Benazir Bhutto's Interview with Newsweek Sept. 3, 2007
It looks like Pervez Musharraf's days as president of Pakistan may be numbered if he does not change course. With one rival, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, threatening to return to Pakistan, Musharraf has been meeting with another former archenemy, Benazir Bhutto, about a possible power-sharing arrangement. Bhutto, twice prime minister of Pakistan and currently leader of the popular opposition PPP party, is on the verge of deciding whether to strike a deal with Musharraf. Either way, she expects to leave her family shortly and go back to Pakistan. NEWSWEEK's Lally Weymouth sat down with Bhutto last week in New York. Excerpts:
WEYMOUTH: Some say that if you make a deal with President Musharraf to return to power, it will diminish your popularity.
BHUTTO: Many in my party have been urging me to distance myself from General Musharraf. They say his popularity ratings are down. But I am trying to convince them that the international community and the armed forces have confidence in Musharraf, and therefore we need to work out a solution [with him]. Now we are at a critical point where I am being tugged between those in my party who believe in dialogue and those who think that time is running out.
What have you asked Musharraf to do?
There is a package: we want a balance of power, reforms for a fair election, lifting of the ban on a twice-elected prime minister, as well as immunity for all holders of public office [in cases] where there are unproven charges that go back for a decade or two.
Did you tell Musharraf that he would have to step down as Army chief of staff if you enter into a partnership with him?
I told him that we could not have a working arrangement with the chief of Army staff. His term finishes either this November or December, so we are concerned that there should not be an extension of it.
What issues stand between you and Musharraf?
One is the power of the president to sack the Parliament at his discretion. This power was used in the '90s to destabilize democracy. In 10 years we had 10 governments. We believe this was actually done at the request of the security services. The political parties were discredited and the militants grew in strength. What stands between us right now is [the absence of] confidence-building steps which were promised and which we want done by the end of the month.
Such as?
Lifting the ban on a twice-elected prime minister. He said yes to that in July. And also immunity to holders of public office from 1988 to 2000. He said yes to that in January of this year.
In exchange for your support?
He doesn't want our support, but he doesn't want us going out in the streets and agitating against him.
What are the Americans saying?
Their message is: we want the stability of Pakistan, fair elections, and General Musharraf is our ally.
Can Musharraf get elected without your party?
Yes, [but] I advised him that it was better not to seek election from this assembly. He has a different perspective.
What do you say to critics who say you cannot control the Army?
I say that I controlled the Army better than any of the others: when I was prime minister, the tribal areas were part of Pakistan. Now their control has been ceded to militants and pro-Taliban forces.
If your deal materializes, will Musharraf control the Army?
Yes, but I don't want the security services to disagree with my attack on internal militancy and get him to sack the Parliament once again. Which is why the president must give up the power [to fire the Parliament]. In a perfect situation the prime minister should have the power over the armed services. But in this transition period, if Musharraf is still commander in chief of the armed forces, he will still appoint the Army chiefs.
Have you heard from him lately?
Yes. He's getting back to me by the end of the month. He has to decide. The person stopping him is [Muslim League president] Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain. He is telling Musharraf to go with the religious parties, and [saying that] we can get you re-elected and we don't need the PPP.
Can you make an alliance with Nawaz Sharif?
If our negotiations with Musharraf fall apart, we can always turn to the other political party.
So will you return to Pakistan?
I'm planning to go back between September and December. I need be there to strengthen my party and the moderate forces.
Are you worried you will be arrested?
I understand he may try to use state forces to stop me. There is a risk, but I am prepared to take it.
"The penalty good men pay for not being interested in politics is to be governed by men worse than themselves." --- Plato
Monday, August 27, 2007
Sunday, August 12, 2007
Pakistan's Disappeared by CBC
Watch here a heart-rending news report by CBC about Pakistan's Disappeared. Click Here
Tuesday, August 07, 2007
Ambassador Interview
Pakistani Ambassador in US Mahmud Ali Durrani's Interview With The Newsweek
Pakistan Ambassador Blasts U.S. Intel
Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States blasts Barack Obama and the National Intelligence Estimate conclusion that Pakistan is a safe haven for Al Qaeda.
By Michael Hirsh Aug 6, 2007
Pakistani Ambassador Mahmud Ali Durrani, a scholar and former general, says the government of President Pervez Musharraf is being unfairly blamed for the failure of U.S. intelligence to locate Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri. In an interview last week with NEWSWEEK’s Michael Hirsh at Pakistan’s Embassy in Washington, Durrani attacked as erroneous the recent National Intelligence Estimate that concluded Al Qaeda has “regenerated key elements” of its ability to attack the United States. The ambassador also argued that the agreement that Musharraf signed with North Waziristan’s Pashtun tribes in September 2006, which gave pro-Taliban tribal elders full control in the Pakistani region, is still intact, even though senior U.S. officials such as Homeland Security Adviser Frances Fragos Townsend say it hasn’t worked. Excerpts:
NEWSWEEK: Critics say Pakistan is not doing all it can to take out the Taliban and Al Qaeda. What’s your response?
Mahmud Ali Durrani: When [U.S. forces] act there’s often more collateral damage than killing the bad guys. We cannot afford that. Second, many times [American] information is faulty. It’s not timely. It’s inaccurate. It’s the same intelligence you’ve been getting in Iraq. People here [in Washington] take it as the gospel truth. We challenge that very seriously.
Why is the United States getting such bad information?
I don’t know. Sometimes the warlords will use you. There are many people in Afghanistan for whom continued violence and debstabilization works for them.
What about the National Intelligence Estimate and what it says about safe havens for Al Qaeda in North Waziristan?
It’s absolutely incorrect. There are no safe havens. Now, what is the definition of a safe haven? It is a place where they can stay and plan and operate from, and there is a kind of tacit approval by the government of Pakistan. This is preposterous. We will agree there may be odd people in hideouts. But there are no safe havens. And whenever we get information we take them out. Five or six times we’ve gone into Waziristan and Bajaur this year. We went after the training camps.
There are supposed to be these mud-hut compounds where the Taliban and Al Qaeda do their training.
This is an absolute fallacy. There is no compound like Fort Knox or Fort Benning. What a training camp in our area entails is a room about this size [pointing to his spacious office] where people can sleep at night. And then there is some space outside where they can train. And from the air it may just look like an innocent hut. … It’s not a compound, that’s totally false.
As you know, Barack Obama, the Democratic presidential candidate, suggested in a speech on Wednesday that if Musharraf doesn’t act in the tribal areas, the United States will have to. Your response?
I think [Obama] is a very able person, and I respect his views, but I totally disagree with him. I think he is misinformed as far as this goes. I mean, he qualifies it nicely in his speech. He says if Musharraf doesn’t act on information which is 100 percent accurate, then we will. Well, if it is 100 percent accurate and we get it, then we will take them out. [For the record, Obama said, “If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf won't act, we will.”] This seems to be a favorite topic—hitting Pakistan. It will weaken the position of the government in Pakistan if the Americans go in and hit bad guys, because even now the public in Pakistan feels the government is doing too much for the United States.
Where do you think the NIE judgments came from?
They must have been some Sigint [“signals” intelligence from the super-secret National Security Agency]. Some chatter that there is some movement, which is possible. But there are no safe havens, no planning cells.
Although some Britons of Pakistani descent who were allegedly involved in the July 7, 2006, bombings in London did go back to visit madrassas [Islamic religious schools] in Pakistan, that connection has never been confirmed.
That’s correct. Hypothetically, there may be some education there. There are people who have connections. But it’s not an operational center. You may go back to your high school. The planning doesn’t start there.
After the Red Mosque operation [when Musharraf sent in Army troops to clear out a mosque taken over by a radical cleric and his followers], there were indications that Zawahiri is more determined than ever to kill President Musharraf.
Because Musharraf is committed to doing what he has to do. We want to take out high-value targets whenever we can. There is cooperation between [American] intelligence and ours. … In the tribal area the agreement was signed with 35 elders, but there are spoilers in every movement. You have to understand the tribal culture. Even today, there are tribal leaders who are literally begging the government not to destroy this agreement.
So is the agreement still intact?
I think so.
Why haven’t we been able to get bin Laden and Zawahiri?
That was a failure of intelligence. As much a failure of [U.S.] intelligence, which has far greater resources, as ours. The track record is not very flattering.
You’ve heard the allegations that the Pakistani government will help to take out second- or third-tier Taliban or Al Qaeda, but because of the legendary status of bin Laden that there is unwillingness by Musharraf to target him.
This is not logical. We take second tier and leave the first tier, which is targeting Musharraf? Are we crazy? Are we nuts? People make fancy theories based on thin air. We would be happy to take him out in a second if we knew where he was. If we knew [where] Zawahiri was.
Where do you think they are?
I think they are floating. Nobody knows. Let’s say he was in Pakistan and [U.S.] intelligence had definite information. Do you think they would let us sit on our rear ends and do nothing about it?
Are you frustrated by the criticism of the NIE and Obama when you know there is so much cooperation going on behind the scenes? Particularly in the context of the new U.S. nuclear deal with India, and big aid packages going to Saudi Arabia and Egypt without any apparent conditions?
Afghanistan too. Absolutely. It is frustrating for Musharraf and everybody around him when people do this to Pakistan. Even the preamble to the NIE says that most of these assessments and judgments are not 100 percent accurate.
Though I will say there is solid reporting that in the wake of the Waziristan agreement there has been a re-establishment of Taliban and Al Qaeda-sympathizing elements in that area.
Yes, but whenever we get intelligence we take them out. What irritates us is that we are doing so much, much more than [the Americans are] doing. The threat to us is far greater.
