited two prominent generals who could emerge as successors if the Army opts to retain formal rule, or alternatively, serve as crucial behind-the-scenes power brokers. The two are Ehsan Saleem Hayat, the army's vice chief of staff, and Ehsan ul-Haq, the chairman of the joint chiefs and a former head of Pakistan's powerful intelligence apparatus, known as the ISI. According to the ex-Pakistani official, both men were recently in Washington, sounding out senior officials: "They didn't come to Washington for a Burger King meal." A State Department official confirms that ul-Haq met in May with Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, but could not say the same for Hayat.
The former Pakistani official says that the message that the possible successors are trying to send to the U.S. is that "continuity in policy can be ensured without the continuity of an individual, while at the same time, a democratic process can proceed." In other words, the U.S. can wean itself off of Musharraf without fear that the U.S.-Pakistani alliance is at risk, and will likely have some kind of election to point to that blesses the result. Not many see the Islamists as able to take control. "One common factor in places where Islamists rise to power is the economy tanking," observes Richer. "But in Pakistan investment is taking off. It doesn't have many of the factors that drive religious elements taking power."
This week, Richard Boucher, the assistant secretary of state for South Asia, will visit Pakistan as part of region-wide trip. A State Department official denies that Boucher would send any particular message to Musharraf, and says he's there to "follow up on (previous) discussions," especially about counterterrorism cooperation.
By Spencer Ackerman - June 11, 2007
Since September 11, 2001, the U.S.'s Pakistan policy can be summed up in two words: Pervez Musharraf. But within the U.S. intelligence community, and in Pakistan, there's a growing belief that the U.S.-friendly military dictator's days are drawing to a close -- and possibly within the next few months. It may be time for the U.S. to face what it's long feared in the nuclear state: the prospect of chaos, rising Islamism or anti-Americanism that follows Musharraf.
But the hope -- among Pakistani military officers and politicians, to say nothing of U.S. diplomats -- is that the increasingly inept and unpopular Musharraf can be eased out of power while the U.S. slowly distances itself from him, allowing for as smooth a transition as is possible in the turbulent South Asian country. Some see the Pakistani Army remaining powerful enough to prevent a chaotic transition or an Islamist takeover. "This is going to be a Pinochet-like transition, instead of a Marcos-like one," one former Pakistani official tells TPMmuckraker. In other words, according to the ex-official, the U.S. may not stand foursquare behind its ally Musharraf until he's ultimately forced from power, as President Ronald Reagan chose with doomed Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos.
Over the past few weeks, U.S. intelligence have started to conclude that Musharraf is on his way out. "It is the sense people have, and it's been out there," says Rob Richer, a former deputy head of CIA operations who has met with Musharraf personally and long worked with the Pakistanis on intelligence issues. "This is the view of both senior (U.S. intelligence) officials and people who follow the issue closely." What's more, Richer tells TPMmuckraker, Musharraf himself knows his time is up, and is "looking for an exit strategy":
"He believes his successor has got to be someone who supports the military but it won't necessarily be someone in uniform. There's no obvious candidate … At this point, he's looking for the right person, a right-winger, someone who understands the Army."
Musharraf's vision is to make Pakistan like Turkey, where Islamic currents ebb and flow with popular sentiment, "but who enforces what they call democracy? The military." Adds Frederic Grare, a former French diplomat in Pakistan, the military could "withdraw behind the scenes but keep the levers of power," while a civilian takes charge after elections that Musharraf has called for in the fall.
Musharraf, whose alliance with the U.S. on counterterrorism has been the subject of fierce controversy within Pakistan, has made error after error since March, when he ousted a leading critic, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, a move of dubious legality. Chaudhry's Supreme Court was set to hear a case on the constitutionality of Musharraf retaining the post of Army Chief of Staff while holding the presidency, and Musharraf cited unspecified allegations of corruption in removing him. Since then, Pakistan has been rocked by popular protest, uniting many of Musharraf's enemies. On May 12, over 40 people were killed when members of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, which supports Musharraf, attacked a pro-Chaudhry demonstration in Karachi, an incident that has become a national scandal.
