Reelection by Fiat

Washington Post Editorial Wednesday, September 19, 2007

Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf tries to dictate the terms for keeping a presidential office most Pakistanis want him out of.

LAST MONTH Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf seemed ready to rescue himself from a mounting political crisis by striking a deal with his country's secular political parties -- a step he should have taken long ago. Now, after unsuccessful negotiations with former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, he has returned to the practice of political fiat that has served his country so poorly over the past eight years. Last week Mr. Musharraf refused to allow another former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, to return to the country from exile, in direct violation of a ruling by Pakistan's Supreme Court. On Monday, the electoral commission his government controls issued a legally questionable ruling that would allow Mr. Musharraf to orchestrate his reelection as president in the next few weeks without giving up his position as army chief of staff.

Yesterday, Mr. Musharraf's lawyer told the Supreme Court, which is considering half a dozen legal challenges to the election scheme, that the president would retire from the army, but only after his reelection. That was less a concession than a threat to both Pakistan's centrist political parties and the court. Mr. Musharraf is in effect insisting that he be given another five-year mandate on his own terms, even though a large majority of Pakistanis want to see him step down and even though his election process violates the constitution on multiple grounds. If he does not get his way, Mr. Musharraf's allies are hinting that he will declare a state of emergency and dictate to the parties and the court.

The likely result of the general's actions is that, instead of uniting against the growing threat from Islamic extremist groups, Pakistan's secular institutions will continue to wage a destructive political war against each other. Their past records contain numerous blots, but the political parties of Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Sharif, like the Supreme Court, are pressing Mr. Musharraf and the army to respect the country's constitution and allow free parliamentary elections. The result could be a centrist government better able to confront al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other extremist movements. If he succeeds in imposing his own solution, Mr. Musharraf will deal a severe blow to the rule of law and further isolate and weaken himself.

It's doubtful that the general would pursue this course if not for the tolerance and support he enjoys from the Bush administration, which has repeatedly signaled that it prefers the short-term benefits of alliance with an autocratic general to the uncertainties and messiness of a return to democracy. The administration conspicuously did not criticize the deportation of Mr. Sharif last week and persistently describes Mr. Musharraf's anti-democratic moves as "an internal matter." The risks and dangers for the United States in Pakistan are unquestionably great. By failing to insist that Mr. Musharraf come to terms with the country's moderate and secular center, the Bush administration is making a bad problem worse.