Particularly in the wake of the Red Mosque operation, is there a new push now?
There is a new push for the last couple of months. Because we thought some of it was creeping outside the tribal areas—the terrorists and extremist thinking. We are going to upgrade our police forces and our paramilitary forces. That, we have determined, will take about six months. I think about 20,000 paramilitary we are going to add in tribal areas. In fact right now if you include FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] it’s over 120,000.
Pakistan Ambassador Blasts U.S. Intel
Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States blasts Barack Obama and the National Intelligence Estimate conclusion that Pakistan is a safe haven for Al Qaeda.
By Michael Hirsh Aug 6, 2007
Pakistani Ambassador Mahmud Ali Durrani, a scholar and former general, says the government of President Pervez Musharraf is being unfairly blamed for the failure of U.S. intelligence to locate Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri. In an interview last week with NEWSWEEK’s Michael Hirsh at Pakistan’s Embassy in Washington, Durrani attacked as erroneous the recent National Intelligence Estimate that concluded Al Qaeda has “regenerated key elements” of its ability to attack the United States. The ambassador also argued that the agreement that Musharraf signed with North Waziristan’s Pashtun tribes in September 2006, which gave pro-Taliban tribal elders full control in the Pakistani region, is still intact, even though senior U.S. officials such as Homeland Security Adviser Frances Fragos Townsend say it hasn’t worked. Excerpts:
NEWSWEEK: Critics say Pakistan is not doing all it can to take out the Taliban and Al Qaeda. What’s your response?
Mahmud Ali Durrani: When [U.S. forces] act there’s often more collateral damage than killing the bad guys. We cannot afford that. Second, many times [American] information is faulty. It’s not timely. It’s inaccurate. It’s the same intelligence you’ve been getting in Iraq. People here [in Washington] take it as the gospel truth. We challenge that very seriously.
Why is the United States getting such bad information?
I don’t know. Sometimes the warlords will use you. There are many people in Afghanistan for whom continued violence and debstabilization works for them.
What about the National Intelligence Estimate and what it says about safe havens for Al Qaeda in North Waziristan?
It’s absolutely incorrect. There are no safe havens. Now, what is the definition of a safe haven? It is a place where they can stay and plan and operate from, and there is a kind of tacit approval by the government of Pakistan. This is preposterous. We will agree there may be odd people in hideouts. But there are no safe havens. And whenever we get information we take them out. Five or six times we’ve gone into Waziristan and Bajaur this year. We went after the training camps.
There are supposed to be these mud-hut compounds where the Taliban and Al Qaeda do their training.
This is an absolute fallacy. There is no compound like Fort Knox or Fort Benning. What a training camp in our area entails is a room about this size [pointing to his spacious office] where people can sleep at night. And then there is some space outside where they can train. And from the air it may just look like an innocent hut. … It’s not a compound, that’s totally false.
As you know, Barack Obama, the Democratic presidential candidate, suggested in a speech on Wednesday that if Musharraf doesn’t act in the tribal areas, the United States will have to. Your response?
I think [Obama] is a very able person, and I respect his views, but I totally disagree with him. I think he is misinformed as far as this goes. I mean, he qualifies it nicely in his speech. He says if Musharraf doesn’t act on information which is 100 percent accurate, then we will. Well, if it is 100 percent accurate and we get it, then we will take them out. [For the record, Obama said, “If we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf won't act, we will.”] This seems to be a favorite topic—hitting Pakistan. It will weaken the position of the government in Pakistan if the Americans go in and hit bad guys, because even now the public in Pakistan feels the government is doing too much for the United States.
Where do you think the NIE judgments came from?
They must have been some Sigint [“signals” intelligence from the super-secret National Security Agency]. Some chatter that there is some movement, which is possible. But there are no safe havens, no planning cells.
Although some Britons of Pakistani descent who were allegedly involved in the July 7, 2006, bombings in London did go back to visit madrassas [Islamic religious schools] in Pakistan, that connection has never been confirmed.
That’s correct. Hypothetically, there may be some education there. There are people who have connections. But it’s not an operational center. You may go back to your high school. The planning doesn’t start there.
After the Red Mosque operation [when Musharraf sent in Army troops to clear out a mosque taken over by a radical cleric and his followers], there were indications that Zawahiri is more determined than ever to kill President Musharraf.
Because Musharraf is committed to doing what he has to do. We want to take out high-value targets whenever we can. There is cooperation between [American] intelligence and ours. … In the tribal area the agreement was signed with 35 elders, but there are spoilers in every movement. You have to understand the tribal culture. Even today, there are tribal leaders who are literally begging the government not to destroy this agreement.
So is the agreement still intact?
I think so.
Why haven’t we been able to get bin Laden and Zawahiri?
That was a failure of intelligence. As much a failure of [U.S.] intelligence, which has far greater resources, as ours. The track record is not very flattering.
You’ve heard the allegations that the Pakistani government will help to take out second- or third-tier Taliban or Al Qaeda, but because of the legendary status of bin Laden that there is unwillingness by Musharraf to target him.
This is not logical. We take second tier and leave the first tier, which is targeting Musharraf? Are we crazy? Are we nuts? People make fancy theories based on thin air. We would be happy to take him out in a second if we knew where he was. If we knew [where] Zawahiri was.
Where do you think they are?
I think they are floating. Nobody knows. Let’s say he was in Pakistan and [U.S.] intelligence had definite information. Do you think they would let us sit on our rear ends and do nothing about it?
Are you frustrated by the criticism of the NIE and Obama when you know there is so much cooperation going on behind the scenes? Particularly in the context of the new U.S. nuclear deal with India, and big aid packages going to Saudi Arabia and Egypt without any apparent conditions?
Afghanistan too. Absolutely. It is frustrating for Musharraf and everybody around him when people do this to Pakistan. Even the preamble to the NIE says that most of these assessments and judgments are not 100 percent accurate.
Though I will say there is solid reporting that in the wake of the Waziristan agreement there has been a re-establishment of Taliban and Al Qaeda-sympathizing elements in that area.
Yes, but whenever we get intelligence we take them out. What irritates us is that we are doing so much, much more than [the Americans are] doing. The threat to us is far greater.
Particularly in the wake of the Red Mosque operation, is there a new push now?
There is a new push for the last couple of months. Because we thought some of it was creeping outside the tribal areas—the terrorists and extremist thinking. We are going to upgrade our police forces and our paramilitary forces. That, we have determined, will take about six months. I think about 20,000 paramilitary we are going to add in tribal areas. In fact right now if you include FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] it’s over 120,000.
Sunday, August 05, 2007
'A Double-Edged Sword' - Benazir's Interview With Newsweek
'A Double-Edged Sword'
Pakistan's banished prime minister on talks with Musharraf that could pave her way back to power.
By Ron Moreau
Newsweek International
Aug. 13, 2007 issue - Benazir Bhutto, the exiled, two-time Pakistani prime minister, is now negotiating a political comeback with President Pervez Musharraf. Last week they reportedly met face to face in Abu Dhabi after months of back-channel talks. The two need each other. Bhutto wants to return to Pakistan to run in next year's elections—without having to face the corruption charges that drove her into exile. She also needs a repeal of the two-term limit for elected prime ministers. Musharraf, meanwhile, is grasping at straws: last month the Supreme Court overturned his suspension of the chief justice; his approval rating is an anemic 34 percent, and Islamic militants have launched a spate of attacks against his security forces, including two suicide bombings in Islamabad. He thus needs the support of Bhutto and her Pakistan People's Party—arguably the most popular political force in the country—if he hopes to be re-elected president. From her London home, Bhutto, 54, discussed Pakistan's political melodrama in a telephone interview with NEWSWEEK's Ron Moreau. Excerpts:
MOREAU: Did you meet with President Musharraf last week in Abu Dhabi?
BHUTTO: I know there's been widespread speculation, but both the presidency and the PPP have not officially said any meeting took place. Both sides have confirmed that there are negotiations going on.
Why such secrecy in the talks?
There's confidentiality about the level of the contacts and how they are taking place, but there's total transparency on the fact that talks are ongoing. We've been searching for a way to facilitate the transfer to democracy. We feel that fair elections are very important for Pakistan and that any attempt to rig the elections would create chaos in the country.
Did you strike any agreement with Musharraf?
We have covered some points, but there are others still to cover. These include steps that can be taken to ensure that the coming elections are fair and open to all political parties and leaders; lifting the ban on a twice-elected prime minister seeking office a third time; a balance of power between the president and the prime minister, and a level playing field for all political parties.
Will you insist that the president resign from the military before he is re-elected?
Both sides have agreed to differ on this issue. We believe that this is unconstitutional and will be challenged in Pakistan's apex court, leading to a fresh controversy and further uncertainty. Such a move would mean more instability.
Aren't some of your supporters disappointed that you're talking with Musharraf at a time when a united opposition could perhaps topple him?
I got a very sweet message from one of our followers who said he was very pleased that the PPP was talking to the regime to help a stable and smooth transition to democracy. I know there are people who feel we could get rid of [Musharraf] by coming onto the streets. But it's a double-edged sword. Coming out on the streets could give him a pretext for [declaring] an emergency or military rule.
Why aren't you cooperating with the Islamic political parties?
The PPP is uncomfortable associating with the alliance of religious parties known as the MMA. Their policies on extremism are ambiguous. The PPP wants the people of Pakistan to have a clear choice between the forces of the future and the forces of the past, between those who condemn extremism and those that don't.
How would you propose to combat rising Islamic extremism?
A PPP government would commit itself to restoring the rule of law in all of Pakistan; to the active engagement and pursuit of Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists; to the interdiction of the drug trade that funds terrorism; to the closing of those militant headquarters posing as political madrassas that house militants and teach hatred.