Making matters worse, just days later, Musharraf was confronted with another crisis: the pro-Taliban Red Mosque, located in the heart of the capitol city of Islamabad, denounced Pakistan's female tourism minister and then captured the policemen who came to arrest the mosque's leaders. On May 22, Musharraf defused the crisis without invading the mosque -- defying the wishes of many in his security apparatus -- but the militants were allowed to keep their weapons. The incident was a reminder that Pakistani jihadists have gained strength since September 2006, when Musharraf agreed to a truce with Islamist militants in the lawless Waziristan province, where Osama bin Laden and his coterie are believed to be hiding.
Within three months, Musharraf has grown steadily weaker in the eyes of the security services, the Islamists, and the general public, compounding the doubts that some in the U.S. have over his commitment to taking on al-Qaeda. The mistakes expose a regime "imploding" under the weight of its contradictions, according to Grere, and unable to mollify the multifaceted discontent that has taken root since Musharraf seized power in a 1999 coup.
Neither Richer nor Grare believes that there's an obvious candidate to succeed Musharraf, the ex-Pakistani official cited two prominent generals who could emerge as successors if the Army opts to retain formal rule, or alternatively, serve as crucial behind-the-scenes power brokers. The two are Ehsan Saleem Hayat, the army's vice chief of staff, and Ehsan ul-Haq, the chairman of the joint chiefs and a former head of Pakistan's powerful intelligence apparatus, known as the ISI. According to the ex-Pakistani official, both men were recently in Washington, sounding out senior officials: "They didn't come to Washington for a Burger King meal." A State Department official confirms that ul-Haq met in May with Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, but could not say the same for Hayat.
The former Pakistani official says that the message that the possible successors are trying to send to the U.S. is that "continuity in policy can be ensured without the continuity of an individual, while at the same time, a democratic process can proceed." In other words, the U.S. can wean itself off of Musharraf without fear that the U.S.-Pakistani alliance is at risk, and will likely have some kind of election to point to that blesses the result. Not many see the Islamists as able to take control. "One common factor in places where Islamists rise to power is the economy tanking," observes Richer. "But in Pakistan investment is taking off. It doesn't have many of the factors that drive religious elements taking power."
This week, Richard Boucher, the assistant secretary of state for South Asia, will visit Pakistan as part of region-wide trip. A State Department official denies that Boucher would send any particular message to Musharraf, and says he's there to "follow up on (previous) discussions," especially about counterterrorism cooperation.
Tuesday, June 12, 2007
Stratfor on Musharraf's Problematic Survival Plan
Summary
In an effort designed to help dissipate the growing political storm in the country and secure his own re-election, Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf plans, among other things, to reinstate suspended Pakistani Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry. The plan is crippled by too many moving parts, however, meaning Musharraf at best could only hold on to power as a president sharing power with a prime minister at the head of a coalition government.
Analysis
Richard Boucher, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, arrived June 12 in Islamabad on a two-day official visit. Topping the agenda of discussion between Boucher and Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf is Pakistan's increasing crisis of governance. Boucher will relay Washington's interest in having Musharraf remain at the helm, but also will communicate that Musharraf needs to reach an accommodation with his opponents.
The two main reasons informing Musharraf's decision to tough it out in the face of the South Asian nation's rapidly expanding crisis are U.S. backing and the support of the senior generals within Pakistan's military hierarchy. Musharraf also knows that he must demonstrate to both Washington and his own generals that he very much controls the situation to ensure their continued support. To do so he has devised a plan to defuse the political crisis involving reinstating suspended Pakistani Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, something that also will help create conditions conducive for his own re-election.
Though Chaudhry's reinstatement might provide the embattled general with a brief respite, his bid for re-election is going to be extremely hard to pull off in part due to the increasingly assertive nature of Pakistan's judiciary and the media. Ultimately, there is just too much that can go wrong in the process of securing a second term.
The first step in defusing tensions was the government's June 9 move to withdraw restrictions on the media; this had two effects. First, it satisfied concerns within the Bush administration, which was finding it difficult to support Musharraf while his government was openly limiting free speech. Second, it prevented the anti-Musharraf movement from receiving a sudden and major boost.
In the meantime, the government produced a budget significantly increasing government employee salaries and announced that an election schedule would be released soon after parliament approved the budget. Musharraf himself said June 8 that the nation would hear the good news about the end of the ongoing political crisis. "The ongoing drama will end itself very soon and there is nothing to worry about it," he told members of parliament from the ruling coalition and Cabinet members.
The next step will be allowing Pakistan's Supreme Court to reinstate the chief justice, which will be Musharraf's way of neutralizing the legal community's protests. Once back on the job, Chaudhry will not be able to participate in rallies given his position as a nonpartisan national figure -- thus taking the chief justice and his supporters out of the limelight. The government also will try to block Chaudhry from presiding over cases involving the president on grounds that as a party to a dispute with the president, the top jurist cannot appear unbiased against Musharraf. The chief justice and his allies indeed would like to see Chaudhry's restoration and Musharraf's ouster. The government, however, hopes the restoration will forestall the latter.
The chief justice's reinstatement could provide some brief respite to Musharraf. But the president general must go through the process of re-election, which according to the government must take place between Sept. 15 and Oct. 15. The presidential election is highly controversial because Musharraf is seeking re-election from the same electoral college, composed of the current national and provincial legislatures, that elected him in the first place. His opponents have demanded fresh parliamentary elections before the presidential vote. But the main opposition group, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto might be willing to negotiate a deal whereby Musharraf can be re-elected on the condition he steps down as military chief.
Accepting a president in uniform is a redline the PPP cannot cross and sustain its position as the country's largest political party and its reputation of being anti-establishment. Musharraf's uniform constitutes the basis of his power, and assuming the role of a civilian president is a prospect fraught with perils. Even so, mounting pressure to defuse the crisis could force his hand and make him decide to retire from the military, though that would entail another set of complexities.
Ideally, Musharraf wants to remain army chief of staff until after the parliamentary elections to be held sometime in November, though even he knows that under the present conditions that is asking too much. At a bare minimum, however, he wants to remain military chief until the first week of October so he can oversee the next round of routine promotions and retirements of senior generals. That would allow him to stack the military deck with people he can theoretically work with even after becoming a civilian president.
Another hurdle to his re-election is that even if he were to have a deal with the PPP, members of parliament from the Islamist coalition, the Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) -- which controls one and a half provinces and is one of the largest opposition blocs in parliament -- could see its members tender their resignations, thereby rendering the electoral college dysfunctional. And street protests would come back with a bang should Musharraf try to force his way to re-election. So any deal would have to include not just the PPP, but the MMA and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf ousted from power in 1999.
Balancing the civilian side of his government with the military side is rapidly becoming untenable for Musharraf. As a result, the resolution to the current crisis requires a very complex arrangement that under the present conditions is unlikely to hold. Thus Musharraf at best can hope to share power as a civilian with a much broader array of far more assertive civilians.
In an effort designed to help dissipate the growing political storm in the country and secure his own re-election, Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf plans, among other things, to reinstate suspended Pakistani Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry. The plan is crippled by too many moving parts, however, meaning Musharraf at best could only hold on to power as a president sharing power with a prime minister at the head of a coalition government.
Analysis
Richard Boucher, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, arrived June 12 in Islamabad on a two-day official visit. Topping the agenda of discussion between Boucher and Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf is Pakistan's increasing crisis of governance. Boucher will relay Washington's interest in having Musharraf remain at the helm, but also will communicate that Musharraf needs to reach an accommodation with his opponents.