So when will you return to Pakistan?
Right now I can only say I'll be back before the end of the year.
During your two terms as prime minister, you were criticized for mismanaging the country. Would you be different this time?
The earlier experience taught me a lot. There's been plenty of time for reflection [since]. We have difficult relations with India and tensions with Afghanistan. I hope to work with other leaders in the region to bring about peace. And within Pakistan I hope we will be able to give transparent government and protect the free press.
Pakistan's banished prime minister on talks with Musharraf that could pave her way back to power.
By Ron Moreau
Newsweek International
Aug. 13, 2007 issue - Benazir Bhutto, the exiled, two-time Pakistani prime minister, is now negotiating a political comeback with President Pervez Musharraf. Last week they reportedly met face to face in Abu Dhabi after months of back-channel talks. The two need each other. Bhutto wants to return to Pakistan to run in next year's elections—without having to face the corruption charges that drove her into exile. She also needs a repeal of the two-term limit for elected prime ministers. Musharraf, meanwhile, is grasping at straws: last month the Supreme Court overturned his suspension of the chief justice; his approval rating is an anemic 34 percent, and Islamic militants have launched a spate of attacks against his security forces, including two suicide bombings in Islamabad. He thus needs the support of Bhutto and her Pakistan People's Party—arguably the most popular political force in the country—if he hopes to be re-elected president. From her London home, Bhutto, 54, discussed Pakistan's political melodrama in a telephone interview with NEWSWEEK's Ron Moreau. Excerpts:
MOREAU: Did you meet with President Musharraf last week in Abu Dhabi?
BHUTTO: I know there's been widespread speculation, but both the presidency and the PPP have not officially said any meeting took place. Both sides have confirmed that there are negotiations going on.
Why such secrecy in the talks?
There's confidentiality about the level of the contacts and how they are taking place, but there's total transparency on the fact that talks are ongoing. We've been searching for a way to facilitate the transfer to democracy. We feel that fair elections are very important for Pakistan and that any attempt to rig the elections would create chaos in the country.
Did you strike any agreement with Musharraf?
We have covered some points, but there are others still to cover. These include steps that can be taken to ensure that the coming elections are fair and open to all political parties and leaders; lifting the ban on a twice-elected prime minister seeking office a third time; a balance of power between the president and the prime minister, and a level playing field for all political parties.
Will you insist that the president resign from the military before he is re-elected?
Both sides have agreed to differ on this issue. We believe that this is unconstitutional and will be challenged in Pakistan's apex court, leading to a fresh controversy and further uncertainty. Such a move would mean more instability.
Aren't some of your supporters disappointed that you're talking with Musharraf at a time when a united opposition could perhaps topple him?
I got a very sweet message from one of our followers who said he was very pleased that the PPP was talking to the regime to help a stable and smooth transition to democracy. I know there are people who feel we could get rid of [Musharraf] by coming onto the streets. But it's a double-edged sword. Coming out on the streets could give him a pretext for [declaring] an emergency or military rule.
Why aren't you cooperating with the Islamic political parties?
The PPP is uncomfortable associating with the alliance of religious parties known as the MMA. Their policies on extremism are ambiguous. The PPP wants the people of Pakistan to have a clear choice between the forces of the future and the forces of the past, between those who condemn extremism and those that don't.
How would you propose to combat rising Islamic extremism?
A PPP government would commit itself to restoring the rule of law in all of Pakistan; to the active engagement and pursuit of Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists; to the interdiction of the drug trade that funds terrorism; to the closing of those militant headquarters posing as political madrassas that house militants and teach hatred.
So when will you return to Pakistan?
Right now I can only say I'll be back before the end of the year.
During your two terms as prime minister, you were criticized for mismanaging the country. Would you be different this time?
The earlier experience taught me a lot. There's been plenty of time for reflection [since]. We have difficult relations with India and tensions with Afghanistan. I hope to work with other leaders in the region to bring about peace. And within Pakistan I hope we will be able to give transparent government and protect the free press.
Saturday, August 04, 2007
BB Lobbyist Pushes US To Push Musharraf
Indian Muslims Website By Arun Kumar
Lobbyists for former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto' s Pakistan People's Party (PPP) are urging top Democrats to press the Bush administration and President Pervez Musharraf to promote free and fair elections in Pakistan this year.
Under contract with the PPP, lobbyists with BKSH & Associates have made dozens of contacts with Capitol Hill, the State Department and think tanks around Washington, the Hill - a Washington journal focusing on the US Congress - reported Thursday.
Advocates have distributed tough-talking letters on Pakistan's need for renewed democracy, signed by the Democratic chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations committees, Tom Lantos and Joseph Biden.
"Our key message has not wavered: Robust US support for free and fair, internationally monitored elections in Pakistan remains critical, as does US support for the safe return and participation of opposition candidates," a BKSH director, Lisa Cotter Colangelo, was quoted as saying.
Her firm has earned more than $80,000 since January for its work on behalf of Bhutto's party, according to records filed with the Justice Department.
The letters by members of Congress pull no punches. In a March 12 letter to Musharraf signed by Senators Biden, John Kerry, Patrick Leahy and Blanche Lincoln, the lawmakers argue that unless Bhutto's party and others can campaign freely, it will be difficult to treat the 2007 elections "as a true expression of democracy".
The senators' letter urges Musharraf to arrest Taliban officials believed to be hiding out along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. A recent National Intelligence Estimate described Pakistan as Al Qaeda's new safe haven.
Lantos and Biden also sent a letter June 1 to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asking her to "forcefully" raise the issue of Musharraf's actions against protesters with his government and make a "public appeal" for restoring "full democracy".
House member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen also signed the letter to Rice and so far is the lone Republican to side with Democrats in their criticism of Musharraf in the correspondence.
Letters by Biden and others are part of Bhutto's larger effort in America, the Hill said. Bhutto toured congressional offices in February, while PPP officials have visited Capitol Hill during the spring and summer.
Lobbyists for the party also have distributed a scathing report on Pakistan' s voter rolls, describing the lists as full of "errors, duplications and missing voters".
Using field analyses from a variety of officials from different Pakistani political parties, the "informal review" was published by the Centre for Civic Education Pakistan, a civic organisation based in the country, and received funding from the National Endowment for Democracy. Pakistan's 2002 elections were troublesome as well.
Lobbyists have handed out several articles critical of Musharraf, including columns by Bhutto and an editorial by The New York Times, entitled "Propping up the General".
But in choosing between Musharraf and Bhutto, Capitol Hill has not come to "a consensus view", according to a congressional aide with experience in foreign affairs cited by the Hill.
"There are those who toe the line with the administration and will not admonish Musharraf, even on free and fair elections," while others "take a pragmatic view and say perhaps we should encourage this coalition of Musharraf and Bhutto", the aide said.
Lobbyists for former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto' s Pakistan People's Party (PPP) are urging top Democrats to press the Bush administration and President Pervez Musharraf to promote free and fair elections in Pakistan this year.
Under contract with the PPP, lobbyists with BKSH & Associates have made dozens of contacts with Capitol Hill, the State Department and think tanks around Washington, the Hill - a Washington journal focusing on the US Congress - reported Thursday.
Advocates have distributed tough-talking letters on Pakistan's need for renewed democracy, signed by the Democratic chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations committees, Tom Lantos and Joseph Biden.
"Our key message has not wavered: Robust US support for free and fair, internationally monitored elections in Pakistan remains critical, as does US support for the safe return and participation of opposition candidates," a BKSH director, Lisa Cotter Colangelo, was quoted as saying.
Her firm has earned more than $80,000 since January for its work on behalf of Bhutto's party, according to records filed with the Justice Department.
The letters by members of Congress pull no punches. In a March 12 letter to Musharraf signed by Senators Biden, John Kerry, Patrick Leahy and Blanche Lincoln, the lawmakers argue that unless Bhutto's party and others can campaign freely, it will be difficult to treat the 2007 elections "as a true expression of democracy".
The senators' letter urges Musharraf to arrest Taliban officials believed to be hiding out along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. A recent National Intelligence Estimate described Pakistan as Al Qaeda's new safe haven.
Lantos and Biden also sent a letter June 1 to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asking her to "forcefully" raise the issue of Musharraf's actions against protesters with his government and make a "public appeal" for restoring "full democracy".
House member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen also signed the letter to Rice and so far is the lone Republican to side with Democrats in their criticism of Musharraf in the correspondence.
Letters by Biden and others are part of Bhutto's larger effort in America, the Hill said. Bhutto toured congressional offices in February, while PPP officials have visited Capitol Hill during the spring and summer.
Lobbyists for the party also have distributed a scathing report on Pakistan' s voter rolls, describing the lists as full of "errors, duplications and missing voters".
Using field analyses from a variety of officials from different Pakistani political parties, the "informal review" was published by the Centre for Civic Education Pakistan, a civic organisation based in the country, and received funding from the National Endowment for Democracy. Pakistan's 2002 elections were troublesome as well.
Lobbyists have handed out several articles critical of Musharraf, including columns by Bhutto and an editorial by The New York Times, entitled "Propping up the General".
But in choosing between Musharraf and Bhutto, Capitol Hill has not come to "a consensus view", according to a congressional aide with experience in foreign affairs cited by the Hill.
"There are those who toe the line with the administration and will not admonish Musharraf, even on free and fair elections," while others "take a pragmatic view and say perhaps we should encourage this coalition of Musharraf and Bhutto", the aide said.
Saturday, July 28, 2007
Musharraf Benazir Meeting And Pakistan
Those who wield power in Pakistan can always depend on their counterparts in the desert kingdoms of Arab families, especially seven poodle sized city fiefdoms unitedly called United Arab Emirates and the family-owned-and-run desert kingdom with added benefit of religious aura called Saudi Arabia. An urgent state visit invitation can be requested and had at only a Day's notice.
From Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, to Ziaul Haq, to Benazir Bhutto to Nawaz Sharif, to Musharraf every occupier of Islamabad has called these trusted allies in the times of distress.
Musharraf's visits to UAE and Saudi Arabia showed all the hallmarks of such an urgent distress call. Visits were announced by the Pakistani foreign ministry only on Thursday. Both the UAE president and its vice-president, who also serves as prime minister, were out of the country. But it did not matter. He needed help and the sooner the better.
Smarting from the Supreme Court verdict on the fired chief justice and hurt by exploding suicide bombers everywhere, including Islamabad, Musharraf limped to Abu Dhahbi on his way to Jeddah. Benazir was asked to abruptly interrupt her scheduled meetings to distribute parlamentary tickets to her party candidates in London. They both were brought "secretly" to meet yesterday in Abu Dahbi where the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed al-Nahayan presided over and signed as witness along with some British and American stake holders.
The tryst was essentially to finalize the prenuptial negotiations for the marriage of convenience. Musharraf wanted his sinking ship brought to safe harbors so he could stay in power and Benazir wanted to come back in out of the long self exile in cold and share the loot all over again. The only way out of their and the west's predicament was thought to be the mutual help and cooperation of 'enlightened moderates'. They will remove constitutional hurdles from each other's ways. The constitution has been amended to prohibit anyone from becoming prime minister more than twice and Musharraf faces constitutional hurdle of his own if he wants to cling onto his position as army chief while staying on as president.
As expected both sides are denying the meeting and the respective spokespersons are scrambling to make official statements giving the impression of just a bunch of heads of states going through the normal state business of discussing bilateral relations, chiefly "cooperation in fighting terrorism and extremism," and other regional issues. Even though he last visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia in January this year to do exactly the same.
Musharraf spokesman, Major General Rashid Qureshi, is vehemently refuting the reports of the meeting as "completely baseless." Even those in the know are leaking to the TV networks that the meeting, if it ever took place, ended in deadlock over the issue of whether Musharraf, who seized power in a bloodless coup in 1999, should be allowed to retain his dual role as army chief and president. Pakistani embassy spokesman in the UAE said he did "not know anything" about the reported meeting, while an aide at Bhutto's home in the nearby emirate of Dubai said he did "not have any information" about it.
Shaikh Rashid, Minister for Railways, on the other hand is saying that Musharraf and Benazir "held a successful meeting". Sher Afgan Khan Niazi, another minister said the two were trying to strike a deal to secure another term for the general while paving the way for Bhutto to return as prime minister.
The question on Pakistani minds is whether all this political maneuvering and somersaults will be enough to hold Pakistan's drift to self-immolation?
From Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, to Ziaul Haq, to Benazir Bhutto to Nawaz Sharif, to Musharraf every occupier of Islamabad has called these trusted allies in the times of distress.
Musharraf's visits to UAE and Saudi Arabia showed all the hallmarks of such an urgent distress call. Visits were announced by the Pakistani foreign ministry only on Thursday. Both the UAE president and its vice-president, who also serves as prime minister, were out of the country. But it did not matter. He needed help and the sooner the better.
Smarting from the Supreme Court verdict on the fired chief justice and hurt by exploding suicide bombers everywhere, including Islamabad, Musharraf limped to Abu Dhahbi on his way to Jeddah. Benazir was asked to abruptly interrupt her scheduled meetings to distribute parlamentary tickets to her party candidates in London. They both were brought "secretly" to meet yesterday in Abu Dahbi where the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed al-Nahayan presided over and signed as witness along with some British and American stake holders.
The tryst was essentially to finalize the prenuptial negotiations for the marriage of convenience. Musharraf wanted his sinking ship brought to safe harbors so he could stay in power and Benazir wanted to come back in out of the long self exile in cold and share the loot all over again. The only way out of their and the west's predicament was thought to be the mutual help and cooperation of 'enlightened moderates'. They will remove constitutional hurdles from each other's ways. The constitution has been amended to prohibit anyone from becoming prime minister more than twice and Musharraf faces constitutional hurdle of his own if he wants to cling onto his position as army chief while staying on as president.
As expected both sides are denying the meeting and the respective spokespersons are scrambling to make official statements giving the impression of just a bunch of heads of states going through the normal state business of discussing bilateral relations, chiefly "cooperation in fighting terrorism and extremism," and other regional issues. Even though he last visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia in January this year to do exactly the same.
Musharraf spokesman, Major General Rashid Qureshi, is vehemently refuting the reports of the meeting as "completely baseless." Even those in the know are leaking to the TV networks that the meeting, if it ever took place, ended in deadlock over the issue of whether Musharraf, who seized power in a bloodless coup in 1999, should be allowed to retain his dual role as army chief and president. Pakistani embassy spokesman in the UAE said he did "not know anything" about the reported meeting, while an aide at Bhutto's home in the nearby emirate of Dubai said he did "not have any information" about it.
Shaikh Rashid, Minister for Railways, on the other hand is saying that Musharraf and Benazir "held a successful meeting". Sher Afgan Khan Niazi, another minister said the two were trying to strike a deal to secure another term for the general while paving the way for Bhutto to return as prime minister.
The question on Pakistani minds is whether all this political maneuvering and somersaults will be enough to hold Pakistan's drift to self-immolation?
Monday, July 23, 2007
Greedy Generals, Hungry Beazir
Benazir Bhutto is behaving as if tomorrow has been ripped off of her calender and the only day she is left with is today's. She is in race against time. She does not care if Pakistan and its people go to hell and stay there for as long as she can get and stay in the seat of the prime minister.
She just can't wait to make a deal with the generals regardless of how little a piece of the pie she is allowed to get. She could care less if they were the ones who hanged her father and murdered her baby brother; and she lost power twice at their hands. When, in 1990, she was prime minister and was pregnent with her second child the general forced through a legislation prohibiting a prime minister from taking maternity leave, she elected to have the baby early by Caesarean section so she could remain in power.
She still wants to make a deal.
But why is she dying for power? The way things are going she is not going to get a lot. She just wants to start from where she had left off: robbing the people blind. She just wants her share in the spoils with the generals.
The looser Musharraf's grip gets on power the more impatient she becomes. Andrian Levy and Cathy Scott of the Guardian report that since September 11 2001, due to the US obsession with the "war on terror" General Pervez Musharraf has been at the center of power in Pakistan. The "long war" as the Americans love to call it the "war on terror" not going to go away in near future. They want it to go, at least, as long as they could drag out the Cold War.
Musharraf is getting all the attention and getting filthy rich at the same time. His generals are already into millions (of Pounds). She also wants to get in this lucrative game. The only way to do so is make a deal with the generals.
If the west has been willing to overlook Musharraf's military record as a close ally of the Taliban it can also ignore her contribution as Prime Minister in Taliban's rise. The west has turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to the fact that early in his career, Musharraf acted as military mentor to Pakistan's home-grown jihadi groups; rose to power in a coup d'état; deposed and exiled an elected prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, and has refused to restore democracy and doff his 'second skin'. Rather Bush has increased his "best friend's" aid by 45,000% (yes, forty five thousand per cent), which now totals more than $4bn.
That is a lot of money to go around. Why not some of it Benazir and Zar-Dari?
According to the Guardian "all that has changed"... "While Washington and London continue publicly to characterise Musharraf as the west's best hope of stopping Pakistan's descent into Islamic extremism, in reality they have concluded that it is the general who is easing the path of the jihadis. And he must be stopped.
The paper says: "Behind the back-slaps and bonhomie, a plot is afoot to remove the current military leaders and revive an old Pakistani dynasty". It will be a different kind of regime change. Without any shock and awe and without the loss of thousands of lives. The aim is "to restore democracy to Pakistan and reinstall Benazir Bhutto".
It all started back on June 20 2004, in a town called Blackburn in Lancashire, England. This little town was made famous by singer John Lennon of The Beatles when he featured Blackburn in his song "A Day in the Life". An article in the Daily Mail about a plan to fill potholes in the town caught his eye as he was writing the song, giving birth to the lyric: "I read the news today. Oh, boy. 4,000 holes in Blackburn Lancashire".
Other than 4,000 pot holes Lancashire had a Councillor named Salas Kiani, a British Pakistani, who had until recently served as the town's mayor helped by a 7,000-strong Pakistani population. He had invited Benazir Bhutto and some political friends to a dinner. Benazir's hopes of returning to power looker slimmer than ever as Musharraf's Pakistan had recently been readmitted to the Commonwealth after being suspended when Musharraf seized control; and, just four days earlier, President Bush had named the country as a major non-NATO ally.
She could only watch from the sidelines. Shortly after deposing Nawaz Sharif Musharraf had vowed never to let Bhutto return. After 9/11, the west forgot about Bhutto.
But then at the Blackburn dinner, Bhutto's host, Councillor Salas Kiani, "had a surprise for her. He passed Bhutto a mobile phone. "It's Jack for you," he said mischievously". It was Jack Straw, then foreign secretary. He was the Member of Parliament for Blackburn and knew Kiani well. Jack Straw invited her to come to the Foreign Office. It was the first official communication the PPP had had with a British government minister in more than a decade. Relations with the British had cooled after she was overthrown and her husband jailed. She and Zar-Dari had been accused by the Pakistan government of amassing an ill-gotten fortune, including a £2million Surrey country estate complete with stud farm and helipad - in stark contrast to life in Pakistan, where 37 million people lived below the UN poverty line. Jack Straw, then home secretary, refused to meet her. Now, in 2004, Straw was on the phone.