The two main reasons informing Musharraf's decision to tough it out in the face of the South Asian nation's rapidly expanding crisis are U.S. backing and the support of the senior generals within Pakistan's military hierarchy. Musharraf also knows that he must demonstrate to both Washington and his own generals that he very much controls the situation to ensure their continued support. To do so he has devised a plan to defuse the political crisis involving reinstating suspended Pakistani Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, something that also will help create conditions conducive for his own re-election.
Though Chaudhry's reinstatement might provide the embattled general with a brief respite, his bid for re-election is going to be extremely hard to pull off in part due to the increasingly assertive nature of Pakistan's judiciary and the media. Ultimately, there is just too much that can go wrong in the process of securing a second term.
The first step in defusing tensions was the government's June 9 move to withdraw restrictions on the media; this had two effects. First, it satisfied concerns within the Bush administration, which was finding it difficult to support Musharraf while his government was openly limiting free speech. Second, it prevented the anti-Musharraf movement from receiving a sudden and major boost.
In the meantime, the government produced a budget significantly increasing government employee salaries and announced that an election schedule would be released soon after parliament approved the budget. Musharraf himself said June 8 that the nation would hear the good news about the end of the ongoing political crisis. "The ongoing drama will end itself very soon and there is nothing to worry about it," he told members of parliament from the ruling coalition and Cabinet members.
The next step will be allowing Pakistan's Supreme Court to reinstate the chief justice, which will be Musharraf's way of neutralizing the legal community's protests. Once back on the job, Chaudhry will not be able to participate in rallies given his position as a nonpartisan national figure -- thus taking the chief justice and his supporters out of the limelight. The government also will try to block Chaudhry from presiding over cases involving the president on grounds that as a party to a dispute with the president, the top jurist cannot appear unbiased against Musharraf. The chief justice and his allies indeed would like to see Chaudhry's restoration and Musharraf's ouster. The government, however, hopes the restoration will forestall the latter.
The chief justice's reinstatement could provide some brief respite to Musharraf. But the president general must go through the process of re-election, which according to the government must take place between Sept. 15 and Oct. 15. The presidential election is highly controversial because Musharraf is seeking re-election from the same electoral college, composed of the current national and provincial legislatures, that elected him in the first place. His opponents have demanded fresh parliamentary elections before the presidential vote. But the main opposition group, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto might be willing to negotiate a deal whereby Musharraf can be re-elected on the condition he steps down as military chief.
Accepting a president in uniform is a redline the PPP cannot cross and sustain its position as the country's largest political party and its reputation of being anti-establishment. Musharraf's uniform constitutes the basis of his power, and assuming the role of a civilian president is a prospect fraught with perils. Even so, mounting pressure to defuse the crisis could force his hand and make him decide to retire from the military, though that would entail another set of complexities.
Ideally, Musharraf wants to remain army chief of staff until after the parliamentary elections to be held sometime in November, though even he knows that under the present conditions that is asking too much. At a bare minimum, however, he wants to remain military chief until the first week of October so he can oversee the next round of routine promotions and retirements of senior generals. That would allow him to stack the military deck with people he can theoretically work with even after becoming a civilian president.
Another hurdle to his re-election is that even if he were to have a deal with the PPP, members of parliament from the Islamist coalition, the Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) -- which controls one and a half provinces and is one of the largest opposition blocs in parliament -- could see its members tender their resignations, thereby rendering the electoral college dysfunctional. And street protests would come back with a bang should Musharraf try to force his way to re-election. So any deal would have to include not just the PPP, but the MMA and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf ousted from power in 1999.
Balancing the civilian side of his government with the military side is rapidly becoming untenable for Musharraf. As a result, the resolution to the current crisis requires a very complex arrangement that under the present conditions is unlikely to hold. Thus Musharraf at best can hope to share power as a civilian with a much broader array of far more assertive civilians.
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