A month later, "Bhutto was brought to a side entrance of the Foreign Office, her trademark white dupatta pulled over her face". The meeting lasted more than an hour. She told Straw that Musharraf's "primary allegiance had been with the jihadi groups that the Pakistan media described as Musharraf's 'ethnic storm-troopers'."
Musharraf had been director general of military operations during Bhutto's second term as prime minister, and had requested permission to "unleash the forces of fundamentalism" - Sunni irregulars sponsored by the army and intelligence community - to infiltrate the Indian-controlled sector of the divided state of Kashmir. In 1996, when the Taliban had grown as a force in Afghanistan, it was Musharraf who ensured the movement was armed and fed.
Straw squirmed as this was recounted and reassured her that his government favoured democracy in Pakistan, but stressed that Musharraf, too, was important. She never told him though that in 1996, when she was the prime minister, Murtaza, her eldest brother was shot dead in an encounter with police in Karachi, for which her husband was indicted. She never let the case come to court.
Within weeks, Mark Lyall Grant, the British high commissioner in Islamabad, flew to Dubai to convey a message to Bhutto from Musharraf. The general was willing to make a gesture: her husband was to be released from jail. Perhaps she should now consider working with him?
Bhutto remained suspicious.
Zar-Dari was released from prison in December 2004.
In early 2005, Bhutto was invited back to the Foreign Office to talk about " a post-Musharraf world" but, the Guardian quotes a Foreign Office spokeswoman saying, "What London feared was chaos. What everyone wanted was a smooth transition, from Musharraf to something sustainable, preferably democratic. Bhutto had a chance of winning an election if that day came."
But the US was not in her corner yet, although Straw advised her that it was beginning to think about change. Condoleezza Rice, US secretary of state, was at that very moment in Islamabad pressing Musharraf to allow free elections.
A series of bombings on London's transport network four months later, in July 2005, killing 52 people and injuring hundreds more, brought a new urgency to the Straw-Bhutto talks. Three of the four British suicide bombers had links to a radical madrasa in Muridke, 20 miles outside Lahore. Straw noted that, in 2001, Musharraf had pledged to outlaw jihadi groups. The Muridke school was now one of 13,000 madrasas, none of which had been regulated as the president had undertaken to do.
Bhutto warned Straw that the PPP would have little chance, unless the Bush administration, too, was willing to look beyond Musharraf and back the call for elections. Straw insisted he had talked to Rice and Washington was reconsidering its position.
The aftermath of an earthquake that left 75,000 dead and more than three million homeless in the Pakistan-administered sector of Kashmir gave additional cause for concern in October 2005. Under the cover of providing aid to the victims, 17 Sunni extremist groups previously banned by Musharraf (under pressure from the US state department) re-emerged with new names. Distributing food, tents and blankets, they opened tent villages, one beneath a banner proclaiming: "Custodian of the blood of 10,000 mujahideen." The outlawed Lashkar-e-Taiba was there, running a field hospital in Muzaffarabad. "Why should we not allow our own people, to go there and assist... whether they are jiihadis or anybody," Musharraf said at the time.
Yet only a few months later, in early 2006, he was sending a new message to Bhutto, asking that she list her demands. She wrote: free elections; political prisoners released; an independent election commission formed; Pakistan's constitution [of 1973] restored. The reply came back almost immediately: Musharraf was not ready for this kind of deal.
Meanwhile, Bhutto had competition in London. On January 30 2006, Nawaz Sharif and his family arrived. Ensconced in their mansion-block apartment in Mayfair, he held court on a leopard-print sofa. "We were mobilising," Sharif tells us. "There could be no deals with Musharraf. No deals. Full stop. It was central to our charter for democracy. We hope Bhutto was acting sincerely when she signed it."
By now the Americans were on track and Musharraf at last agreed to hold a poll. It was to be staged after November 2007, when the National Assembly's term ran out. But he insisted that Bhutto and Sharif should not to be allowed to return until after the election. Prospective PPP parliamentary candidates began finding envelopes containing bullets left in their cars or on their desks - similar intimidatory tactics had been used in the previous election.
As direct contact was established between the US and Bhutto, the newly appointed US assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, Richard Boucher, urged her not to encourage PPP supporters to take to the streets in protest, as they had done on previous occasions. The PPP agreed. Over a series of meetings, Boucher made clear that the US would not be dealing with Sharif, whom they blamed for putting Pakistan at risk of nuclear war with India in a conflagration over Kashmir that flared up just a few months after both countries tested nuclear weapons.
"But by 2006, we didn't need the US," Sharif says. "It was time they realised that, in backing Musharraf in Pakistan, they were going to get their fingers burned, just like they did in Iran. Then, they had kept saying the Shah was safe until one day he was overthrown and the Ayatollahs took over the country. That could be Pakistan's future, too - Musharraf overthrown and the fundamentalists taking over. We are a better option, believe me. Regardless, I intend to go back. Like Bhutto, I have to go back and fight the election or be damned by our supporters." Sharif and his younger brother, Shahbaz, were working to rebuild their shattered party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), in Pakistan. But Nawaz Sharif was reluctant to talk dates and timings for his return - it sounded more like an aspiration than a plan.
On the other hand, Bhutto and Musharraf continued to sound each other out through emissaries. It seemed that a major sticking point was Musharraf's pride. He had never forgiven Bhutto for embarrassing him during a discussion they had about starting a war with India over Kashmir in 1993, when Musharraf had wanted the Pakistan army to launch a full-scale invasion on its own initiative. "This country is run by a civilian government," Bhutto recalls snapping. "I am still the prime minister."
In early 2007, President Bush made his first public criticism of Musharraf, warning that he had to be more aggressive in hunting down terrorists. Under pressure, Musharraf leaned toward a deal with Bhutto - if he could stay on as president. The talks stalled again, this time because Bhutto's supporters resented her being in cahoots with the general. Then Musharraf's emissaries came up with an even stranger proposal: if Bhutto stayed away from Pakistan during the election, Musharraf would "adjust the vote". A Bhutto aide said, "We could not believe it. He was offering to rig the election."
In Pakistan, unrest was building up, especially after Musharraf suspended Pakistan's chief justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. In the ensuing mass demonstrations, more than 40 people, many of them PPP supporters, were killed and 300 more were rounded up.
Bhutto stepped up her demands. "We wanted a free vote and I told them I was going back home to campaign for one." Then she made a remarkable concession: if she fought and won the election and became Pakistan's prime minister, Musharraf could stay on as a civilian president for the next five years. In another seismic shift, Bhutto proposed that the military retain responsibility for foreign affairs and national security over this five-year period, while her government would concentrate on the domestic agenda.
Publicly, all sides denied the talks. Nevertheless, a US state department spokesman, briefing the media on June 11, was positively bullish. "There are going to be some important elections coming up in the fall," he said, adding that Musharraf had pledged that, if he "continues in political life", he will "put aside the uniform".
Bhutto is committed to returning to Pakistan in September, and informal polls have shown that, despite the rampant extremism in the country, she is likely to dominate the elections. Her constituency in the Sindh had been battered but could be salvaged and built into a movement, she claims, while the tribal areas, in which the Taliban and jihadi groups had made the most inroads, are electorally insignificant.
For Bhutto, the recent siege at the Red Mosque was evidence of the calamity facing Pakistan. "The country is experiencing its darkest hour," she says - General Musharraf stood by while a religious institution was transformed into a 7,000-strong army of would-be jihadis in the heart of the capital. "Nothing is as General Musharraf portrays it," she says. "He talks of the army battling militants who are trying to get a toe-hold. In fact, in the border regions, there are thousands of new madrasas. And they are not just madrasas, they are mini-cantonments, ruling the tribal areas through terror. Free and fair elections are the last chance to halt the expansion of al-Qaida and the neo-Taliban."
Musharraf has reiterated that he is still committed to holding an election, but the pressing question now being asked is whether Bhutto, if elected, is capable of bringing Pakistan back from the brink.
When the military was last forced into free elections, it was in 1988, after a decade of Zia's increasingly unpopular military dictatorship. Then it stacked the odds in its favour by dumping leaflets from the air that bore humiliating, doctored photographs of Bhutto and her mother in bikinis, beneath the slogan "Gangsters in bangles". When Bhutto won, despite the slurs, military intelligence stepped up its covert campaign. Much was made of the fact that the publisher of Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses in the US was the same as for Bhutto's memoir, Daughter Of Destiny.
Bhutto was made to look like a woman of poor judgment. Weakened, she was forced out of office in 1990, and when she attempted to stand again in the election later that year, the ISI and military, according to documents lodged in the Pakistan supreme court, deployed a £1.5m slush fund with which they bribed religious candidates to slander Bhutto. The election was lost.
Seventeen years on, the Pakistan military, on the verge of conceding another election, may be even more vicious, having evolved into the most powerful economic entity in the country. The military have gone into business by stealth, accruing a fortune estimated at £6bn. Ayesha Siddiqa, a former research director for the Pakistan navy and author of Military Inc, which exposes the new-found wealth of Pakistan's armed forces, characterises Pakistan as "a racketeer state run by soldiers".
The military's empire has been built up by the auctioning of Pakistan's state assets to its own welfare organisations. Foundations established to look after servicemen and their families now run Pakistan's cement and fertiliser industries, as well as pharmaceuticals and telecommunications, banking, aggregates, aviation, transport and insurance. Everything - from the Tarmac people drive on to the petrol they put in their tanks, to the motorway tollbooths they can barely afford, to the road hauliers they hire - is owned by the military.
Since Musharraf came to power, originally choosing the title of Pakistan's chief executive, he has transformed Pakistan's market economy into a military one. The Army Welfare Trust, created in the 70s with a grant of only £6,000, now has assets of more than £200m. According to the IMF, such foundations control more than one quarter of Pakistan's economy. The personal wealth of Musharraf's key generals is estimated at £3.5m a head. And Musharraf himself, who has a combined salary of £700 a month for his jobs as president and army chief, has acquired a real-estate portfolio worth £5m.
Musharraf declined an interview with the Guardian. However, he has publicly commented on the military's business world, recently claiming, "We've got fertilisers, we're involved in banking, we are involved even in pharmaceuticals. So what is the problem? Why is anyone jealous? We do things well."
The Pakistan military, with their enormous economic clout, have become a new political class and ultimately might not care who wins the elections. Regardless of whether or not Benazir Bhutto returns to triumph at the polls, it is the military who will remain in power.
She just can't wait to make a deal with the generals regardless of how little a piece of the pie she is allowed to get. She could care less if they were the ones who hanged her father and murdered her baby brother; and she lost power twice at their hands. When, in 1990, she was prime minister and was pregnent with her second child the general forced through a legislation prohibiting a prime minister from taking maternity leave, she elected to have the baby early by Caesarean section so she could remain in power.
She still wants to make a deal.
But why is she dying for power? The way things are going she is not going to get a lot. She just wants to start from where she had left off: robbing the people blind. She just wants her share in the spoils with the generals.
The looser Musharraf's grip gets on power the more impatient she becomes. Andrian Levy and Cathy Scott of the Guardian report that since September 11 2001, due to the US obsession with the "war on terror" General Pervez Musharraf has been at the center of power in Pakistan. The "long war" as the Americans love to call it the "war on terror" not going to go away in near future. They want it to go, at least, as long as they could drag out the Cold War.
Musharraf is getting all the attention and getting filthy rich at the same time. His generals are already into millions (of Pounds). She also wants to get in this lucrative game. The only way to do so is make a deal with the generals.
If the west has been willing to overlook Musharraf's military record as a close ally of the Taliban it can also ignore her contribution as Prime Minister in Taliban's rise. The west has turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to the fact that early in his career, Musharraf acted as military mentor to Pakistan's home-grown jihadi groups; rose to power in a coup d'état; deposed and exiled an elected prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, and has refused to restore democracy and doff his 'second skin'. Rather Bush has increased his "best friend's" aid by 45,000% (yes, forty five thousand per cent), which now totals more than $4bn.
That is a lot of money to go around. Why not some of it Benazir and Zar-Dari?
According to the Guardian "all that has changed"... "While Washington and London continue publicly to characterise Musharraf as the west's best hope of stopping Pakistan's descent into Islamic extremism, in reality they have concluded that it is the general who is easing the path of the jihadis. And he must be stopped.
The paper says: "Behind the back-slaps and bonhomie, a plot is afoot to remove the current military leaders and revive an old Pakistani dynasty". It will be a different kind of regime change. Without any shock and awe and without the loss of thousands of lives. The aim is "to restore democracy to Pakistan and reinstall Benazir Bhutto".
It all started back on June 20 2004, in a town called Blackburn in Lancashire, England. This little town was made famous by singer John Lennon of The Beatles when he featured Blackburn in his song "A Day in the Life". An article in the Daily Mail about a plan to fill potholes in the town caught his eye as he was writing the song, giving birth to the lyric: "I read the news today. Oh, boy. 4,000 holes in Blackburn Lancashire".
Other than 4,000 pot holes Lancashire had a Councillor named Salas Kiani, a British Pakistani, who had until recently served as the town's mayor helped by a 7,000-strong Pakistani population. He had invited Benazir Bhutto and some political friends to a dinner. Benazir's hopes of returning to power looker slimmer than ever as Musharraf's Pakistan had recently been readmitted to the Commonwealth after being suspended when Musharraf seized control; and, just four days earlier, President Bush had named the country as a major non-NATO ally.
She could only watch from the sidelines. Shortly after deposing Nawaz Sharif Musharraf had vowed never to let Bhutto return. After 9/11, the west forgot about Bhutto.
But then at the Blackburn dinner, Bhutto's host, Councillor Salas Kiani, "had a surprise for her. He passed Bhutto a mobile phone. "It's Jack for you," he said mischievously". It was Jack Straw, then foreign secretary. He was the Member of Parliament for Blackburn and knew Kiani well. Jack Straw invited her to come to the Foreign Office. It was the first official communication the PPP had had with a British government minister in more than a decade. Relations with the British had cooled after she was overthrown and her husband jailed. She and Zar-Dari had been accused by the Pakistan government of amassing an ill-gotten fortune, including a £2million Surrey country estate complete with stud farm and helipad - in stark contrast to life in Pakistan, where 37 million people lived below the UN poverty line. Jack Straw, then home secretary, refused to meet her. Now, in 2004, Straw was on the phone.
A month later, "Bhutto was brought to a side entrance of the Foreign Office, her trademark white dupatta pulled over her face". The meeting lasted more than an hour. She told Straw that Musharraf's "primary allegiance had been with the jihadi groups that the Pakistan media described as Musharraf's 'ethnic storm-troopers'."
Musharraf had been director general of military operations during Bhutto's second term as prime minister, and had requested permission to "unleash the forces of fundamentalism" - Sunni irregulars sponsored by the army and intelligence community - to infiltrate the Indian-controlled sector of the divided state of Kashmir. In 1996, when the Taliban had grown as a force in Afghanistan, it was Musharraf who ensured the movement was armed and fed.
Straw squirmed as this was recounted and reassured her that his government favoured democracy in Pakistan, but stressed that Musharraf, too, was important. She never told him though that in 1996, when she was the prime minister, Murtaza, her eldest brother was shot dead in an encounter with police in Karachi, for which her husband was indicted. She never let the case come to court.
Within weeks, Mark Lyall Grant, the British high commissioner in Islamabad, flew to Dubai to convey a message to Bhutto from Musharraf. The general was willing to make a gesture: her husband was to be released from jail. Perhaps she should now consider working with him?
Bhutto remained suspicious.
Zar-Dari was released from prison in December 2004.
In early 2005, Bhutto was invited back to the Foreign Office to talk about " a post-Musharraf world" but, the Guardian quotes a Foreign Office spokeswoman saying, "What London feared was chaos. What everyone wanted was a smooth transition, from Musharraf to something sustainable, preferably democratic. Bhutto had a chance of winning an election if that day came."
But the US was not in her corner yet, although Straw advised her that it was beginning to think about change. Condoleezza Rice, US secretary of state, was at that very moment in Islamabad pressing Musharraf to allow free elections.
A series of bombings on London's transport network four months later, in July 2005, killing 52 people and injuring hundreds more, brought a new urgency to the Straw-Bhutto talks. Three of the four British suicide bombers had links to a radical madrasa in Muridke, 20 miles outside Lahore. Straw noted that, in 2001, Musharraf had pledged to outlaw jihadi groups. The Muridke school was now one of 13,000 madrasas, none of which had been regulated as the president had undertaken to do.
Bhutto warned Straw that the PPP would have little chance, unless the Bush administration, too, was willing to look beyond Musharraf and back the call for elections. Straw insisted he had talked to Rice and Washington was reconsidering its position.
The aftermath of an earthquake that left 75,000 dead and more than three million homeless in the Pakistan-administered sector of Kashmir gave additional cause for concern in October 2005. Under the cover of providing aid to the victims, 17 Sunni extremist groups previously banned by Musharraf (under pressure from the US state department) re-emerged with new names. Distributing food, tents and blankets, they opened tent villages, one beneath a banner proclaiming: "Custodian of the blood of 10,000 mujahideen." The outlawed Lashkar-e-Taiba was there, running a field hospital in Muzaffarabad. "Why should we not allow our own people, to go there and assist... whether they are jiihadis or anybody," Musharraf said at the time.
Yet only a few months later, in early 2006, he was sending a new message to Bhutto, asking that she list her demands. She wrote: free elections; political prisoners released; an independent election commission formed; Pakistan's constitution [of 1973] restored. The reply came back almost immediately: Musharraf was not ready for this kind of deal.
Meanwhile, Bhutto had competition in London. On January 30 2006, Nawaz Sharif and his family arrived. Ensconced in their mansion-block apartment in Mayfair, he held court on a leopard-print sofa. "We were mobilising," Sharif tells us. "There could be no deals with Musharraf. No deals. Full stop. It was central to our charter for democracy. We hope Bhutto was acting sincerely when she signed it."
By now the Americans were on track and Musharraf at last agreed to hold a poll. It was to be staged after November 2007, when the National Assembly's term ran out. But he insisted that Bhutto and Sharif should not to be allowed to return until after the election. Prospective PPP parliamentary candidates began finding envelopes containing bullets left in their cars or on their desks - similar intimidatory tactics had been used in the previous election.
As direct contact was established between the US and Bhutto, the newly appointed US assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, Richard Boucher, urged her not to encourage PPP supporters to take to the streets in protest, as they had done on previous occasions. The PPP agreed. Over a series of meetings, Boucher made clear that the US would not be dealing with Sharif, whom they blamed for putting Pakistan at risk of nuclear war with India in a conflagration over Kashmir that flared up just a few months after both countries tested nuclear weapons.
"But by 2006, we didn't need the US," Sharif says. "It was time they realised that, in backing Musharraf in Pakistan, they were going to get their fingers burned, just like they did in Iran. Then, they had kept saying the Shah was safe until one day he was overthrown and the Ayatollahs took over the country. That could be Pakistan's future, too - Musharraf overthrown and the fundamentalists taking over. We are a better option, believe me. Regardless, I intend to go back. Like Bhutto, I have to go back and fight the election or be damned by our supporters." Sharif and his younger brother, Shahbaz, were working to rebuild their shattered party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), in Pakistan. But Nawaz Sharif was reluctant to talk dates and timings for his return - it sounded more like an aspiration than a plan.
On the other hand, Bhutto and Musharraf continued to sound each other out through emissaries. It seemed that a major sticking point was Musharraf's pride. He had never forgiven Bhutto for embarrassing him during a discussion they had about starting a war with India over Kashmir in 1993, when Musharraf had wanted the Pakistan army to launch a full-scale invasion on its own initiative. "This country is run by a civilian government," Bhutto recalls snapping. "I am still the prime minister."
In early 2007, President Bush made his first public criticism of Musharraf, warning that he had to be more aggressive in hunting down terrorists. Under pressure, Musharraf leaned toward a deal with Bhutto - if he could stay on as president. The talks stalled again, this time because Bhutto's supporters resented her being in cahoots with the general. Then Musharraf's emissaries came up with an even stranger proposal: if Bhutto stayed away from Pakistan during the election, Musharraf would "adjust the vote". A Bhutto aide said, "We could not believe it. He was offering to rig the election."
In Pakistan, unrest was building up, especially after Musharraf suspended Pakistan's chief justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. In the ensuing mass demonstrations, more than 40 people, many of them PPP supporters, were killed and 300 more were rounded up.
Bhutto stepped up her demands. "We wanted a free vote and I told them I was going back home to campaign for one." Then she made a remarkable concession: if she fought and won the election and became Pakistan's prime minister, Musharraf could stay on as a civilian president for the next five years. In another seismic shift, Bhutto proposed that the military retain responsibility for foreign affairs and national security over this five-year period, while her government would concentrate on the domestic agenda.
Publicly, all sides denied the talks. Nevertheless, a US state department spokesman, briefing the media on June 11, was positively bullish. "There are going to be some important elections coming up in the fall," he said, adding that Musharraf had pledged that, if he "continues in political life", he will "put aside the uniform".
Bhutto is committed to returning to Pakistan in September, and informal polls have shown that, despite the rampant extremism in the country, she is likely to dominate the elections. Her constituency in the Sindh had been battered but could be salvaged and built into a movement, she claims, while the tribal areas, in which the Taliban and jihadi groups had made the most inroads, are electorally insignificant.
For Bhutto, the recent siege at the Red Mosque was evidence of the calamity facing Pakistan. "The country is experiencing its darkest hour," she says - General Musharraf stood by while a religious institution was transformed into a 7,000-strong army of would-be jihadis in the heart of the capital. "Nothing is as General Musharraf portrays it," she says. "He talks of the army battling militants who are trying to get a toe-hold. In fact, in the border regions, there are thousands of new madrasas. And they are not just madrasas, they are mini-cantonments, ruling the tribal areas through terror. Free and fair elections are the last chance to halt the expansion of al-Qaida and the neo-Taliban."
Musharraf has reiterated that he is still committed to holding an election, but the pressing question now being asked is whether Bhutto, if elected, is capable of bringing Pakistan back from the brink.
When the military was last forced into free elections, it was in 1988, after a decade of Zia's increasingly unpopular military dictatorship. Then it stacked the odds in its favour by dumping leaflets from the air that bore humiliating, doctored photographs of Bhutto and her mother in bikinis, beneath the slogan "Gangsters in bangles". When Bhutto won, despite the slurs, military intelligence stepped up its covert campaign. Much was made of the fact that the publisher of Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses in the US was the same as for Bhutto's memoir, Daughter Of Destiny.
Bhutto was made to look like a woman of poor judgment. Weakened, she was forced out of office in 1990, and when she attempted to stand again in the election later that year, the ISI and military, according to documents lodged in the Pakistan supreme court, deployed a £1.5m slush fund with which they bribed religious candidates to slander Bhutto. The election was lost.
Seventeen years on, the Pakistan military, on the verge of conceding another election, may be even more vicious, having evolved into the most powerful economic entity in the country. The military have gone into business by stealth, accruing a fortune estimated at £6bn. Ayesha Siddiqa, a former research director for the Pakistan navy and author of Military Inc, which exposes the new-found wealth of Pakistan's armed forces, characterises Pakistan as "a racketeer state run by soldiers".
The military's empire has been built up by the auctioning of Pakistan's state assets to its own welfare organisations. Foundations established to look after servicemen and their families now run Pakistan's cement and fertiliser industries, as well as pharmaceuticals and telecommunications, banking, aggregates, aviation, transport and insurance. Everything - from the Tarmac people drive on to the petrol they put in their tanks, to the motorway tollbooths they can barely afford, to the road hauliers they hire - is owned by the military.
Since Musharraf came to power, originally choosing the title of Pakistan's chief executive, he has transformed Pakistan's market economy into a military one. The Army Welfare Trust, created in the 70s with a grant of only £6,000, now has assets of more than £200m. According to the IMF, such foundations control more than one quarter of Pakistan's economy. The personal wealth of Musharraf's key generals is estimated at £3.5m a head. And Musharraf himself, who has a combined salary of £700 a month for his jobs as president and army chief, has acquired a real-estate portfolio worth £5m.
Musharraf declined an interview with the Guardian. However, he has publicly commented on the military's business world, recently claiming, "We've got fertilisers, we're involved in banking, we are involved even in pharmaceuticals. So what is the problem? Why is anyone jealous? We do things well."
The Pakistan military, with their enormous economic clout, have become a new political class and ultimately might not care who wins the elections. Regardless of whether or not Benazir Bhutto returns to triumph at the polls, it is the military who will remain in power.
Sunday, July 22, 2007
Americans And Muslims
Poll: Americans Are Mixed on U.S. Muslims
The latest NEWSWEEK Poll paints a complicated portrait of attitudes toward America's Muslims. By Brian Braiker. July 20, 2007
Americans are largely accepting of their fellow citizens who are Muslims, but remain worried about radicals inside the United States, according to a new NEWSWEEK Poll—the first the magazine has conducted on attitudes toward Islamic Americans. Forty percent of those surveyed believe Muslims in the United States are as loyal to the U.S. as they are to Islam. (Thirty-two percent believe American Muslims are less loyal to the U.S.) But close to half (46 percent) of Americans say this country allows too many immigrants to come here from Muslim countries.
A solid majority of Americans (63 percent) believe most Muslims in this country do not condone violence, and 40 percent tend to believe the Qur'an itself does not condone violence (28 percent feel it does). But 41 percent of Americans feel Muslim culture glorifies suicide.
Most Americans surveyed (52 percent) view Muslims who live here as more peaceable than those living outside the United States. (Only 7 percent think Muslims here are less peaceable.) Still, there is a high level of concern among Americans about Islamic radicals inside the United States. A majority of Americans report being either "somewhat" (38 percent) or "very worried" (16 percent) about radicals within the American Muslim community.
The concern over radicalism seems to translate into some support for FBI wiretapping of mosques. Roughly half (52 percent) of the poll’s respondents favor this kind of surveillance. The same number rejects the notion that Muslim Americans are unfairly singled out or profiled by law enforcement, while more than a third (38 percent) do think Muslims are unfairly targeted. Yet if a 9/11-style terrorist attack were to occur again, only 25 percent of Americans would support mass detentions of U.S. Muslims; a solid majority (60 percent) would oppose such detentions.
There are between 3 million and 6 million Muslims living in the United States. More than a third of adult Americans (36 percent) say they personally know a Muslim living in the United States. Fifty-two percent of those surveyed are aware that most Muslims in this country are immigrants; 19 percent believe most are converts born on U.S. soil. Nearly two thirds (64 percent) say they would have no objection to a son or daughter dating a Muslim, and slightly more (69 percent) think Muslim students should be allowed to wear headscarves in class (23 percent think they should not).
Americans are split on whether they would vote for a qualified Muslim for political office (45 percent would, and the same amount would not). Younger Americans tend to be more likely to vote for a Muslim candidate. More than half (57 percent) of Americans between the ages of 18 and 39 say they would cast their ballot for a qualified Muslim—a number that dips to 44 percent for the 40-59 crowd and drops to 32 percent among Americans 60 and older.
The NEWSWEEK Poll was conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International on July 11-12. Telephone interviews were conducted with 1,003 adults, age 18 and older; the overall margin of error is plus or minus 4 percentage points. The margin of error for questions asked only of Democrats and Democratic leaners is plus or minus 6 percentage points; for Republicans and GOP leaners, 7 percentage points.
The latest NEWSWEEK Poll paints a complicated portrait of attitudes toward America's Muslims. By Brian Braiker. July 20, 2007
Americans are largely accepting of their fellow citizens who are Muslims, but remain worried about radicals inside the United States, according to a new NEWSWEEK Poll—the first the magazine has conducted on attitudes toward Islamic Americans. Forty percent of those surveyed believe Muslims in the United States are as loyal to the U.S. as they are to Islam. (Thirty-two percent believe American Muslims are less loyal to the U.S.) But close to half (46 percent) of Americans say this country allows too many immigrants to come here from Muslim countries.
A solid majority of Americans (63 percent) believe most Muslims in this country do not condone violence, and 40 percent tend to believe the Qur'an itself does not condone violence (28 percent feel it does). But 41 percent of Americans feel Muslim culture glorifies suicide.
Most Americans surveyed (52 percent) view Muslims who live here as more peaceable than those living outside the United States. (Only 7 percent think Muslims here are less peaceable.) Still, there is a high level of concern among Americans about Islamic radicals inside the United States. A majority of Americans report being either "somewhat" (38 percent) or "very worried" (16 percent) about radicals within the American Muslim community.
The concern over radicalism seems to translate into some support for FBI wiretapping of mosques. Roughly half (52 percent) of the poll’s respondents favor this kind of surveillance. The same number rejects the notion that Muslim Americans are unfairly singled out or profiled by law enforcement, while more than a third (38 percent) do think Muslims are unfairly targeted. Yet if a 9/11-style terrorist attack were to occur again, only 25 percent of Americans would support mass detentions of U.S. Muslims; a solid majority (60 percent) would oppose such detentions.
There are between 3 million and 6 million Muslims living in the United States. More than a third of adult Americans (36 percent) say they personally know a Muslim living in the United States. Fifty-two percent of those surveyed are aware that most Muslims in this country are immigrants; 19 percent believe most are converts born on U.S. soil. Nearly two thirds (64 percent) say they would have no objection to a son or daughter dating a Muslim, and slightly more (69 percent) think Muslim students should be allowed to wear headscarves in class (23 percent think they should not).
Americans are split on whether they would vote for a qualified Muslim for political office (45 percent would, and the same amount would not). Younger Americans tend to be more likely to vote for a Muslim candidate. More than half (57 percent) of Americans between the ages of 18 and 39 say they would cast their ballot for a qualified Muslim—a number that dips to 44 percent for the 40-59 crowd and drops to 32 percent among Americans 60 and older.
The NEWSWEEK Poll was conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International on July 11-12. Telephone interviews were conducted with 1,003 adults, age 18 and older; the overall margin of error is plus or minus 4 percentage points. The margin of error for questions asked only of Democrats and Democratic leaners is plus or minus 6 percentage points; for Republicans and GOP leaners, 7 percentage points.
Friday, July 20, 2007
Amina's Judge Is Back In Chair
Amina sounded very upset and down over the phone on that fateful day, March 9. I had asked her how did it go in the court for her husband, Masood Janjua, and all those other missing Pakistanis whose cause she had taken on her slender shoulders and was fighting an uphill fight in the Supreme Court of Pakistan. She told me that she no more had a judge to listen to her case because Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry had been sacked by General Musharraf.After hearing the news this morning that Justice Chaudhry has been reinstated by a 13-member bench of the Supreme Court which threw out the government's accusations against him, I called her and found her ecstatic and besides herself.
Her judge is back and she thinks he can bring her husband back. She has been waiting for him since July 30, 2005 when he went missing. She believes and has heard from those who have seen him in detention that he is Pakistani intelligence agencies' illegal custody.
In Justice Chaudhry's absence the case of missing Pakistanis was being heard by two judges of the Supreme Court but it was moving with the pace of a tired lethagic snail.
“He was very fatherly,” she Told the New York Times, recalling a hearing on March 8 before Mr. Chaudhry. “I was insisting hard. I was in tears. He said: ‘Be comforted. We are using every channel, and every person is going to be released, and we are going to continue the hearings until the last person is released.’ ” She added: “On March 8, he was speaking like this. The very next day, he was not in his chair.”
Now he is back in chair. She believes he will push harder for her husband and other 'disappeared' Pakistanis' release. I hope her wish is fulfilled by him.
Thursday, July 19, 2007
Amina Janjua Embodies Cause of Disappeared
Pakistani Wife Embodies Cause of ‘Disappeared’: The New York Times Coverage of Amina Masood Janjua
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Sitting in the sparsely furnished office of her missing husband, Amina Masood Janjua counted the calls on a recent day from Pakistanis who have suffered a fate similar to hers. More and more are coming forward, she says, to report that their husbands, brothers or sons have disappeared under the rule of Pakistan’s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf.
“It used to be two cases every week,” she said. “Today, there were three. The numbers are incredible. I get cases when I’m driving. I have three diaries full of names.”
She and Pakistani human rights groups say that those who are missing have disappeared into the hands of Pakistan’s military and intelligence services since 2001. The total could be more than 400, they say.
While American intelligence officials say that General Musharraf has not done enough to crack down on militants in the country, human rights groups here assert that Pakistan’s security services have been sweeping up civilians and holding them incommunicado without charges since 9/11, when the government forged an alliance with the United States to fight terrorists.
They say the Bush administration has pushed the government to arrest people who are overtly religious or show an interest in radical Islamic thought. Most of the men who are reported missing wore full beards, a sign of religiosity.
The movement to free the missing men gathered momentum in October when Pakistan’s chief justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, decided to take up the cases. His boldness may have contributed to the decision by General Musharraf to suspend him on March 9.
But Mr. Chaudhry’s determination to challenge that decision by appealing to the Supreme Court and holding a series of rallies over the last few months has weakened the president and left other Pakistanis less fearful of standing up to the government. He has become the focus of a growing popular movement to restore civilian rule even as General Musharraf also comes under increasing pressure from radical Islamists.
That popular outpouring has given momentum to Defense of Human Rights, a group founded by Mrs. Janjua, and the nongovernmental Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, who are trying to locate and free the missing men.
Every two weeks in crowded sessions of the Supreme Court here, judges listen to the pleadings of women demanding to know the whereabouts of their husbands and sons and brothers, who they believe are locked up in government jails and safe houses.
Security officers, dressed in pressed khakis and black berets, are regularly dragged before the bench and asked to explain where the men — known here as the “disappeared” — are being held.
“At least tell me whether my husband is alive,” Mrs. Janjua pleaded at a recent Supreme Court hearing here in Islamabad.
The officers professed to have no inkling of the whereabouts of Masood Ahmed Janjua, 45, whose slightly smiling portrait Mrs. Janjua has held aloft outside government buildings for nearly two years.
One mother, Syeda Nargis, a diminutive woman swathed in black, travels four hours by bus from Lahore to the capital to attend the court hearings. It is a year since she waited at the Islamabad airport to greet her son upon his arrival from Dubai.
“He landed at 7 p.m.; I stayed until 1 a.m.,” she recalled, a color poster of her son Syed Imran Naqvi, 31, dressed in a tartan shirt, blazer and trim beard, clutched in her hands. “They said, ‘Maybe he will come after two or three hours.’ Now it is 12 months, and nothing has happened.”
Her son, a software engineer, was her main source of income, she said. “We spent so much money for him to be an engineer, not to go to jail,” she said. “Musharraf should tell us the reason, what is the problem?”
Asked specifically about the cases of the 400, a senior Pakistani government official said many of the people on the list had “religious links” with Afghanistan and had joined “militant organizations” there.
The official, Javed Iqbal Cheema, the director general of the National Crisis Management cell at the Ministry of Interior, said, specifically, that Mr. Janjua was close to Al Qaeda and the Taliban and was not in the Pakistani government’s custody.
Mrs. Janjua denies that assertion, saying that her husband was close to Tablighi Jamaat, a large Muslim organization involved in proselytizing whose membership includes former government officials. That group is also active in Britain, where some authorities contend that it serves as a conveyor belt for extremists.
Some of those who have been released by the government have been tortured, and their experiences have been sparingly reported. But for the most part they remain too afraid to describe publicly what was done to them, the leaders of the groups say.
About 60 of the detained have been released but as they have been freed others have been jailed, keeping the number of the missing at a fairly constant 400 since the beginning of the year, said Mrs. Janjua and the secretary general of the Human Rights Commission, Iqbal Haider.
The list of 400 does not include many more people, “perhaps thousands,” who have been arrested in Baluchistan and kept secretly for supporting the separatist movement in that province, said Mr. Haider, a former minister of justice in the government of Benazir Bhutto.
The most recent United States State Department human rights report on Pakistan said its human rights record “remained poor,” though that has not diminished the Bush administration’s support for the Musharraf government.
Among the methods of abuse used against people in custody, the report said, were “beating, burning with cigarettes, whipping the soles of the feet, prolonged isolation, electric shock, denial of food or sleep, hanging upside down, use of electric shocks and forced spreading of the legs with bar fetters.”
A former officer in the Pakistani Air Force, Khalid Khawaja, 56, who is well known for his good relations with a number of Islamic radical groups, was released from the Rawilipindi jail in late June after six months in custody.
Mr. Khawaja, a force behind Defense of Human Rights, said he was arrested and blindfolded in January, then shuffled around several prisons, including a new maximum-security one in Faisalbad. He was held in solitary confinement for long periods and denied medicine, he said.
His wife, Shamama Malik, turned up at every demonstration, and his son worked the phones to win his father’s freedom. “The Americans are getting all the people with religious motivation and taking them away,” Mr. Khawaja said angrily in an interview at his home the morning after his release.
Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui, the lawyer who has led the effort in the Supreme Court for the Defense of Human Rights, said the government had three laws, including the Security of Pakistan Act, under which it could detain people for specific periods. But none of them had been applied in the cases he was handling, he said.
“Even if some of the missing persons have some link with Osama bin Laden,” Mr. Siddiqui said, “they have to be treated in accordance with the law.”
So far, the Supreme Court seems to agree. Even with the chief justice’s suspension, the other justices have not shied away from hearing the cases, though Mrs. Janjua says she is convinced that Mr. Chaudhry’s determination to do so led to General Musharraf’s attempt to oust him.
“He was very fatherly,” she said, recalling a hearing on March 8 before Mr. Chaudhry. “I was insisting hard. I was in tears. He said: ‘Be comforted. We are using every channel, and every person is going to be released, and we are going to continue the hearings until the last person is released.’ ”
She added: “On March 8, he was speaking like this. The very next day, he was not in his chair.”
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